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Glossary of Military Terms and Ranks
Missions
The former Yugoslavia
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force, UN-led mission in the former Yugoslavia, 
1992-1995
Dutchbat Dutch troops deployed in and around Srebrenica, the former Yugoslavia, as 
part of UNPROFOR, 1994-1995. Four rotations (Dutchbat 1 to 4) were deployed 
in total. The third rotation, Dutchbat III, was the battalion that experienced the 
fall of Srebrenica
Afghanistan
ISAF International Security Assistance Force, NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, 
2003-2014
TFU Task Force Uruzgan, Dutch troops deployed to Uruzgan, South Afghanistan, 
as part of ISAF, 2006-2010. Eight rotations (TFU 1 to 8) were deployed in total
OEF(-A) Operation Enduring Freedom, US-led operation in Afghanistan, 2001-2014
Military Terms
OP Observation Post
IED Improvised Explosive Device, also referred to as roadside bomb
TIC Troops In Contact, used to refer to a military engagement (combat)
OMF Opposing Military Forces
Ranks in the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces (simplified)
Enlisted ranks
Private / Aircraftman / Seaman / Marine (depending on military branch)
Corporal
Enlisted ranks: non-commissioned officers [NCO’s]
Sergeant
Sergeant Major
Warrant Officer 
Officers
Lieutenant
Captain
Major
Lieutenant-Colonel
Colonel 
General (Brigadier General; Major General; Lieutenant General; General)
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Maps of Mission Areas
Figure 1: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina1  Figure 2: Map of Srebrenica ‘Safe Area’ (area: ~150 km²)
Figure 3: Map of Afghani-
stan2   Figure 4: Map of Province of Uruzgan (area: 12.640 km²)
1  Map Data ©2017 Google 
2  Map Data ©2017 Google 
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Part One 
Setting the Stage
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Chapter 1. Introduction
A government decides to contribute troops to an international military intervention. On the 
mission, the deployed soldiers confront difficult circumstances. Casualties mount: among 
the opponents, among the own troops, and among civilians. Meanwhile, the mission is the 
subject of debate in parliament and media, which heats up when something happens to draw 
the legitimacy of the mission into question. How did it happen? Who is responsible? What 
should they have done differently? Was this mission not doomed from the start? Eventually, 
these questions are translated into Lessons Learned, to prevent similar failures in the future.
This is one way to describe military intervention and related issues of justice, responsibility 
and blame. Its bird’s view approach provides a structured and legible overview, allowing a 
clear understanding of a military mission’s course of events. As such, however, it offers only 
little insight into the experience of those involved in the mission.
Another way to describe an intervention is as follows. The veteran – still a young man – 
recounts the difficult circumstances he and his colleagues confronted while on deployment. 
Initially he speaks about his deployment and homecoming experience in a matter-of-fact 
and almost casual manner, yet visibly tenses when discussing disturbing experiences. He has 
struggled with lingering doubts about situations in which he made choices he did not want 
to make. Is he responsible for those people’s suffering? This question still haunts him. At the 
same time, he feels that he did what he did because he had no other option. He often asks 
himself, what were they doing there in the first place? The government sent them there with 
limited resources and then abandoned them to their fate. Over there, and back here.
On returning home, he started to work hard and party hard. He became aggressive, at 
work and at home, driven into a spiral of guilt and anger. At first, however, he did not link any 
of this to his deployment. Even so, he refused to talk about it because he was afraid of being 
condemned. Accusations about what they had done wrong over there would slice into him 
like a knife and infuriate him, because people had no idea of what had happened there. At the 
same time, the accusations hurt so much because self-reproach kept him up until early in the 
morning. Still, for a long time he thought he was fine, and that in fact he was the lucky one 
for not developing problems, up until his haunting thoughts and feelings finally made him 
collapse. He sought help and eventually received a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). Yet, even if his PTSD-focused therapy helped counter his persistent tension, it could 
not rid him of his feelings of guilt and anger. His family and friends insisted that nobody was 
to blame for what had happened, but he kept struggling with the sense that he and others 
should have acted differently.
In the present study, I adopt this second approach of considering moral dimensions of 
military practice from below, focusing on the experiences of Dutch veterans deployed to 
Srebrenica, the former Yugoslavia, and Uruzgan, Afghanistan, and on to what extent and how 
their experiences were embedded in the wider sociopolitical context of their missions. In 
doing so, I attempt to better understand how moral challenges at both the micro- and macro-
level affect soldiers ‘on the ground’ and potentially generate distress among them. 
17
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Moral Injury: Linking the Moral and the Psychological
Many of the stories I have collected over the past years are about perceived personal failure, 
betrayal of trust, guilt and anger, and suffering. Put differently, they are about questions of 
right and wrong, the psychological experience of distress, and the link between them. Both 
scientific and media discourses of military intervention, however, tend to separate these two 
topics.
The topic of moral questions surrounding military intervention is usually dealt with in 
the domains of political ethics and law. These domains discuss when military intervention is 
justified, what conduct is legitimate, and where responsibility lies in the case of transgression 
(see e.g. Walzer 1973, 1977, Ely 1993, Ó Tuathail 1999, Ramsey 2002, Evans 2005, Parrish 
2007, Cooper and Kohler 2009, Dorn 2011, Wijze 2012, Berkowitz 2013, Orend 2013). While 
this approach offers normative considerations for military practice, it does not necessarily 
yield insight into how soldiers struggle with questions of right and wrong and thus develop 
distress.
At the same time, the topic of soldiers’ distress is predominantly taken up in the medical 
domain, and conceptualized as post-traumatic stress disorder (Kienzler 2008, Scandlyn and 
Hautzinger 2014). In most Western countries, the concept has become so well-known that it 
is often only referred to by its acronym, and many war movies depict typical PTSD symptoms 
such as jumpiness and vivid flashbacks. Most current models of the disorder define PTSD 
as the result of exposure to (threatened) violence or injury, and identify fear as the reaction 
lying at the core of post-traumatic stress (DePrince and Freyd 2002, Litz et al. 2009, Drescher 
et al. 2011, Difede et al. 2014). Consequently, moral dimensions of trauma generally receive 
little attention (Shay 1994, Bica 1999, Litz et al. 2009, Drescher et al. 2011).
However, there is considerable evidence indicating that moral challenges encountered 
during deployment may engender profound suffering. Mental health practitioners working 
with veterans report that moral conflict is a significant element of many veterans’ struggles 
(Shay 1994, Drescher et al. 2011), and their observations resonate with academic research on 
this matter. In a survey conducted among US combat veterans, 10.8% reported engagement in 
moral transgressions, 25.5% reported transgressions by others, and 25.5% reported feelings 
of betrayal (Wisco et al. 2017). Another survey showed that 28% of US Iraq and Afghanistan 
veterans had encountered ‘ethical situations’, in which they ‘did not know how to respond’ 
(MHAT-V 2008, p. 58). Schut (2015), similarly, found that Dutch soldiers are often confronted 
by ‘morally critical situations’. Moreover, many studies find that a significant proportion of 
soldiers faced by such situations develop feelings of shame, guilt and/or anger (see e.g. Litz 
et al. 2009, Ritov and Barnetz 2014, Currier et al. 2015, Bryan et al. 2016, Frankfurt and Frazier 
2016, Jordan et al. 2017, Wisco et al. 2017). Though most of these studies focus on combat 
soldiers, and particularly on the moral impact of killing, others indicate that negative 
moral emotions may also arise in other deployment circumstances. A study among Dutch 
peacekeepers (Rietveld 2009), for instance, found that 25% felt guilty about their deployment 
experience, of which one third experienced distress due to their feelings of guilt.
The idea that war can be morally disrupting is ancient (see Shay 1994, 2002). However, 
systematic, comprehensive efforts to conceptualize moral dimensions of deployment-related 
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distress are relatively recent (Litz et al. 2009, Maguen and Litz 2012, Nash and Litz 2013, Shay 
2014). In 2009, psychologist Brett Litz and his colleagues introduced a preliminary, now often-
cited conceptual model of ‘moral injury’ (Litz et al. 2009, 2015, Nash and Litz 2013, Nash et al. 
2013). The model is intended to capture what current PTSD models fail to sufficiently address: 
moral dimensions of trauma. The general idea is that moral injury results from deployment 
experiences that affect a soldier’s moral foundations and thus cause suffering. Specifically, it 
is defined as the result of ‘an act of transgression that creates dissonance and conflict because 
it violates assumptions and beliefs about right and wrong and personal goodness’ (Litz et 
al. 2009, p. 689, see also Boudreau 2011, Drescher et al. 2011, Shay 2014). Although some 
symptoms assigned to moral injury overlap with those of PTSD, such as intrusive distressing 
memories, avoidance behavior and numbing, other symptoms are believed to be specific 
to moral injury, including demoralization, self-sabotaging behaviors and self-injury (Litz et 
al. 2009, Maguen and Litz 2012, Frankfurt and Frazier 2016). Also, whereas in current PTSD 
models feelings of guilt, shame and anger are readily approached as misplaced emotions 
that need to be corrected, in the concept of moral injury they are understood as possibly 
appropriate (Litz et al. 2009, Nash and Litz 2013). ‘Moral injury’, in short, addresses the link 
between moral issues of military intervention and psychological distress.
The concept of moral injury has attracted fast-growing attention in both academic and 
public discourse. Many studies are currently working on developing workable clinical models 
for moral injury. These studies seek to validate the concept with empirical evidence (e.g. 
Drescher et al. 2011, Maguen and Litz 2012, Vargas et al. 2013), facilitate the measurement and 
diagnosis of moral injury (Nash et al. 2013, Currier et al. 2015, 2017, Bryan et al. 2016, Koenig et 
al. 2018) and develop therapies for moral injury (Gray et al. 2012, Steenkamp et al. 2013, Paul 
et al. 2014, Laifer et al. 2015, Litz et al. 2015, Farnsworth et al. 2017, Griffin et al. 2017, Held 
et al. 2018). Such research is valuable. In addition to working on the validation, diagnosis 
and treatment of moral injury, however, it is important to take a step back and work on the 
concept itself, as it is still in its developmental stages. First, the concept needs empirical 
and theoretical development regarding the specific mechanisms at play (Maguen and Litz 
2012, Frame 2015, Frankfurt and Frazier 2016, Farnsworth et al. 2017). Moreover, as critical 
attitudes suggest, it may need modification. Though ‘moral injury’ is intended to address 
the moral aspects that current PTSD models fail to capture, the current concept still focuses 
on the ‘injury’ while attending too little to the ‘moral’ (Kinghorn 2012, Wilson 2014, Beard 
2015, Molendijk et al. 2018). Also, like current PTSD models, it decontextualizes deployment-
related trauma away from the people who send soldiers on a mission and welcome them back 
(MacLeish 2010, Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2014, Molendijk et al. 2018).
In the present study I address these gaps, aiming to advance the concept of moral injury 
by attending to three related issues. The first issue concerns questions about ‘the moral’ 
in ‘moral injury’. The current concept describes a person’s moral beliefs as a ‘code’ which 
may be violated by intruding acts (see e.g. Litz et al. 2009, Ritov and Barnetz 2014, Currier 
et al. 2015, Bryan et al. 2016, Frankfurt and Frazier 2016, Jordan et al. 2017, Wisco et al. 2017), 
a conceptualization that can be further developed and refined. As philosophical and social 
scientific studies teach us, moral beliefs do not constitute a harmonious system but a total 
of multiple, potentially competing values (e.g. Zigon 2008, Hitlin and Vaisey 2013, Tessman 
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2014). Soldiers internalize both civilian and military values, and as soldiers they are not 
merely instruments of the state who must adhere to political norms, but always remain 
moral agents with personal values (e.g. Baarda and Verweij 2006, Molendijk et al. 2018). 
In other words, soldiers have multiple moral commitments that may co-exist in tension, 
and it seems worthwhile to examine whether and how this complexity plays a role in the 
experience of ‘moral injury’.
The second and third issues concern the role of political practices and public debates in 
‘moral injury’. Both issues relate to the fact that soldiers – as civilians, soldiers, instruments 
of the state and so on – do not live in a social vacuum, but with reference to the political 
domain and society. The current concept of moral injury ‘keeps the emphasis on the 
individual soldier and his or her actions and away from the political and military leaders 
who ordered them into combat and the civilians, willingly or not, who stand behind them’ 
(Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2014, p. 15). However, political practices and public perceptions 
clearly have consequences for circumstances on the micro-level. They shape the ways in 
which soldiers are deployed and how soldiers are perceived and treated when they get back; 
they shape and constrain soldiers’ actions on deployment, and co-construct judgments 
on what soldiers have done or failed to do. Therefore, it is worth examining whether such 
political practices and public perceptions play a role in experiences of ‘moral injury’, and if 
so, in what ways.
 
Research Objectives and Questions
Before being able to translate the above considerations into specific research objectives 
and questions, I need to outline this study’s approach to the concept of moral injury. To 
refine and possibly modify this concept requires critical reflection on the concept itself, the 
phenomena it aims to capture and the relation between both. Therefore, rather than readily 
accepting the current moral injury concept as established fact, I will carefully observe the 
distinction between the concept of moral injury and the phenomena this concept seeks to 
understand – just as one may distinguish, for instance, between the psychiatric concept of 
‘major depressive disorder’ and the phenomena of feeling worthless, being unable to gain 
pleasure from activities, feeling restless and having trouble getting to sleep. 
Research on psychological concepts, particularly, is often plagued by reification, that is, 
by misreading analytical abstractions as ‘things’ existing in objective reality (Hyman 2010, 
Dehue 2011, Nesse and Stein 2012, Korteling 2014). To avoid confusion and explicitly refrain 
from reification, I use different terms for concept and phenomena, respectively. I use the 
term moral injury to refer to the concept of moral injury developed by Litz and colleagues (Litz 
et al. 2009, 2015, Nash and Litz 2013, Nash et al. 2013). This concept puts forward a particular 
psychological definition of the moral dimension of deployment-related suffering (a mental 
wound yet distinct from PTSD), a particular cause (transgression of the own moral code) and 
particular solutions (including therapy focused on self-forgiveness). The phenomena that 
this concept aims to capture, I label as moral distress, intended as a nonspecific, open term. 
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It is not intended as yet another theoretical concept alongside the moral injury concept, but 
simply as shorthand for ‘moral dimensions of deployment-related hurt or suffering’ for the 
lack of a shorter term.
Having clarified this, I can formulate the overall objective of this study: to advance the 
empirical and theoretical understanding of moral, political and societal dimensions of 
deployment-related moral distress, and in doing so, contribute to the concept of ‘moral 
injury’ and to practical interventions to address and prevent moral distress. This objective 
is achieved by examining (potential) moral dimensions of experiences of distress, and 
the (potential) role of political practices and public perceptions in experiences of moral 
distress, among Dutchbat and Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) veterans. For this endeavor, I 
draw on case study-oriented empirical research I conducted involving 40 Dutchbat veterans 
deployed to Srebrenica, the former Yugoslavia, and 40 Dutch TFU veterans deployed to 
Uruzgan, Afghanistan. ‘Veterans’ refers to persons who have been on a mission and may or 
may not still be serving on active duty.
Achieving the objectives involves examining the following research questions: 
what do (potential) moral dimensions of distress among veterans involve, what 
is the (potential) role of political practices and public perceptions in veterans’ 
experiences of moral distress, and what does this mean for the concept of ‘moral 
injury’ and for practical interventions to address and prevent moral distress? 
Examining these questions in turn involves the following steps (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Research Framework
The first step is a literature review of relevant existing studies from the fields of psychology, 
philosophy and social sciences regarding the topics of trauma, morality and sociopolitical 
aspects of mental suffering. The subsequent step involves a multiple case study among 
Dutchbat and TFU veterans, answering the following subquestions. 
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The individual level
1. How did Dutchbat and TFU soldiers in general interpret and cope with (potential) moral 
challenges related to their profession?
2. Did Dutchbat and TFU (ex-)soldiers report distress related to moral challenges, and if so, 
what did these challenges and experiences of distress entail?
Moral distress in relation to factors at the political level
3. Did political practices surrounding the Dutchbat and TFU missions, including decision-
making practices related to the mission design, its framing and practices in the mission’s 
aftermath, play a role in experiences of moral distress among deployed (ex-)soldiers, and 
if so, how?
Moral distress in relation to factors at the societal level
4. Did public perceptions of the Dutchbat and TFU missions and of the military in general, 
as expressed in for instance public debates, play a role in experiences of moral distress 
among (ex-)soldiers deployed on these missions, and if so, how?
The final step concerns determining the implications of the findings of this multiple case 
study. In terms of the theoretical implications, this involves answering the question of how 
the findings correspond with, add to or diverge from the current concept of moral injury, and 
how they contribute to the development and potential refinement of the concept. Reflecting 
on the findings involves translating them into practical implications for the question of how 
to address and decrease moral distress among (ex-)soldiers.
Relevance
This study takes up several critiques and appeals from different disciplines with regard to 
understanding deployment-related distress. First, it answers recent calls for research on moral 
aspects of mental health problems among veterans, termed moral injury (e.g. Boudreau 2011, 
Brock and Lettini 2012, Kinghorn 2012, Nash and Litz 2013, Farnsworth 2014, Meagher 2014, 
Shay 2014, Frame 2015). Second, it takes up persistent calls to address societal factors involved in 
war-related suffering, which overspill the boundaries of prevalent trauma models (Kleinman 
et al. 1997, Summerfield 2001, Withuis 2002, Kienzler 2008, Efraime and Errante 2012, Suarez 
2013, Daphna-Tekoah and Harel-Shalev 2017) as well as those of current conceptualizations 
of moral injury (MacLeish 2010, 2018, Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2014). Third, it responds 
to appeals to go beyond an understanding of psychological distress in terms of disease, 
and also appreciate such distress as more or other than pathological (e.g. Kleinman et al. 1997, 
22
Pa
rt
 I  
   S
ett
in
g 
th
e S
ta
ge
Ch
ap
te
r 1
   I
nt
ro
du
ct
io
n
Summerfield 2000, Withuis 2002, Das 2007, Kinghorn 2012, Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2013, 
Daphna-Tekoah and Harel-Shalev 2017). 
In responding to these calls, this study makes several contributions to knowledge. Overall, 
it goes beyond general assertions that military action has a moral impact on soldiers, toward a 
comprehensive understanding of specific factors at play in deployment-related moral distress, 
including in military operations other than war. Specifically, this study provides insight into 
the moral beliefs with which soldiers are deployed and return home, the characteristics of the 
situations they may encounter on and after deployment, and how they are affected by political 
practices and public perceptions surrounding their mission. Theoretically, this study’s main 
contribution lies in advancing the concept of ‘moral injury’, which originated in psychological 
circles, by contributing to the development and refinement of the concept regarding moral, 
political and societal dimensions of moral distress. In helping develop this interdisciplinary 
conceptualization of ‘moral injury’, this study furthers understanding of how the macro-
level sociopolitical context of military missions may affect soldiers’ individual experience of 
military practice, not only in war and combat, as is the focus of current research on ‘moral 
injury’, but also in peace support missions. In practical terms, this study provides therapists, 
counselors, military trainers and policy makers with suggestions for how to address moral 
distress at the individual, military, political and societal level.
 
Structure of the Dissertation
This Introduction and the next two chapters form Part I, which lays the groundwork for this 
study. Chapter 2 locates this research in relation to perspectives from various disciplines on 
the topics of trauma, morality and sociopolitical aspects of mental suffering. It provides both 
a review of relevant literature and a preliminary theoretical framework for the multiple case 
study. Chapter 3 specifies the methods and techniques this study used. Besides explaining the 
overall research strategy and elaborating on choices made for sampling, data collection and 
analysis, this chapter discusses epistemology, credibility, generalizability and research ethics.
Part II presents and analyzes the findings of the multiple case study. Chapter 4 sketches an 
overview of the Dutchbat and TFU missions, in anticipation of the subsequent four chapters, 
which discuss and analyze in detail various aspects of these missions. In these chapters, the 
focus moves from moral dimensions of deployment-related distress at the individual level 
(Chapters 5 and 6), to the role of political factors (Chapter 7) and societal factors (Chapter 8) 
in moral distress.
Chapter 5 explores how Dutchbat and TFU veterans in general – including those who 
do not develop distress – made sense of their deployment and (potential) moral challenges 
related to their profession. The purpose is to gain insight into the ways in which soldiers 
generally attempt to prevent moral distress, to better understand when and why moral 
distress does arise. The veterans’ stories indicate that soldiers generally do not experience as 
much moral tension as one might expect considering their operational circumstances. Yet, 
the veterans’ accounts also show that it does not mean that soldiers never experience tension, 
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and when they do, they tend to employ justifying simplifications to resolve it, relying on 
the belief that all situations are ultimately uncomplicated and soluble. Foreshadowing the 
subsequent chapters, Chapter 5 concludes that while such a belief may work in many cases as 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, it may exacerbate confusion and distress when conflicts turn out 
to be truly irresolvable.
Chapter 6 zooms in on veterans who reported distress related to moral challenges, 
examining the morally distressing experiences that emerged in their stories. It turns out 
that these were often not clear-cut experiences of wrongdoing (the focus of current studies 
on moral injury), and accordingly did not allow straightforward interpretations (which 
soldiers tend to employ). While veterans felt guilt and anger, they often also experienced 
uncertainty and conflict with respect to these feelings. That is, many developed a profound 
sense of moral disorientation, meaning that they lost their trust not only in the goodness 
of themselves and the world, but also in the very notions of good and bad. This painful loss 
forced them to engage in an ethical struggle, in order to find moral re-orientation again.
Chapter 7 relates the experiences of moral distress among Dutchbat and TFU veterans 
to the political practices that surrounded their mission. Specifically, this chapter examines 
how political decision-making and narratives played a role in the emergence of particular 
quandaries for soldiers ‘on the ground’, both on and after deployment, and how this in turn 
resulted in morally distressing experiences. This investigation reveals that the Dutchbat and 
TFU missions had far more in common than not. Both missions shared several fundamental 
problems at the political level, and as these problems remained unresolved, they affected 
soldiers at the micro-level. Moreover, political compromises did not always mean that 
problems were solved, but instead often implied that conflicts were left to the lower levels to 
deal with. As a result, many soldiers developed profound feelings of political betrayal and, in 
turn, sought reparations from the political leadership.
Chapter 8 turns to the role of public perceptions in moral distress. Specifically, it examines 
the public condemnation that Dutchbat veterans faced and the mixed reactions that the TFU 
mission evoked. This chapter finds that not only public criticism but also admiration may 
be experienced as misrecognition, and that perceived societal misrecognition may directly 
and indirectly contribute to moral distress. At the same time, it becomes clear that not just 
veterans struggle with the moral significance of military intervention, but society does as 
well. Yet, in neither mission did this lead to a rapprochement between soldiers and society. On 
the contrary, how public debates tried to resolve societal discomfort with the missions only 
alienated veterans further from society. To complicate matters, the societal misrecognition 
that many veterans experienced engendered not only a sense of estrangement from society, 
but also from themselves.
Part III reflects on the theoretical and practical implications of the research findings. 
Chapter 9 answers this study’s research questions, summarizing the major findings and 
turning them into a refined concept of moral injury. Also, it reflects on the broader theoretical 
contributions of this study and proposes possible directions for future research. Chapter 10 
is devoted to translating the research findings into practical implications and considerations 
for the individual, military, political and societal level.
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Chapter 2. Toward a Broader Theoretical Approach to Moral Distress 
Introduction: ‘Trauma and far more’
Peter1 sits in the corner of the bar, where he has a clear view of the place, including entrance 
and exit. In the hours that follow, we speak about his deployment as a Dutchbat III soldier 
stationed just outside of the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica, and about the aftermath of his 
deployment. He tells me about witnessing his buddy’s death, about being unable to do 
anything when Srebrenica fell – his company was not allowed to go there when it happened 
– and about how these experiences affected him. 
‘I wanted to help people. And then you find out the world is rotten’, Peter says. ‘I have a 
trauma, because of what happened with [my buddy]. But it’s far more than that’. When I ask 
him what that ‘far more’ is, he summarizes: feeling helpless, feeling guilty about his own 
inaction, being abandoned by the UN and the Dutch government, and being accused in the 
Dutch media. He goes on to say that he is ‘lucky’ that he witnessed the terrible death of his 
buddy, because this event entitled him to a PTSD diagnosis and thus to ‘recognition and 
compensation’. Had he not experienced that, he says, he perhaps ‘would have felt almost 
just as shitty as I do now’, but he would not have received recognition and compensation. He 
knows many colleagues who have missed out on this because they were never diagnosed with 
a deployment-related illness. Then again, Peter tells me, although the therapy he received 
for his PTSD helped him, he has always held ‘a feeling of dissatisfaction’. He kept feeling 
‘it wasn’t finished’, that his therapy mainly focused on his buddy’s death and insufficiently 
addressed the ‘far more’.
To understand deployment-related suffering as PTSD is to regard it as a medical condition 
characterized by specific symptoms. According to the most recent official definition, PTSD 
diagnosis requires ‘exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence’, 
either directly or indirectly (DSM-V 2013, p. 271). Also, it requires the following symptoms: (1) 
recurrent intrusive memories of the trauma (for instance re-experiencing in nightmares) (2) 
avoidance of trauma-related stimuli (for instance by evading certain situations), (3) negative 
changes in thoughts and mood, and (4) heightened arousal and reactivity (for instance 
jumpiness) (DSM-V 2013, pp. 271–272).
It is impossible to determine whether Peter would have been diagnosed with PTSD had he 
not been exposed to the death of a close colleague. Yet, it is conceivable that a psychologist 
or psychiatrist would hesitate to judge his indirect exposure to the fall of Srebrenica as 
fulfilling the required criteria. On the basis of symptoms, a PTSD diagnosis is not easy to 
make either. Many of the symptoms associated with PTSD (sleep disturbance; avoidance 
behavior; negative changes in thoughts and mood; heightened arousal) overlap with those 
of other conditions, such as depressive and anxiety disorders (Richardson et al. 2010, DSM-V 
2013, p. 265). 
1  As will be explained in chapter 3, all names are pseudonyms to help ensure the veterans’ anonymity. 
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In addition to the difficulty of diagnostic practice, Peter’s story highlights issues of 
addressing and treating deployment-related distress. Many prevalent PTSD treatment 
models are based on the notion that post-traumatic stress is rooted in exposure to life-threat 
and in resultant fear-responses (see e.g. DePrince and Freyd 2002, Litz et al. 2009, Drescher 
et al. 2011, Difede et al. 2014). Yet, Peter’s story is not only about life-threat and fear, but also 
about perceived injustice, feelings of guilt, abandonment and condemnation. Like Peter, 
several veterans told me that their therapist kept focusing on a particularly violent incident – 
such as an IED attack and/or a colleague’s death – while they also wanted to talk about other 
events, which did not always involve direct exposure to violence but nevertheless caused 
great distress because they violated deeply held values.
The violation of values lies at the core of the concept of moral injury. Distinct from the 
fear-based traumas associated with PTSD, moral injury is about transgressions of beliefs of 
right and wrong, and accordingly, about feelings of shame, guilt and anger (Litz et al. 2009, 
Drescher et al. 2011). As such, this concept has the potential to fill the space left by the concept 
of PTSD. However, it requires development with respect to dimensions that go beyond the 
conventional focus of psychological approaches. Not only does the current concept employ 
an understanding of morality that can be further developed and refined, it also tends to leave 
the broader political and societal context of moral distress out of the frame. 
In philosophy and social sciences, there are many studies of trauma, morality and the 
sociopolitical aspects of mental suffering. The insights these studies yield can contribute to 
a more substantial understanding of the factors possibly involved in moral distress. In this 
chapter, I discuss these insights, producing a state-of-the-art overview of relevant literature 
and, simultaneously, an initial theoretical framework from which to approach stories such 
as Peter’s. Throughout the remainder of this study, empirical findings will prompt the adding 
of further theoretical insights, which will be discussed in the chapters of Parts II and III, 
together with the case study results from which they emerged.
In the following sections, I first elaborate on the origin and rise of the concept of PTSD. 
Subsequently, I discuss the increasing tendency to understand deployment-related suffering 
in medical terms and the implications thereof. Next, I discuss the value and potential of 
the concept of moral injury, as well as its current shortcomings. In order to address these 
shortcomings, I discuss various insights on the complex nature of morality and on what has 
been dubbed ‘social suffering’. In doing so, I set the stage for examining, in the subsequent 
chapters, whether and how moral complexities at both the individual and sociopolitical level 
relate to experiences of moral distress among veterans.
 
PTSD and Moral Injury
The Origin and Rise of PTSD
In 1980, ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ was introduced in the third edition of the official 
classification guide of psychiatrists, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III 1980). Currently, PTSD constitutes the dominant explanatory model for the 
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suffering of veterans (Summerfield 2001, Withuis and Mooij 2010, Hautzinger and Scandlyn 
2013). However, it is not the first concept to acknowledge the psychological impacts of war. 
However, it is not the first concept to acknowledge the psychological impact of war. Before 
1980, it was already well established that the stress of combat could cause suffering – known 
over time as ‘combat fatigue’, ‘shell shock’ and ‘war neurosis’. Toward the end of World War 
One, there were psychiatrists and doctors who stated that ‘everyone had a breaking point’ 
(Jones and Wessely 2007, p. 173). At the same time, the history of war neuroses did not follow 
a linear course, but entailed a back-and-forth movement between different views on war-
related suffering (Shephard 2001). The twentieth century, for instance, witnessed a repeated 
pendulum swing between the notion that trauma was due to individual predisposition, on 
the one hand, and an emphasis on external causes of trauma, on the other (Shephard 2001).
In the Vietnam era, individual predisposition ‘became the fault-line across which 
American psychiatry split’ (Shephard 2004, p. 50). While it was acknowledged in the 1960s 
and ‘70s that war can cause people to break down, the dominant belief was that when 
soldiers failed to recover within a certain period of time, this was predominantly due to 
other factors. Especially the then-older psychiatrists thought that in most cases, soldiers’ 
problems were the result of childhood trauma or innate predisposition to mental illness, 
which war had merely ‘triggered’ (Scott 1990, Shephard 2004, Jones and Wessely 2007). The 
Vietnam war, however, fueled an important change in this view, largely due to the efforts of 
anti-war psychiatrists and veterans, who advocated the introduction of ‘post-traumatic stress 
disorder’ in the DSM-III (Scott 1990, Shephard 2004, Jones and Wessely 2007). PTSD officially 
shifted the cause of persistent war-related psychological problems from the internal, namely 
the person’s personality and background, to the external, namely a traumatic event (ibid). 
It was now officially acknowledged that serious mental problems could also be caused by 
trauma in one’s adult life. An external event, not the distressed person, was to ‘blame’ for 
persistent distress. In fact, claiming that personal characteristics are also involved in an 
individual’s response to stressors became a controversial statement to make (Shephard 
2004, p. 54).
Since its introduction, the PTSD concept has changed in several ways. In the DSM-
III of 1980, the traumatic event was defined as ‘a recognizable stressor that would evoke 
significant symptoms of distress in almost everyone’ and the stressor was described as 
‘generally outside the range of usual human experience’ (DSM-III 1980, pp. 238; 236). In the 
latest edition, DSM-V, it is defined more specifically as exposure to ‘actual or threatened 
death, serious injury, or sexual violence’ (DSM-V 2013, pp. 271–272). Relatedly, studies on 
PTSD initially included d a wide range of symptoms. Currently, most studies are centered 
on fear, meaning that they are founded on the assumption that fear lies at the core of post-
traumatic stress (Lee et al. 2001, DePrince and Freyd 2002, Drescher et al. 2011, Nash and Litz 
2013). Another important change concerns the perceived role of individual predispositions in 
the development of PTSD symptoms. As mentioned, DSM-III turned previous views on war-
related suffering on their head by emphasizing external rather than internal causes. More 
recently however, studies have started to point out again that severe stressors do not always 
produce long-term distress, thus swinging the historic pendulum somewhat back toward 
pre-individual predispositions (Nash et al. 2009). For instance, research found soldiers who 
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had suffered childhood abuse to be at increased risk of developing PTSD symptoms (Zaidi 
and Foy 1994). 
Currently, behavioral and cognitive psychology constitute the dominant approach in 
research on PTSD, as opposed to for instance psychodynamic approaches (Finley 2011). For 
example, PTSD is often approached in terms of maladaptive conditioned fear responses and 
distorted cognitions (Finley 2011). The dominance of behavioral and cognitive psychology 
is in line with general trends favoring such approaches in the field of psychology (Robins et 
al. 1999, Pilgrim 2011). Furthermore, potential genetic and neurobiological aspects of PTSD 
are increasingly studied, again in correspondence with broader developments in the field 
of mental health research. Extensive research is being conducted on biological markers 
that could indicate the presence of PTSD in an individual, thereby validating the objective 
existence of the PTSD classification (Lehrner and Yehuda 2014, Schmidt et al. 2015). As yet 
no unequivocal biomarker has been identified for PTSD (Lehrner and Yehuda 2014) – or for 
any other mental disorder (Nesse and Stein 2012, Sokolowska et al. 2015) – but progress has 
been made in other respects. For instance, it has been found that specific psychobiological 
changes may occur in people with PTSD diagnoses (Stein et al. 2007, Fragkaki et all. 2016).2 
Generally, research indicates that the acute reactions of animals (such as mice) to life-threat 
are comparable to those of humans (Yehuda and LeDoux 2007, Daskalakis et al. 2016). Apart 
from all these developments, the essence of the concept of PTSD has remained the same, 
namely that of a traumatic event causing symptoms in an individual.
Limitations of PTSD Understandings
While much valuable research has been and is still being conducted on PTSD, it has also 
evoked much debate and criticism. In particular, the concept of PTSD is surrounded by 
discussion.
A main issue – mentioned in the Introduction – concerns the general reification of 
mental disorders, which is worthy of discussion in order to better comprehend criticisms 
specifically directed at the PTSD concept. Many scholars, as well as DSM itself, warn that 
mental disorders cannot be understood as tangible ‘things’ with a certain content and clear 
boundaries, explicating that a ‘disorder’ is a standardized collection of clinical descriptions 
of people’s behavior, not an objectively identifiable entity in the mind of a person (Faust 
and Miner 1986, Radden 1994). In a similar vein, some scholars take the fact that extensive 
research has failed to result in the identification of a specific biomarker for any disorder to 
argue that the psychiatric classification system is not ‘tidy’ but ‘blurry’. Mental disorders 
may overlap, they argue, and it is impossible to distinguish one from the other completely 
objectively (Nesse and Stein 2012). Some scholars go so far as to reject the idea that biomarkers 
could ever validate a disorder all together, calling this a fallacy (Morse 2008, Dehue 2011). 
2 The amygdala and hippocampus areas of the brain seem to play a critical role in fear-related change (Difede et al. 2014). 
Activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis leads to arousal and sleeplessness (Daskalakis et al. 2016, Fragkaki 
et al. 2016). Findings suggest a possible biological susceptibility to developing symptoms considered typical for ‘PTSD’. 
For instance, a small hippocampus volume and an inability to produce enough cortisol may increase the probability of 
developing typical ‘PTSD’ symptoms (Yehuda and LeDoux 2007, Daskalakis et al. 2016).
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Even if a biomarker were found, they argue, it would not prove the independent existence 
of a disorder. One can identify the marker of a disorder only after defining the disorder, that 
is, after having first developed a concept of what that disorder is. A biomarker would only 
tell us something about the differences between people with and without the diagnosis of 
a disorder, not anything about the disorder itself. In short, these scholars argue, a disorder 
necessarily remains a concept, an analytical abstraction.
 Starting from this notion, several scholars have examined the genealogy of the scientific 
conceptualization of PTSD. They argue that introducing the PTSD concept is not merely the 
result of scientific progress, but also of particular political processes (as they maintain is 
always the case) (see e.g. Scott 1990, Young 1997, Shephard 2001). The previous section has 
touched upon these processes, namely the efforts of anti-war psychiatrists and veterans 
to have veterans’ suffering recognized were intimately linked to their political criticism 
of the Vietnam War. Yet, paradoxically, while this politically informed struggle led to the 
introduction of a psychiatric concept that recognizes military suffering, the medicalization 
of suffering immediately implied its depoliticization (cf. Summerfield 2004, Fassin and 
Rechtman 2009). The current concept frames PTSD simply as a psychiatric response to a 
traumatic event, much like how animals respond to extreme danger.
At first glance, it may seem that the medicalization process has freed the concept of PTSD 
from all bias. But ignoring political dimensions is just as biased as highlighting them. Like 
all concepts, PTSD is an explanation, an interpretation, and, inevitably, a judgment. It is 
a story in a nutshell about someone’s suffering (cf. Withuis 2010, Dehue 2011, Molendijk et 
al. 2016). It says something about the nature of the suffering, including about whether it is 
normal or abnormal. It specifies where the disorder, the disruption, lies: in the individual, 
in external events, or in the system. And, as such, it suggests who and what is responsible for 
the suffering, and who and what is not. 
Through the story of ‘PTSD’, deployment-related suffering has become both ‘normalized’ 
and ‘medicalized’. On the one hand, it is now often described as ‘a normal reaction to an 
abnormal event’ (Nash et al. 2009, p. 791, Meichenbaum 2011, p. 325). This normalization of 
deployment-related suffering helps to destigmatize the troubled veteran, releasing him as it 
were from blame for his suffering. Growing evidence that traumatic events affect the brain 
(Pitman et al. 2012) contributes to the idea that a breakdown is not the result of a lack of 
moral fiber, but of an external event affecting a person’s biology. Considered as such, the 
veteran is neither weak nor crazy, nor did he do anything wrong in war; he ‘simply’ suffers a 
mental combat wound, and his nightmares, doubts and anger stem from that wound (Jones 
and Wessely 2007).
On the other hand, through the story of ‘PTSD’ deployment-related suffering has become 
medicalized. It has become a psychiatric disorder, a medical condition characterized by 
‘not so normal’ thoughts and behavior on the part of the suffering individual. As such, it 
is understood as a problem in the head of the soldier, and thus as a problem that should 
be addressed by means of training and treatment of soldiers, not by changing the context 
in which they operate.3 Accordingly, the story of ‘PTSD’ absolves those actors who place 
3	 This	development	is	in	line	with	a	broader	shift	in	how	western	societies	appreciate	suffering	and	deviant	behavior;	from	
religious	understandings	of	moral	deficiency,	to	medical	understandings	of	mental	illness	(Foucault	2006).
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the soldier in potentially traumatizing circumstances from responsibility. That is, it does 
demand governments (and by extension, militaries) to take responsibility for the suffering 
of their veterans, but by establishing medical treatment programs, governments can free 
themselves from having to review the circumstances in which they put soldiers in the first 
place (cf. Fassin and Rechtman 2009).
The two sides of ‘PTSD’ (normalization and medicalization) have moral and sociopolitical 
consequences. Framing deployment-related suffering as PTSD entitles a suffering veteran 
to symbolic and material recognition. But simultaneously it removes his distress from the 
moral and sociopolitical domain by treating it as a purely medical issue characterized by 
his individual dysfunctional thoughts and feelings. This is especially the case when PTSD 
is understood in terms of fear-related changes in brain areas. Although this understanding 
has value in its own right, it inevitably fails to address moral and sociopolitical questions. It 
does not attend to moral aspects of a soldier’s own actions in deployment-related suffering, 
or to the political assignments on which the soldier is sent to war, or to the ways in which the 
soldier is perceived by society at home.
Moral Injury: Promises and Limitations
The concept of moral injury emerged from discontent with the marginal attention that 
current PTSD models pay to potential moral dimensions of veterans’ struggles (Shay 1994, 
Bica 1999, Litz et al. 2009, Drescher et al. 2011). The psychiatrist Shay (1994) and veteran/
philosopher Bica (1999) are both cited as coining the term ‘moral injury’ (Dokoupil 2012, 
Kirsch 2014). Psychologist Litz and his colleagues played an important role in systematically 
conceptualizing the notion (Litz et al. 2009, 2015, Drescher et al. 2011, Maguen and Litz 2012, 
Nash and Litz 2013). They developed a much-cited preliminary model of moral injury, which 
served as the foundation of an increasing number of psychological studies (Steenkamp et 
al. 2013, Vargaset al. 2013, Currier et al. 2015, Frame 2015, Laifer et al. 2015, Bryan et al. 2016, 
Frankfurt and Frazier 2016, Farnsworth et al. 2017). With ‘moral injury’, they do not aim to 
replace the concept of PTSD, neither do they propose it as a new diagnosis. Rather, they aim 
to capture particular experiences in ways that deviate from dominant understandings of 
PTSD (see also Table 1). 
Litz and colleagues argue that whereas some characteristics of PTSD may overlap with 
what they call moral injury (e.g. intrusions, avoidance behavior and numbing), in other ways 
moral injury is unique (Litz et al. 2009, 2015, Nash and Litz 2013). As opposed to the fear-related 
responses that are central to PTSD models, they place moral emotions such as shame and 
guilt at the core of their model. Their definition of ‘potentially morally injurious experiences’ 
also deviates from the traumatic experiences defined in the PTSD concept. While these 
experiences may or may not involve (threatened) death, violence or injury – requirements for 
a PTSD diagnosis – Litz and colleagues’ definition centers on moral transgression, namely ‘[p]
erpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply 
held moral beliefs and expectations’ (Litz et al. 2009, p. 700). 
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To be sure, the idea that war can be morally compromising is not new. As Shay (1994, 2002) 
emphasizes, descriptions of moral suffering are found in ancient texts on war, such as the 
Iliad and the Odyssey. Considering recent texts, the theme is reflected in Grossman’s well-
known study on killing (1995), which puts forwards the moral aspect of killing rather than 
the threat of being the object of violence as an important source of post-traumatic stress. 
Killing-induced guilt is also an important theme in the work of psychiatrist Lifton (1973), 
who played a key role in introducing PTSD to the DSM (see e.g. Scott 1990, Shephard 2001), 
making it remarkable that current PTSD models pay so little attention to moral dimensions of 
trauma. However, this does not mean that moral struggles have gone completely unnoticed. 
DSM-III, for instance, mentions ‘survivor guilt’, referring to guilt about surviving a situation 
when others have not as a possible symptom of PTSD. Though this symptom ceased to be 
listed in later editions of DSM, it still appeared as a potential coexisting feature (Marshall 
et al. 1999). Moreover, in the most recent DSM classification of PTSD, blame and self-blame 
re-occur as possible symptoms. The DSM-V classification includes, as part of the criterion 
‘negative alterations in cognitions and mood’, the potential symptom of ‘persistent, 
distorted cognitions about the cause or consequences of the traumatic event(s) that lead the 
individual to blame himself/herself or others’ (DSM-V 2013, p. 272). Generally, DSM-V has 
moved ‘PTSD’ from the category of ‘anxiety disorders’ to the newly introduced category of 
‘trauma and stressor-related disorders’, allowing a wider range of traumatic responses (see 
DSM-V 2013).
Nevertheless, systematic efforts to conceptualize moral dimensions of deployment-
related suffering, namely through the concept of moral injury, are relatively new. Also, though 
current PTSD models do acknowledge potential feelings of guilt and shame, they approach 
these emotions in a particular way. First, they treat blame of self or others as one of many 
symptoms of trauma-related distress, not as a potential source. Second, they tend to approach 
blame as misguided and misplaced. The DSM classification of PTSD explicitly defines blame 
of self or others as the result of ‘distorted cognitions’ and ‘exaggerated negative beliefs’ 
(DSM-V 2013, p. 272), resonating with existing psychological approaches to trauma-related 
guilt. Edward Kubany, for instance, conceptualizes ‘combat-related guilt’ as ‘irrational guilt’, 
based on ‘false assumptions and faulty logic’ (1994, p. 5). 
In contrast to these PTSD-based approaches, Litz and colleagues stress that negative 
judgments about events may be ‘quite appropriate and accurate’ (Litz et al. 2009, p. 702). 
Although blame may be ‘unfair and destructive’, they state, ‘it is equally unhelpful to suggest 
to morally injured persons that no one is at fault’. Instead, ‘each person’s culpability is usually 
somewhere between none and all, and many people share responsibility for any outcome’ 
(Nash and Litz 2013, p. 372). Furthermore, they emphasize, for a person to be able to hold onto 
the idea of a moral self, it is important to judge a bad act as such (Litz et al. 2009, p. 703). For 
this reason, instead of recommending efforts to alleviate feelings of guilt or anger, Litz and 
colleagues propose other procedures. They recommend ‘imaginal dialogues’ with a moral 
authority figure, discussing and apportioning blame in a fair way, and making amends. As 
part of these procedures, they propose ‘Socratic questioning’ and suggest that engaging in 
discussions ‘within religious and spiritual frameworks is potentially instrumental’ in the 
treatment of moral injury (Litz et al. 2009, pp. 702; 704). The goal of these procedures is that 
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the veteran will eventually be able to forgive himself or others (Litz et al. 2009, Nash and Litz 
2013).
Thus, in contrast to the current PTSD concept, the concept of moral injury explicitly 
attends to moral dimensions of deployment-related suffering, and it does so in promising 
ways. However, the concept is still very much in its developmental stages. While praised for 
its cross-disciplinary potential, the concept has drawn criticism for being predominantly a 
psychological construct (Kinghorn 2012, Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2014). Some have pointed 
out that the concept only focuses on moral injury as a dysfunction that must be treated 
while failing to actually venture into the ethics of war (Kinghorn 2012, Wilson 2014, Beard 
2015). Others, in addition, have signaled that it decontextualizes deployment-related trauma 
from the political leaders who send soldiers into war and the civilians who ‘welcome’ them 
back (MacLeish 2010, Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2014). As I argued in an exploratory article 
that prompted the present study (Molendijk et al. 2018), the concept of moral injury needs 
to go beyond a strictly psychological approach in at least two ways. First, it would benefit 
from moral philosophical perspectives that can help to develop a better appreciation of 
the complexity of morality. Second, because military intervention is not an individual 
endeavor but a sociopolitical enterprise, and because morality is generally a socially shaped 
phenomenon, the concept would benefit from social scientific perspectives, which would 
help to capture the role of contextual factors in moral distress. In the following sections, I 
take up these issues. In doing so, I attempt to construct a broader theoretical framework to 
examine moral distress.
Table 1: Dominant Understandings of Distressing Deployment Experiences 
Current conceptualization of PTSD Current conceptualization of Moral 
injury
Event (Life-)threat Moral transgression
Significance One’s sense of safety is violated One’s sense of ‘what’s right’ is violated
(Perceived) role in event Victim;	witness Victim;	witness;	responsible	agent
Characteristic responses Fear-related responses Moral emotions
How to understand guilt, 
shame, anger
Exaggerated negative beliefs about 
the	self	and	the	world;	resulting	from	
distorted cognitions
Guilt, shame and anger may be 
considered appropriate and accurate
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Toward a Broader Theoretical Approach to Moral Distress
Issue 1: The Complex Nature of Moral Beliefs
Adequately theorizing the role of morality in moral distress is crucial for understanding what 
‘moral injury’ entails. When questions about the complex nature of morality go unaddressed, 
unsubstantiated assumptions about trauma’s moral dimensions and its implications are 
easily incorporated, leading to the risk of complex issues being approached reductively. In 
the current concept, the general idea is that moral injury is the result of an act that violates a 
soldier’s beliefs about right and wrong (e.g. Litz et al. 2009, Drescher et al. 2011, Nash et al. 2013, 
Vargas et al. 2013, Currier et al. 2015). The concept speaks of violations of one’s ‘deeply held 
moral belief and expectations’ (Litz et al. 2009), and a resultant ‘loss of trust in previously 
deeply held beliefs about one’s own or others’ ability to keep our shared moral covenant’ 
(Nash and Litz 2013, p. 368, see also Farnsworth et al. 2014, Litz et al. 2015, Frankfurt and 
Frazier 2016). A person’s moral beliefs are thus understood as a coherent system of values that 
may be violated by intruding acts. Yet, no consideration is given to the possibility of values 
being in conflict with one another (see also Molendijk et al. 2018). This implicit approach 
to moral beliefs as a harmonious unity gives rise to questions when considered from the 
perspectives of philosophical and social scientific studies. An important insight drawn from 
these disciplines is that an individual embodies multiple and potentially competing moral 
beliefs and assumptions (e.g. Williams 1973, Baarda and Verweij 2006, Zigon 2008, Hitlin and 
Vaisey 2013, McConnell 2014, Tessman 2014). In this section, I will discuss this issue and its 
implications in more detail. 
A person’s moral beliefs and expectations are essentially both personal and social 
(Bandura 1991, Haidt and Joseph 2004). While specific moral beliefs and expectations may 
differ in people, they do not develop in a social vacuum. Individuals develop them through 
the socialization process of becoming members of a community. The community provides 
assumptions and meanings through which they understand their experience and make 
moral judgments about what is acceptable and unacceptable conduct, creating a moral 
compass that guides their actions (cf. Bandura 1991, Haidt and Joseph 2004, Zigon 2008, 
Hitlin and Vaisey 2013). Childhood constitutes an important period of moral socialization, 
yet the process of internalizing moral beliefs and expectations never stops. Interacting with 
others – including parents, friends, communities and social institutions – an individual 
continuously elaborates and alters acquired values and norms, and adopts new ones (cf. Van 
Gennep 1909, Bandura 1991, Eriksen 2001, Zigon 2008). 
So, whereas some moral concerns may be found world-wide (Haidt and Joseph 2004, 
Cassaniti and Hickman 2014), morality is ‘thick’, meaning that values and norms are shaped 
by their specific sociohistorical context (Walzer 1994). An individual’s moral beliefs are 
developed with reference to the different groups of which he is a member, such as religious 
groups, generational distinctions and organizations. Accordingly, morality can both serve as 
a glue binding groups together and be a source of conflict between groups (Zigon 2007, 2008, 
Hitlin and Vaisey 2013). Moreover, conflict may arise within the individual. A person lives and 
acts on a daily basis, within a range of social levels (e.g. group, organization, nation) and a 
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range of social contexts (e.g. different ethnic cultures, professional cultures) (see e.g. Eriksen 
2001, Hanna 2004, Baarda and Verweij 2006). As a result, rather than owning an orderly and 
harmonious system of values, a person embodies multiple moral commitments, which at 
times make conflicting demands, creating tensions that need to be managed (Hanna 2004, 
Baarda and Verweij 2006, Laidlaw 2014, McConnell 2014, Tessman 2014). 
Managing moral tensions is not a rational endeavor, like solving brainteasers. Only in 
laboratory experiments with hypothetical situations could one come close to a situation 
where people approach moral issues as abstract puzzles. In practice, people’s judgments 
are not merely governed by formal reasoning, which rationally weighs all relevant values 
one against one the other, but also by deeply felt emotions. Anger, disgust, shame and 
compassion, to name but a few, inform moral perceptions and decisions (see e.g. Haidt 2001, 
Skoe et al. 2002, Harris 2003, De Graaff et al. 2014). Furthermore, the specific social context 
plays an important role. Experiments by Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (2008) provide perhaps 
the most notorious reminders of this. Their experiments showed that when people are placed 
in situations with particular group dynamics, social pressures and power relations, they may 
more readily engage in behavior they would otherwise consider immoral.4 Of course, these 
experiments were radical and extreme, and in some respects their direct applicability to 
real-life situations may be questionable (e.g. Banuazizi and Movahedi 1975). Nevertheless, 
by creating these extreme circumstances, the experiments made apparent what is often not 
so obvious: people’s moral standards and behaviors are to an important extent shaped by 
context and the social roles people assume in this context (e.g. Bandura 1991, Hanna 2004). 
This means that the same people may adopt different moral standards in different contexts. 
In the case of soldiers, the values and norms they follow on deployment may not be the same 
as those they abide by in civilian settings.
Morality, in short, comprises rational and emotional dimensions of social life, and as 
such is multilayered and fragmented. At the same time, people are generally unaware of this. 
Moral beliefs can be best understood as embodied dispositions which people usually enact 
without thinking out beforehand (Zigon 2008). This is not to suggest that moral decisions are 
based on nothing, but rather that they are not primarily the result of reflection. Accordingly, 
people are generally unaware of having multiple, potentially competing moral beliefs. 
They live their lives without constantly experiencing conflict by which they maintain, as 
Ewing (1990) called it, an ‘illusion of wholeness’. They tend to think of themselves in terms 
of completeness, coherence and consistency, not in terms of fragmented, shifting selves 
(Ewing 1990, Zigon 2008).
In line with this, people’s explanations of their behavior are often judgments made in 
hindsight. These are often, at least partially, post-hoc rationalizations rather than completely 
accurate reflections of what occurred at the moment (Haidt 2001, Tessman 2014). Usually, 
people only come up with reasoned arguments when they become aware of an inconsistency 
in their moral judgment, either because the inconsistency generates discomfort (Haidt 
4 In the Milgram experiment, participants were ordered to administer what seemed to be agonizing dangerous electric 
shocks	 to	 whom	 they	 thought	 were	 other	 voluntary	 participants;	 many	 did	 (Milgram	 1974).	 In	 Zimbardo’s	 Stanford	
experiment,	participants	were	placed	 in	a	situation	with	strongly	asymmetric	power	 relations;	 some	participants	were	
made prisoners, others were made guards. Many ‘guards’ resorted to disrespectful and even sadistic behavior toward the 
‘prisoners’	(Zimbardo	2008).	
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2001, Tsang 2002) or because anticipated criticism by others raises the need for justification 
(Billig 1996, Haidt 2001). In any case, both ad-hoc and post-hoc interpretations are ways in 
which people eventually come to understand the situation in which they were involved and 
the role they played in this situation. Organizing and structuring memories into meaningful 
narratives enables people to make sense of their experiences. As such, the stories that people 
construct of their experiences become personal truths of what they have seen and done (cf. 
Kleinman 1988, Good 1994, Haidt 2001, Molendijk et al. 2016).
To turn back to the issue of competing moral commitments, these are most obvious 
in moral dilemmas. To begin with, let me give an example that soldiers joked about in an 
ethics course I observed. They sketched a scenario in which a soldier’s girlfriend asks for his 
opinion of her trendy flower-printed jeans. As her boyfriend, the soldier does not want to hurt 
her, but as his mother’s son, he does not want to lie. Hence, he is confronted by a dilemma. 
While this example was meant as a joke, it well illustrates that everyone embodies multiple 
moral commitments and that everyone encounters numerous moral dilemmas every day, 
often without being aware of it. Moreover, it demonstrates that a moral conflict does not 
necessarily engender disturbance or distress.
That said, a soldier’s world constitutes pre-eminent conditions for moral conflicts that 
do engender serious distress. Soldiers may have to use and witness violence in dangerous 
circumstances. While they are instruments of the state who must adhere to political norms 
and legal rules, they also remain moral agents with personal values (Baarda and Verweij 
2006). Even when they agree with all they are ordered to do, they remain members of a society 
which makes violence taboo (cf. Grossman 1995). Given that soldiers hold multiple moral 
commitments in the context of war and violence, it is not hard to imagine that they may 
experience distressing moral conflicts. In extreme cases, they may face tragic dilemmas which 
force them to choose between two evils, leaving them inevitably with ‘dirty hands’, no matter 
their choice (e.g. Walzer 1973, Baarda and Verweij 2006, Parrish 2007, Blattberg 2015).
What is the psychological impact of tragic dilemmas and other morally critical situations? 
The literature on this topic provides no clear answers. Philosophers have predominantly 
discussed the topic in normative debates on ethics, and the specific psychological impact 
of these acts has therefore not been their main concern (Walzer 1973, Williams 1973, Marcus 
1980, Wijze 2005, 2012, Tessman 2014). However, when desiring to understand moral distress, 
it seems that precisely this is necessary: to examine in depth how people experience and are 
affected by tragic dilemmas and other moral quandaries. The concept of moral injury does 
attend to the psychological experience of moral quandaries, but the problem is that this 
concept tends to approach a person’s moral beliefs as a harmonious unity. Instead, drawing 
on the abovementioned insights, this study considers that a person’s moral beliefs constitute 
a complex total of multiple, potentially competing values. As the following chapters will 
make clear, morally distressing experiences are often more complicated than clear-cut 
transgressions, and, accordingly, moral distress is more complicated than unequivocal 
feelings of guilt and shame.
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Issue 2: Political and Societal Dimensions
The insight that soldiers embody multiple moral commitments brings me to a second 
insufficiently addressed issue in the current concept of moral injury: the (potential) role of 
political and societal factors in moral distress. In recent decades, it has become increasingly 
clear that besides the nature of war and individual susceptibilities contextual factors play a 
crucial role in the onset of war-related suffering, (e.g. Breslau and Davis 1987, Summerfield 
2000, Perilla et al. 2002, De Jong 2005, Stein et al. 2007, Finley 2011, Suarez 2013). At the same 
time, most research on war-related suffering, both in terms of PTSD and moral injury, 
decouples the suffering from its wider context (ibid).
The concept of PTSD is persistently criticized for failing to attend to context. As various 
studies have argued, it frames war-related suffering as a condition contained within the 
individual, thus failing to account for its societal and political context (e.g. Summerfield 
2000, Das 2007, Withuis and Mooij 2010, Finley 2011, Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2013, MacLeish 
2013). As a medical concept it tends to give war victims the status of patients (Kleinman et 
al. 1997, Summerfield 2001, Withuis 2002). In response, studies on what is dubbed ‘social 
suffering’ (Kleinman et al. 1997) have examined how violence is generated and shaped by 
political, economic and cultural structures, mostly in non-Western settings, attesting to the 
many ways in which social forces can produce human suffering (e.g. Kleinman et al. 1997, 
Summerfield 2000, Das 2007, Kienzler 2008). These studies challenge the biomedical notions 
that characterize suffering as an intra-individual disease.
Although most research on ‘social suffering’ focuses on challenging biomedical notions as 
Western conceptions (Bracken et al. 1995, Summerfield 2000, Kienzler 2008), it follows that in 
Western settings, too, war-related suffering may be considered more than an intra-individual 
disease. A ‘social suffering-lens’ seems particularly important when trying to understand 
moral dimensions of deployment-related distress. As discussed above, individuals develop 
their moral beliefs and form their moral judgments not in a social vacuum but in interaction 
with family, friends, and formal and informal institutions (Bandura 1991). Specifically with 
respect to a soldier’s conduct, questions of right and wrong are not ‘owned’ by the soldier but 
explicitly debated by the soldier’s social environment. It is at the societal and political level 
that debates take place about, for instance, the legitimacy of military missions.
Generally, the military does not operate in isolation from politics and society, but 
consists of ‘people with arms’ who act in the name of ‘people without arms’ (Rukavishnikov 
and Pugh 2006, p. 131). This means that in case of military operations, the military is granted 
exemptions from certain standards that society holds for its citizens. While war and violence 
are generally considered immoral and criminal, it is also maintained that ‘killing may be 
necessary to save lives’ and that ‘the devastation of war may be required to prevent the 
destruction of deeply held values’ (Williams and Caldwell 2006, p. 309). And so, military 
action is considered ‘justified harm’ (Shue 2005, p. 743). Yet, this is only the case because its 
justification is not unconditional. On the contrary, the justification of an intervention rests 
on the condition that it is subject to rules and constraints (MacFarlane 2002, Kennedy 2006, 
Berkowitz 2013).
The political and public domain thus play an important role in shaping soldiers’ 
deployment. These domains determine the conditions under which soldiers have to operate, 
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and where their actions are monitored and judged. Today’s military interventions tend to occur 
in a multilateral context, often on the basis of commitments to international organizations 
such as the United Nations. Accordingly, decision-making with regard to an intervention is 
shaped by political alliances, as well as international law and other normative principles and 
criteria that are considered important (see e.g. MacFarlane 2002, Narine 2016). Abiding to 
international principles and criteria narrows the possibilities of intervention and shapes the 
nature of a mission, but as such they also enhance the mission’s legitimacy. Governments 
may follow such principles and criteria for sincere reasons – to reach a reasonable consensus 
and abide by moral standards – or, conversely, to mask self-centered motives and bypass 
moral questions (cf. Berkowitz 2013).
At the national level, decision-making regarding military intervention is often directly 
influenced by parliamentary demands and indirectly by public sensitivities and attitudes 
(Everts and Isernia 2003, Klep 2011, Grandia 2015, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016).5 Parliamentarian 
demands and public opinion usually influence the decision to contribute national troops to 
a military mission, as well as the ways in which this contribution takes shape, by making the 
government add so-called national caveats (limitations) for its own troops to the mandate 
of the mission. For instance, public sensitivities and resultant parliamentarian demands can 
lead a government to focus the mission on humanitarian activities and restrict the use of force 
allowed (cf. Born et al. 2010, p. 21). However, the government may also attempt to gain public 
support by trying to sway parliamentary and public opinion and mobilize support. It may for 
instance create persuasive narratives of a mission’s ‘why-what-and-how’ – which, notably, 
may or may not turn out to be an accurate description of the actual mission (Ringsmose and 
Børgesen 2001).
Political concessions and persuasive narratives are thus supposed to legitimize a military 
intervention on several levels. When this is achieved, deployed soldiers are assured that their 
mission accords with political demands, legal rules and societal wishes. However, in practice, 
it is not always clear what military conduct is desired, and tensions between sociopolitical 
justifications and personal experience are not always resolved. In fact, the opposite may be 
the result. Consider for instance a mission justified by images of the opponents as a violent, 
terrorist ‘them’ (Bhatia 2005, Chambers 2012), and by rhetoric on national security (Goldstein 
2010) and/or liberation and civilization (Abu-Lughod 2002, Kellner 2004). Such framing may 
initially protect soldiers from worrying about their mission, but this very protection may also 
lead them to do things they might later regret, and for which they might be condemned in 
their home country (Lifton 1973, Shay 1994, Bica 1999, Gutmann and Lutz 2009, Boudreau 
2011, Sherman 2011). For instance, Bourke (1999), Lifton (1973), Shay (1994) and Ticke (2005), 
describe the profound shock US soldiers experienced when the Vietnamese ‘gooks’ they were 
supposed to hate turned out to be human, just like them. Bica (1999) similarly notes that 
5	 The	 influence	of	parliament	 is	especially	strong	 in	countries	with	multi-party	systems	 like	 the	Netherlands,	which	more	
often	than	not	have	coalition	governments	and	a	powerful	parliament.	Although	much	like	other	governments,	the	Dutch	
government	 officially	 holds	 the	 exclusive	 power	 to	 deploy	 troops,	 parliament	 exerts	 considerable	 influence	 over	 the	
government’s	decision-making	(cf.	Wagner	2006,	p.	49).	With	respect	to	recent	missions,	the	Dutch	government	has	always	
tried to gain a majority of parliamentary support for a mission. With respect to public opinion, it is true that political leaders 
often	 do	 not	 completely	 follow	 public	 demands,	 since	 they	 also	 wish	 to	 fulfill	 commitments	 concerning	 international	
cooperation. Yet, they are also unlikely to completely ignore the impact of public pressure or the threat of decreasing 
electoral support (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001). 
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these soldiers felt deeply confused when they saw the ‘myth’ of the warrior as noble and 
heroic crumble in war. Moreover, Sherman (2011) describes the deception US soldiers felt on 
returning from Iraq and discovering that their government’s claims about Iraq stockpiling 
weapons of mass destruction were untrue. Ex-Marine Boudreau (2008, 2011) stresses that 
political and legal justifications may encourage soldiers to do things they later came to 
regret, pointing to his own remorse for the heavy handed actions he ordered in Iraq.
The studies cited above all focus on war and combat operations. But what about other 
types of missions? Recent years have mostly seen peace missions for which the national and 
international leadership imposed tight restrictions on the use of force (Rietveld 2009). The 
UN missions in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s are well-known examples of 
such missions, or rather of the possible downsides of such missions (Van der Meulen 1998, 
Klep and Winslow 1999). They show that while restrictions on the use of force may protect 
soldiers from doing things they might regret later, they may also render soldiers powerless 
when confronted by situations that do require force. The trauma literature describes the 
profound psychological impact that powerlessness may have (Herman 1967, 2011).
In short, political practice and public debate shape the ways in which soldiers are deployed 
and how they are perceived at home. While the current concept of moral injury keeps moral 
distress encapsulated at the level of the individual soldier, there is much reason to expect 
that political practice and public debate may play an equally important role in moral distress. 
It is therefore worth examining exactly how political and societal influences affect soldiers’ 
experience, and particularly whether and how these influences relate to moral distress.
I began this chapter by discussing the potential of the concept of moral injury for capturing 
moral dimensions of deployment-related distress, yet subsequently noted the current 
concept’s failure to address and incorporate the complexity of morality and the role of wider 
sociopolitical contexts in moral distress. Therefore, I complicated the concept by adding 
philosophical and social scientific perspectives on morality and the impact of sociopolitical 
factors on soldiers’ experience. First, I established that a soldier’s moral beliefs constitute 
a complex constellation rather than one coherent system. Second, I contended that this 
complexity is related to the fact that soldiers are not entirely autonomous, but embedded in 
a sociopolitical context. Soldiers are, of course, individuals. Yet, they are also institutional 
instruments, and civilians as well. These contentions led me, first, to propose further 
examination of moral dimensions of deployment-related suffering, and second, to propose 
broadening the research scope to examine the role of political practices (including decision-
making and mission framing) and public perceptions (including public demands and 
criticism regarding military interventions) in moral distress. I do so in the present study with 
the perspectives and insights discussed here serving as a theoretical framework, ultimately 
to advance the concept of moral injury.
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Chapter 3. Methodological Choices and Considerations
 
 
In this chapter, I explain the methodological considerations and choices of this study. 
I discuss, first, the epistemological underpinnings of the methods; second, the overall 
research strategy; third, the missions chosen as case studies; fourth, choices made regarding 
sampling and data collection; fifth, the process of data analysis; sixth, issues of credibility 
and generalizability; seventh, reflections on researcher role and objectivity, and finally, 
ethical considerations.
Epistemological Underpinnings
As explained, this study aims to contribute to the concept of moral injury by seeking 
holistic, in-depth insight into mechanisms of moral distress, examining veterans’ personal 
experiences of distress in relation to complexities of moral beliefs and socio-political 
processes. To achieve this objective, it deviates from the positivist traditions in which 
most current research on ‘moral injury’ can be situated. Current ‘moral injury’ research 
predominantly focuses on identifying correlations between different variables, attempting 
to explain moral distress in terms of isolable and one-directional causal relations between 
events and symptoms (see e.g. Maguen et al. 2009, Nash et al. 2013, Currier et al. 2015, Bryan 
et al. 2016). While such an approach helps to systematically identify empirical regularities, 
it inevitably overlooks and even distorts the multidimensional and multidirectional nature 
of the human world (cf. Kleinman 1988, Good 1994, Bryman 2012). Also, it tends to reify the 
concept of moral injury as a clearly demarcated entity. Consequently, current research on 
‘moral injury’ has been unable to adequately capture and conceptualize complexities of both 
moral and contextual dimensions of moral distress.
This study approaches social reality not as a closed system of isolable facts, but as an 
open world shaped by countless factors and always embedded in a wider social context (cf. 
Kleinman 1988, Good 1994, Bryman 2012). Accordingly, it examines moral beliefs and socio-
political processes, not as independent variables of which moral distress may be a function, 
but as complex webs of meanings and practices in which veterans’ experiences of moral 
distress can take the shape they do (cf. Kleinman 1988, Good 1994, Bryman 2012). It does 
not examine questions such as ‘how often can moral distress be identified among a given 
population?’ and ‘can a correlation be found between moral distress and a particular political 
act?’, but such questions as ‘if veterans experience distress due to moral challenges, what 
does their distress entail?’ and ‘if political practices surrounding veterans’ missions play a 
role in experiences of moral distress, what does this entail?’. In other words, this study does 
not cut up moral distress into variables in order to find correlations between these variables, 
but attempts to better understand under what structural and contextual conditions, and in 
what shapes, moral distress may come into being.
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The overarching objective of this approach is to contribute to the concept of moral injury. 
To be able to do so, this study consistently extends its critical epistemological approach to 
this concept. As noted in the previous chapter, a scientific concept is always an explanation, 
an interpretation, and, inevitably, a judgment (Lock and Nguyen 2010, Withuis 2010, Dehue 
2011). ‘Moral injury’, likewise, is not a tangible and objectively identifiable entity, but rather 
a useful analytical lens to understand moral dimensions of deployment-related distress. 
It is from this line of thought that this study distinguishes ‘moral distress’ (an open range 
of experiences) from ‘moral injury’ (a particular demarcation and conceptualization of 
these experiences). This approach echoes an established anthropological approach, which 
distinguishes people’s experience of illness, on the one hand, and on the other, biomedical 
concepts of disease and disorder (Kleinman 1988, Good 1994, Lock and Nguyen 2010). Starting 
from an unspecified, open notion of moral distress, this study explores experiences that 
overspill the boundaries of the current ‘lens’ of moral injury, ultimately to advance this lens. 
 
Research Strategy
The aims of this study require a research strategy that has a strong inductive component 
(to gain novel insight into moral, political and societal dimensions of moral distress) while 
also making theory development (of the concept of moral injury) possible. This led me to 
adopt grounded theory, both a rigorous and flexible methodology to construct or advance 
theory, as my overarching research strategy. Rather than testing predetermined hypotheses, 
this method involves theory development through a relatively open analysis of relevant 
data, in which data and theory continuously inform one another (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 
Charmaz 2006). In accordance with revised versions of grounded theory (Evers and Wu 2006, 
Richardson and Kramer 2006), I did start from relevant existing theories and concepts, as 
is also the case in more traditional research, but I let the subsequent research process be 
guided by a continuous interplay between data and theory.
Specifically, this study involved three alternating activities. In anticipation of the 
next, detailed sections on these activities, let me briefly explain what they entailed. First, 
I developed a preliminary theoretical framework of relevant knowledge by gathering and 
integrating existing insights from the fields of psychology, philosophy and social sciences, 
which I presented in the previous chapter. Developing this framework allowed me to move 
from the predominantly psychological approach of the current concept of moral injury to a 
more comprehensive perspective. 
Second, since existing knowledge appeared insufficient to gain insight into moral, 
political and societal dimensions of deployment-related moral distress, I conducted a 
qualitative empirical study, namely a multiple case study focused on two Dutch missions. The 
qualitative character of the study made it possible to gain in-depth insight into the particular 
mechanisms of moral distress. For reasons to be discussed in the next section, as my cases 
I chose the Dutchbat mission to Srebrenica, the former Yugoslavia, and the TFU mission to 
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Uruzgan, Afghanistan. The main part of the case study data consisted of interviews with 
Dutchbat and TFU veterans.
Third, I analyzed these interviews as narratives, which allowed me to inductively and 
holistically explore veterans’ accounts. In contrast to, for instance, the investigation of pre-
defined symptoms through structured questionnaires, this approach made openness to new 
observations possible while allowing these observations to be appreciated in their wider 
context (cf. Mishler 1986, Kleinman 1988, Finley 2011). Ultimately, the narrative approach 
meant that I gained insight into the personal experience of veterans while understanding their 
experience in the context of political practices and public perceptions. To do so adequately, I 
drew on existing information on the political practices, public perceptions and operational 
realities that characterized veterans’ missions, thus combining and triangulating the stories 
of veterans with other perspectives (cf. Morey and Luthans 1984, Eriksen 2001). 
The inductive aspect of the grounded theory approach allowed me to draw novel insights 
from the empirical material. At the same time, the continuous use of theory assured that 
I linked and integrated empirically grounded insights with existing theoretical insights. 
Together, these two aspects made it possible to achieve the research objective of advancing 
the understanding of moral, political and societal dimensions of moral distress, and to 
further develop the concept of moral injury.
 
Case Selection: Dutchbat and TFU
The empirical part of this research consisted of a multiple case study focused on two missions. 
The focus on just two missions, instead of a wider range, made it possible to conduct detailed 
analysis of the specific political practices and public debates that characterized those 
missions, and of the ways in which veterans’ experiences are embedded in these practices 
and debates. At the same time, although comparison between cases was not the main 
aim of the empirical research, the choice of two missions as opposed to only one mission 
made it possible to distinguish mission-specific observations from general patterns and 
mechanisms.
Mission selection was motivated by two considerations. First, the two had to be partially 
dissimilar, both in order to approximate the diversity of present-day missions and to enable 
comparison (cf. Gerring 2007). Specifically, the missions had to be dissimilar with regard to 
the focal points of this study, namely moral dimensions of deployment-related distress at 
the individual level, the role of political practices in moral distress, and the role of public 
perceptions in moral distress. Yet both missions had to be sufficiently representative of 
the variety of present-day missions. While current research on ‘moral injury’ focuses on 
traditional situations of war and combat (see e.g. Litz et al. 2009, Vargas et al. 2013, Shay 2014), 
most recent missions are actually a variation of what has been called peace support missions 
(Pugh 2018). The second, practical consideration was to ensure that sufficient literature on the 
missions, and the decision-making processes and public debates was available. Eventually, I 
decided to focus on (a) Dutchbat veterans deployed to the former Yugoslavia (in what is now 
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called Bosnia and Herzegovina), as part of the ‘blue helmet’ UNPROFOR mission, and (b) TFU 
veterans deployed to Uruzgan, Afghanistan, as part of the ‘green helmet’ ISAF mission.
In anticipation of detailed discussions of both missions throughout this dissertation, 
let me sketch three relevant characteristics. The first has to do with moral distress at the 
individual level. In both missions many soldiers were exposed to violence and human 
suffering. However, Dutchbat troops were mainly bystanders of violence, though unwillingly, 
whereas TFU soldiers were often used force themselves. It seemed worthwhile to examine 
whether and how these different positions had different psychological effects, in particular 
for the investigation of moral dimensions of deployment-related stress.
Second, both missions had different political characteristics which seemed related 
to the abovementioned differences. While neither mission was a regular war operation, 
both differed significantly in their approach. The Dutchbat mission was a ‘blue helmet’ 
peacekeeping mission, while TFU’s mission was a ‘green helmet’ counterinsurgency mission 
involving combat. That is, Dutchbat soldiers were deployed as UN peacekeepers with light 
weaponry and few troops. At least partially due to their limited possibilities and resources, 
they were unable to perform their tasks. This incapacity became most clear in July 1995, when 
the third rotation of Dutchbat could not prevent the now infamous fall of Srebrenica and 
subsequent mass slaughter of thousands of boys and men (NIOD 2002, Van der Meulen and 
Soeters 2005, Van de Bildt 2015). In contrast to Dutchbat’s mission, TFU’s mission was part 
of a NATO-led mission which both anticipated and authorized combat. Although the Dutch 
government attempted to downplay the mission’s ‘green’ element, Dutch soldiers were 
mandated to engage in combat when deemed necessary, which turned out to regularly be 
the case (Grandia 2015, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). The selection of these two missions thus 
made it possible to identify and compare potential moral quandaries ‘on the ground’ related 
to the political practices surrounding each mission.
Third, with respect to societal dimensions, extensive public debates surrounded and 
shaped both missions, yet in different ways. The Dutchbat mission soon became overshadowed 
by allegations of cowardice in the soldiers, who would have lacked the courage to fight (Van 
der Meulen and Soeters 2005, Van de Bildt 2015). In the TFU mission, Dutch troops did fight, 
which evoked mixed reactions, however. Although it bolstered the damaged reputation of 
Dutch soldiers (Klep 2011), it fueled criticism in the Dutch public and in parliament that the 
mission was simply combat in the guise of ‘reconstruction’ (Van der Meulen and Grandia 
2012, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). Whereas Dutchbat soldiers thus were accused of having been 
unwilling to fight, TFU soldiers received both admiration and criticism for the fact that they 
did fight, and it seemed insightful to examine the potentially different ways in which these 
divergent public responses affected the soldiers in question.
In short, both missions are characterized by individual, political and societal challenges, 
in interestingly different ways, which made them suitable cases for this study. This does not 
mean, however, that their characteristics became predetermined themes. In line with this 
study’s grounded theory approach, I took the accounts of the veterans interviewed as the 
starting point from which to examine relevant contextual factors, not the other way around. 
As will become clear, this approach resulted in the finding that Dutchbat’s and TFU’s missions 
had far more in common than anticipated. 
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Sampling and Data Collection
Sample Selection 
Soldiers constitute a heterogeneous population, with different ranks, tasks and experiences. 
Therefore, in addition to choosing the military missions, I had to choose a sample selection. 
To do so, I employed the theoretical sampling method, which is typical in grounded theory 
research (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Charmaz 2006, Bryman 2012). While, for instance, random 
sampling is driven by the aim to collect data representative of a given population, theoretical 
sampling serves the aim of collecting theoretically valuable data. It involves the collection 
of material that makes it possible to fill determined gaps in extant theory and to refine 
theoretical ideas that develop during research (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Charmaz 2006, 
Bryman 2012). Put differently, theoretical sampling implies that the search for data is led by 
the study’s research objectives and questions.
My sample criteria were the result of several considerations. Importantly, the first 
concerned the goal of gaining a better understanding of moral distress; that is, not to collect 
statistical data about the prevalence of moral distress, but data that helped gain an in-depth 
understanding in order to advance theory about the phenomenon. While this goal did not 
require all research participants to experience deployment-related distress, it did seem 
valuable that it was the case for a substantial number of the participants, either at the time 
or in the past. However, since only a minority of veterans appears to develop mental health 
problems (Engelhard et al. 2007, Richardson et al. 2010), random sampling would likely have 
resulted in a handful of participants with deployment-related distress. Therefore, I chose 
to ensure that I would reach a substantial number of participants with deployment-related 
distress, while also including participants without deployment-related distress for the 
purpose of comparison. In later sections I explain how the data collection methods I used 
made this possible. 
A second important issue concerned the comparability of the Dutchbat and TFU 
missions. To be able to juxtapose the two missions with respect to their political and societal 
characteristics, it seemed desirable that the selected veterans were as similar as possible with 
respect to other characteristics. Hence, for purposes of comparison, I chose to confine the 
research to veterans from similar types of units. In both Dutchbat and TFU, the infantry units 
of the Airmobile Brigade played a major role. Moreover, in both cases these units frequently 
encountered local civilians as well as combatants, and were exposed to violence and human 
suffering. Therefore, I selected the infantry units of the Airmobile Brigade, including 
attached troops such as medical units. With respect to rank, I chose not to further limit my 
focus, because it seemed insightful to explore similarities and differences across ranks.
 
Data Collection
The empirical research was carried out between July 2016 and March 2017. The research was 
divided into one short orientation phase and two additional phases. This division was made 
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so that data collection could alternate with data analysis, which made it possible to examine 
insights gained in one phase through additional questions in the next phase. Several sources 
and methods were used in the empirical research phase, including the literature, interviews, 
participant observation and other sources such as media documents. Below, I discuss these 
sources and methods.
 
Existing Information in Literature
I drew on three kinds of empirical material in existing literature. First, I made use of studies 
on the political practices, public debates and operational realities that characterized the 
Dutchbat and TFU mission, respectively, which provided important context for the primary 
data (e.g. Honig and Both 1996, NIOD 2002, Klep 2008, 2011, Beeres et al. 2012, Grandia 
2015). Second, I drew on large-scale qualitative and quantitative studies on deployment-
related guilt and ‘moral injury’, which provided useful ‘facts and figures’ to substantiate 
observations that would otherwise be more impressionistic (e.g. Rietveld 2009, Nash et al. 
2013, Vargas et al. 2013, Bryan et al. 2016). Third, I made use of existing personal accounts 
of Dutchbat and TFU veterans, dating from shortly before these veterans’ deployment to 
long after their deployment, which aided in triangulating my own empirical material. These 
accounts were found in academic studies, reports, (auto)biographies, interviews, internet 
blogs and documentaries (e.g. Vogelaar et al. 1996, Kroon et al. 1997, KMAR 1999, Jongbloed 
2002, NIOD 2002, Vogelaar and Kramer 2004, Praamsma et al. 2005, Hetebrij 2006, 2006, 
2007, Eijsvoogel 2007, Kramer 2007, NRC TV 2009, Van Bemmel 2009, Ter Velde 2010, Van 
Hemert 2014, Veldhuizen 2014, Freebird69 2016, Veteraneninstituut.nl 2017). 
 
Interviews
The main part of the empirical research comprised interviews. In total, I collected and 
analyzed 80 interviews, of which 40 were semi-structured interviews I conducted myself. The 
other 40 interviews were audio-recorded ‘life story’ interviews selected from the collection 
of the Netherlands Veterans Institute (Veteraneninstituut). 
 
Self-Conducted Interviews
No contact details are readily available for veterans who have left service. Therefore, to 
recruit veterans, I used the following routes.
- Announcements on formal and informal websites for Dutch (ex-)soldiers
- Networks of service members of different ranks, established in prior research
- In several cases, chance encounters at events such as military training and Veterans Day
In addition, I employed snowball sampling, identifying research participants who could 
then refer me to colleagues, acquaintances or friends. Snowball sampling has been identified 
as a method that considerably facilitates research into sensitive topics which involve hard-
to-reach populations (cf. Faugier and Sargeant 1997, Atkinson and Flint 2001, Penrod et al. 
2003). It makes it possible to gain access to otherwise distrustful respondents who would 
49
Chapter 3   M
ethodological Choices and Considerations 
Part I     Setting the Stage
not have participated had they not been referred by someone they knew, and it increases the 
likelihood that respondents are willing to speak openly about sensitive topics (cf. Atkinson 
and Flint 2001, Schulman-Green et al. 2009). This advantage seems to have been especially 
valuable in the case of Dutchbat veterans, whose negative experiences with media had made 
many distrustful of interviewers. Aware of the limitations of conventional snowball sampling 
regarding representativeness, I drew on the above-outlined variety of starting points. Doing 
so resulted in ‘multiple snowballs’, which extended the sample scope beyond a single social 
network, thus decreasing bias (Penrod et al. 2003).
Before interviewing a veteran, I always explained my study in general terms, by which I 
abided with the obligation of informed consent. In the announcements posted on websites, 
for instance, I stated that my study focuses ‘on how soldiers and veterans deal with challenges 
during deployment and after homecoming’. Having noted that the words ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ 
often evoke specific associations in which most veterans do not recognize themselves, I 
decided to avoid these terms. Instead I gave the following examples, formulated such that 
they were open to interpretation. ‘Seeing, doing or experiencing difficult things. Having 
to make hard choices. Seeing injustice. Doing something that seems not right (or simply 
wrong). Being treated unjustly. Or, any other challenge soldiers and veterans may face’. I 
made explicit in my announcement that ‘it is not necessary that you recognize yourself in 
this description, because it is also an interesting fact if soldiers and veterans don’t. First and 
foremost, I am interested in the experiences of deployed soldiers’. Also, I clarified that all 
participants would remain anonymous.
I refrained from stating in my initial announcement that my research focuses on 
experiences of (moral) distress. Only after veterans responded to the announcement I 
explained clearly that my study was concerned with better understanding deployment-related 
distress and that it would also look at political decision-making and public opinion. Despite 
the fact that I did not select veterans beforehand on experiences of distress, a substantial 
number of participants reported deployment-related distress (as I will discuss later in the 
section headed ‘The Research Participants’). Presumably, veterans who had deployment-
related distress were particularly inclined to respond to my request. Also, when a veteran 
referred me to a colleague or acquaintance, relatively often this person also had deployment-
related distress.
The interviews I conducted were semi-structured, which enabled me to hone in on 
the research questions while at the same time allowed the interviewees to bring up what 
they felt was important. I organized the interviews around three phases of military life: 
pre-deployment, deployment and post-deployment. Specifically, I inquired about the 
interviewees’ reasons for joining the military, their motivation for joining a particular 
mission, the expectations they had of their deployment, their overall deployment 
experiences, impressive or difficult experiences during deployment, the experience of 
homecoming, possible challenges in terms of returning to the world at home, and the 
ways in which their experiences did or did not affect and change them, both positively and 
negatively. When veterans spoke about experiences that seemed particularly relevant to this 
research, I probed deeper. Interview length ranged between two and five hours, with most 
lasting between three and five hours. Appendix A presents the interview topic list.
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One challenge worth mentioning concerned the retrospective nature of many veterans’ 
accounts. As is well-known, time colors and changes memory, and influences which 
memories are retained and which are not (cf. Kleinman 1988, Mattingly 1994, Sturken 1998). 
While this is insightful in itself, this study’s purpose also required insight into the beliefs and 
expectations that veterans ‘actually’ held at various moments in their lives. Therefore, I always 
sought concrete examples to support or contradict their statements. Also, as mentioned, I 
triangulated veterans’ memories with studies and media documents containing accounts 
of Dutchbat and TFU soldiers dating from earlier periods. Interestingly, at the time of the 
interviews by far the majority of interviewees (all except two) had never heard of the term 
‘moral injury’, which means that though the notions of trauma and PTSD might have shaped 
their memories and accounts, this could not have been the case for moral injury.
 
Interviews Conducted by the Netherlands Veterans Institute
In addition to 40 self-conducted interviews, I drew on 40 ‘life story’ interviews from the 
Dutch Veterans Interview Collection (Interviewcollectie Nederlandse Veteranen) of the Netherlands 
Veterans Institute (Veteraneninstituut), which expanded this study’s data to 80 interviews.
The Netherlands Veterans Institute owns a collection of more than 1000 interviews with 
veterans from several missions that the Institute has conducted to offer Dutch civilians the 
possibility to listen to veterans’ life stories. The interview length is between two and six 
hours. Half of the interviews are publicly accessible on the website (www.veteraneninstituut.
nl). The other half of the interviews are – responding to the wishes of the interviewees in 
question – only available with explicit permission. For this study I was given access to both 
public and restricted parts of the collection, having agreed that the interviews would only be 
used for research purposes and that interviewee anonymity s would be maintained.
The Netherlands Veterans Institute accessed the majority of interviewees through an 
announcement in the veteran magazine ‘Checkpoint’, which is free for veterans both in and out 
of service. An initial exploration indicated that the interviewees were of different ages, ranks, 
rotations and military branches. Some interviewees had left the military; others were still in 
active service at the time of the interview. With respect to the issue of distress, the interviews 
ranged from interviewees reporting no psychological difficulties at all to interviewees 
reporting significant suffering. Because this distribution was in line with the sample criteria 
I had determined, I chose to select a random sample. The interviews included in the selection 
were conducted between 2008 and 2014, but by far the majority in 2010 and 2011.
The interviews of the Netherlands Veterans Institute had no particular objective to 
examine moral distress. Consequently, they are limited in that the interviewer did not ask 
(supplementary) questions when I would have, which means that these interviews provided 
less in-depth information than self-conducted interviews. However, this very limitation 
also served the purpose of triangulation (see Denzin 2006). Although the interviews were 
not specifically intended to produce material on moral, political and societal dimensions 
of distress, nonetheless the veterans often shared stories that concerned these dimensions, 
and when this was the case, the accounts were comparable to the accounts of the veterans I 
had interviewed.
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Participant Observation and Other Sources
In addition to interviews, I conducted several participant observations. The main purpose 
was triangulation of the data gathered in my interviews. I documented my observations 
in extensive field notes (Bryman 2012, p. 440). The observed occasions include military 
classroom courses on ethics and stress at military bases, Veterans Day, information days 
on PTSD organized by and for veterans, and a political demonstration of Dutchbat soldiers 
regarding the delay in responding to legal claims they had filed against the Dutch state. When 
attending an event, I would look its content as well as the responses of the participants. In 
the case of military training courses, I would observe how soldiers responded to the content 
of the training. On Veterans Day, I attended speeches and asked veterans for their opinions of 
the speeches. In the case of political demonstrations, I read the printed flyers and reflected on 
their content with participants. On all occasions, I asked participants why they participated 
in the event in question and joined in group conversations.
The Research Participants
This section discusses the characteristics of the 80 interviewed veterans. In line with 
the sample criteria, half of the veterans were sent to the former Yugoslavia, in or around 
Srebrenica, as part of Dutchbat or attached to Dutchbat, such as in a medical unit. Between 
1994 and 1995 they were deployed for several months, in one or other of the four rotations 
of Dutchbat.1 The other half of the interviewees were deployed to South Afghanistan as part 
of Task Force Uruzgan’s Battle Groups, or as part of a unit attached to the Battle Groups. 
Between 2006 and 2010 they were deployed for several months, as part of one of the eight 
rotations of TFU. Three interviewees served in both Dutchbat and in TFU. Of the Dutchbat 
veterans, the majority had left service, while of the TFU veterans, about half had left service. 
A likely reason for this difference is that the mission of Dutchbat lies further in the past than 
the TFU mission.
Two interviewees are female, both Dutchbat veterans. The age of the interviewees at 
the start of their deployment varies from 19 to 46 years, but the majority was between 20 
and 30 years old. Their rank at the time of deployment ranges from private to colonel. Most, 
however, were a private, corporal or non-commissioned officer at the time of deployment. 
While this distribution is in line with the distribution of ranks in the military population at 
large – the lower the rank, the higher the number of (ex-)soldiers – it does mean that some 
ranks are better represented than others.
With respect to the issue of moral distress, the characteristics of the interviewees are 
more difficult to express in figures. If placed on a continuum based on this criterion – 
ranging from veterans who reported no psychological problems at all to veterans who spoke 
of years of debilitating suffering – it could be said that about half are on the left side, and 
the other half are on the right of the continuum. To repeat, this distribution is probably not 
1 It	is	not	well-known	that	after	Dutchbat	III,	one	company	of	the	planned	fourth	rotation	of	soldiers	was	still	deployed	to	the	
former Yugoslavia.
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representative of the Dutch military population at large. Rather, it is the outcome of this 
study’s aim to reach a substantial number of participants with deployment-related distress 
(see ‘Sample Selection’).
Finally, it is worth noting that the study sample is not limited to a specific social or 
institutional network. Most interviewees, including those interviewed by the Netherlands 
Veterans Institute, were not actively involved in either the Netherlands Veterans Institute 
or other associations. Also, because I drew on multiple sources, the interviewees were 
acquainted with only a couple other interviewees at most.
Data Analysis
In accordance with grounded theory methods, a crucial part of the analytical process entailed 
coding the collected material. The coding technique served to label and organize the data, 
so that analysis and the data’s translation into theoretical concepts occurred systematically 
(Bryman 2012, p. 402). I coded the data with the help of the qualitative data analysis program 
ATLAS.ti. For the coding process, I followed grounded theory guidelines usually employed 
for narrative analysis (Charmaz 2006, Lal et al. 2012). In the initial coding phase, I coded 
recurring phrases and other regularities at a low level of abstraction. During this phase, I 
constantly compared the emerging codes with the data and with one another, in order to 
identify additional relevant regularities and to ensure I had not left out relevant context 
with respect to the regularities already identified. When necessary, I renamed and modified 
codes, or merged them into new ones. In the focused coding phase, I grouped the codes 
into more abstract and theoretical categories and explored the relationships between them. 
Again, I re-explored the data in comparison with the constructed categories. Eventually, I 
established ‘core categories’. Appendix B presents a schematized report of the codes that 
emerged from this analytical process.
Coding and analysis occurred iteratively, with the research questions and theoretical 
framework in mind, which allowed for constant revision. I constantly compared the data 
with the preliminary theoretical framework, searched for new theoretical literature based 
on empirical findings, and questioned emerging understandings by exposing them to 
deeper data analysis. Further, I regularly presented my emerging findings at symposia and 
to several of the interviewed veterans, who served as a sounding board. The findings of 
this study are thus the result of an iterative process in which data and theory continuously 
informed one another. As such, they are the result of ‘abductive inference’ (Richardson and 
Kramer 2006): they are regularities and associations detected in the empirical material for 
which theoretically sensible explanations could be given.
To illustrate the coding process, the following example describes how I coded accounts 
of potentially morally challenging situations. Initially, I coded on the basis of the factors 
evoked by the interviewed veterans (e.g. ‘adrenaline’, ‘orders’, ‘it was him or me’) and the 
ways in which veterans interpreted the situation (e.g. right, wrong, non-moral). I thus 
analyzed veterans’ accounts by focusing simultaneously on content (e.g. the situation and 
the factors involved in the situation) and meaning (e.g. evoking orders to justify a decision, 
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or, conversely, to condemn a situation). This process resulted in codes such as ‘rules and 
instructions’ and ‘moral distancing and numbing’. In the focused coding phase, I grouped 
codes that had emerged in the initial coding phase into more abstract categories. Initially 
I tried to distinguish between different values or value sets, but found that disentangling 
veterans’ accounts in this way was virtually impossible. For instance, I found that professional 
values such as obedience to ‘rules and instructions’ were often also deeply personal values, 
while personal tendencies such as ‘moral distancing and numbing’ were not always seen as 
contradictory to professionalism. Moreover, I found that disentangling veterans’ accounts 
like this would eliminate the multiplicity and complexity of some experiences, while a 
noticeable feature of many distressing experiences was this very multiplicity and complexity. 
Therefore, I decided to group the emerging concepts from initial coding into categories 
such as ‘justifications and rationalizations’ and ‘inconsistency in interpretations’. Finally, I 
identified these categories as coping mechanisms, specifically as ways of ‘making soldiering 
less complex’, and thus grouped these categories into a core category with this label. Figure 
6 and Table 2 show the emerging and final results of this process.
 The ultimate aim of the coding and analysis was to gain insight into moral, political 
and societal dimensions of veterans’ experiences of moral distress. The iterative procedure 
made it possible to generate theory (rather than merely test existing theory) while ensuring 
that the emergent theory was empirically grounded. In other words, the procedure made it 
possible to contribute to the concept of moral injury.
Figure 6: Example of the Coding Process in ATLAS.ti
Table 2: Example of the Coding Results
Initial codes Focused codes Core categories
Doing good things
Justifications	and	
rationalizations Inconsistency in 
interpretations
Making soldiering less complex
Rules and instruction
Reciprocity
Distancing and numbing
No	justification	needed No	justification	needed
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Credibility and Generalizability
This section discusses the issues of credibility and generalizability. Credibility is the 
qualitative equivalent to what in quantitative research is referred to as internal validity 
(Bryman 2012, pp. 274–5). It refers to a high level of correspondence between what one 
wants to study and what is actually studied (cf. Golafshani 2003, Bryman 2012, p. 273). This 
study gathered detailed qualitative material, drew upon various data sources using several 
methods, applied a largely inductive approach, and constantly compared data and theory, 
seeking both confirmation and disconfirmation. All these methods have been identified as 
enhancing credibility because they ensure triangulation of data and methods, and firmly 
ground theory in empirical material (Denzin 2006, Bryman 2012). In particular, these 
methods ensure high ‘ecological credibility’, meaning that my research findings do not apply 
just to hypothetical or experimental situations, but to natural social settings as well (Denzin 
2006, Bryman 2012).
Regarding the issues of generalizability, the chosen sampling method is relevant to 
consider. I consciously choose to use theoretical sampling (selection of theoretically relevant 
data) rather than random sampling (selection of statistically representative data). My aim 
was not to provide quantitative information about the prevalence of symptoms associated 
with ‘moral injury’. Several other studies have already done this (Maguen et al. 2009, Rietveld 
2009, Drescher et al. 2011, Nash et al. 2013, Vargas et al. 2013, Currier et al. 2015, Schut 2015, 
Bryan et al. 2016). Rather, my aim was to gain theoretical insight into moral distress. As 
mentioned, this study does not examine questions such as ‘can a correlation be found 
between moral distress and a particular other factor?’, but such questions as ‘if veterans 
experience distress due to moral challenges, what does it entail?’. While random sampling is 
useful when examining the first kind of question, theoretical sampling is most appropriate 
for the second kind. It increases the potential for theoretical generalization, that is, for the 
transferability of the study findings to other settings characterized by similar processes and 
circumstances, because it makes it possible to thoroughly examine particular mechanisms 
at work in phenomena (cf. Glaser and Strauss 1967, Charmaz 2006). So, while this study is 
substantially limited with respect to statistical generalization, it relies on relatively strong 
methods for theoretical generalization. 
Researcher Role and Issues of Interpretation
In this section, I consider my own role in this study and issues of interpretation more 
generally. Let me start by stating that no research is simply an objective presentation of the 
world. The way the researcher enters a research setting inevitably shapes the result. Research 
questions and theoretical approaches, as they guide the analysis, always color the research. 
For instance, the fact that I focused on sociopolitical dimensions of moral distress resulted in 
findings on these dimensions, which may give the false impression that sociopolitical factors 
are entirely responsible for the prevalence of moral distress. Yet, the fact that I identified 
a relation between moral distress and sociopolitical factors (rather than other factors) is a 
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direct result of this focus, which inevitably causes bias. Also, rather than rendering these 
factors blameworthy, their identification reveals no more than that they formed a context 
that shaped the ways in which veterans experienced their deployment and homecoming.
A second issue is my role in the empirical research process. It would be naïve for any 
social researcher to think it is possible to simply be a ‘fly on the wall’. Although I could 
triangulate my own interviews with those conducted by the Netherlands Veterans Institute, 
it still seems relevant to reflect on how the veterans’ perceptions of me may have shaped my 
material. As a female civilian academic, I was generally seen as a partial outsider. While a 
completely insider position is undesirable as it presents the risk of ‘home blindness’ (Eriksen 
2001, p. 30), being perceived as a complete outsider may hinder the establishment of rapport. 
Interviewers always face issues of building trust, and as noted, these issues are exacerbated 
in research on sensitive subject matters (Schulman-Green et al. 2009). Indeed, veterans 
would sometimes comment that ‘people who have not been through the same thing cannot 
understand it’. At least partially, I could compensate for this limitation by my familiarity with 
the military organization, the Dutchbat and TFU mission, and military jargon. Speaking ‘the 
same language’ to this extent helped me to build rapport, which was indicated, for instance, 
by the fact that many veterans expressed views to me which they knew were different from 
what ‘civilians would like to hear’. At the same time, my partial outsider position also turned 
out to be an advantage, because it facilitated the discussion of emotional topics that soldiers 
usually do not talk about to each other. Furthermore, it gave me a technique for obtaining 
relevant information. By making my perceived position an explicit theme of the interview, I 
was able to probe deeper into veterans’ perceptions and attitudes.
Third, the focus on accounts of distress led to specific challenges. As Sayer has noted, 
‘analyses of things that bear on well-being and what people care about cannot avoid taking 
on a certain evaluative load’ (Sayer 2009, p. 782). As mentioned, some veterans I interviewed 
commented that people without similar experience cannot truly understand what they have 
seen and done. At the same time, some veterans told me they hoped my study would generate 
recognition of the veterans’ problems, to which others added that they felt ‘sort of proud’ 
that they were ‘doing something useful’ by helping me with my research. All these statements 
were more than mere descriptions of feelings. By saying these things, veterans inevitably 
made implicit appeals to write my research in their name, while their overwhelming stories 
already made critical analysis a challenge. How to maintain critical detachment to barely 
imaginable stories of suffering? Then again, how to write compassionately without the study 
becoming an idealized fiction of victim-heroes instead of real human beings?
I came to understand veterans’ statements through the notions of transference and 
countertransference. Initially developed in the field of psychoanalysis, these notions are 
increasingly applied in scientific research (e.g. Paul 1989, Withuis 2002). In research contexts, 
transference is used to indicate the totality of feelings and reactions of the respondent toward 
the researcher. Countertransference, in turn, is meant to describe the feelings and reactions 
of the researcher toward the respondent and his transference (ibid). As Robben (1996) 
noticed in his own research on political violence in Argentina, a major risk of examining 
impressionable stories of suffering is that they may overwhelm researchers. Consequently, 
researchers may uncritically reproduce the world-views of their respondents while believing 
that they have gained a true understanding of their pain. Conversely, as Withuis (2002) 
56
Pa
rt
 I  
   S
ett
in
g 
th
e S
ta
ge
 C
ha
pt
er
 3 
  M
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
l C
ho
ic
es
 a
nd
 C
on
si
de
ra
tio
ns
signaled, researchers may also declare themselves speechless and refrain from analysis 
out of respect for the stories of overwhelming suffering they examine. However, as Robben 
and Withuis also emphasize, critical analysis is exactly what makes a scientific research 
valuable. Just as a critical attitude is not the same as criticizing others, empathy is not the 
same as absorbing others’ perceptions. While it remains true that an empathetic attitude 
is indispensable for understanding people’s experiences, its pitfall is being led astray from 
one’s scientific objectives toward a superficial analysis. Such a study is to no one’s benefit.
Yet, Withuis (2002), Robben (1996) and others (e.g. Paul 1989) also contend that 
transference and countertransference, when recognized, can actually benefit one’s research. 
In line with psychoanalytic understandings, they state that the mechanisms can be used as 
an analytical tool. That is, the interactions between researcher and respondents can also be 
seen as insightful data. Indeed, veterans’ responses to my requests and my own responses 
to their stories were part of what my research was about: the impact of experiences of 
powerlessness, feelings of isolation and mistrust toward others, appeals for recognition, 
discomfort in others when hearing stories of violence and pain, and so on. Understanding 
my interactions with veterans as such helped me to refrain both from uncritically absorbing 
veterans’ perspectives and from forcing indifference out of a fear of not being objective. 
Moreover, it allowed me to use these interactions as a source of information.
Ethical Considerations
The previous section discussed the ethical issue of doing critical research without doing 
injustice to the research participants. In this final section, I briefly explain how I dealt with 
other ethical issues. Overall, I followed the ethical guidelines for good research practice 
defined by the Association of Social Anthropologists (ASA) (2011), which are the result of broad 
qualitative research experience among marginalized or otherwise vulnerable populations.
To be more specific, I first made sure that all my research participants were aware of my 
identity as a researcher. I always emphasized that I am not a therapist or a professional able to 
offer information or advice. I only interviewed individuals who gave informed consent to the 
research. In the preparatory, orientation phase I only interviewed veterans who had already 
spoken publicly about their deployment experience. I asked two military chaplains for advice 
on the ethical dimensions. On this basis, I decided to interview veterans who had already 
confided their experiences to at least one other person, which I made sure was the case 
before making an interview appointment. At the start of every interview, I always mentioned 
the website of the Veteranenloket (‘Veteran Office’) that can guide veterans in finding health 
care. Also, I explicitly said that participants did not have to answer any question if they did 
not want to. I closely observed how the interview affected the veteran, and if it seemed 
necessary I would briefly steer us to a less emotional topic. To ensure veterans’ anonymity, 
I use pseudonyms in this study. Also, where it does not compromise the significance of the 
stories, I have omitted other details, such as specific dates and locations.
Part Two 
Soldiers in Conflict
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Part II. Soldiers in Conflict 
In the following chapters, which make up Part II, I present the findings of my research. The 
structure of each chapter reflects the grounded theory approach taken in this study. The 
presentation of empirical findings alternates with the discussion of theoretical insights, 
mirroring the continuous process of the coding and analysis of data having been informed 
by extant theoretical literature while additional theoretical inquiries were guided by the data 
coding and analysis. A report of the coding results can be found in Appendix B. Following 
this iterative path, each chapter ends with a theoretical contribution to the understanding 
of moral distress.
Regarding the ways in which Dutchbat and TFU veterans in general tended to make 
sense of their deployment experiences (Chapter 5), and the kinds of moral challenges 
that engendered moral distress among a number of them (Chapter 6), I found many more 
remarkable similarities than differences. For this reason, I take the two groups together 
when discussing these topics. However, with respect to the role of political practices and 
public perceptions in moral distress (Chapters 7 and 8), respectively, it did prove valuable 
to separately discuss the experiences of these two groups, although, again, it will turn out 
that what was most striking were not the differences but the similarities between their 
experiences. Before proceeding to Chapters 5 to 8, it is useful to give a short overview of the 
Dutchbat mission and the TFU mission, which I will do in Chapter 4. 
4
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Chapter 4. The Missions
 
This chapter sketches an overview of the Dutchbat and TFU missions to offer some context 
in advance of detailed discussions in the subsequent chapters. In light of these chapters’ 
focus on soldiers’ experiences of conflict and disorientation, however, it seems that a word 
of caution is in order. Outlines like this one inevitably turn the complexity, uncertainty and 
unintelligibility of the missions into simplified, structured and readable overviews. Hence, 
they should always be understood as the post-facto interpretations that they are.
 
Dutchbat, UNPROFOR
The UNPROFOR mission in the former Yugoslavia, which lasted from 1992 to 1995, was a UN-
led peacekeeping operation. It was thus a ‘blue helmet’ mission, based on three principles: 
voluntary consent of the parties in conflict, impartiality in relation to all parties, and a 
minimum use of force allowed only as a last resort (UN 2008). The Netherlands was one of 
the countries that contributed troops to the UN mission, driven by the wish to help address 
humanitarian necessity coupled with the desire to improve Dutch prestige in the world 
(NIOD 2002, Van der Meulen 2004). In the Netherlands, and in many European countries 
for that matter, there was broad public support for the peacekeeping mission and even for 
more forceful intervention (Ten Cate 1998, Klep and Winslow 1999, Van der Meulen 2004). 
However, both the UN and the Dutch government feared that forceful military intervention 
would lead to intensification of the conflict and too many casualties in UN troops, and so 
the mission remained a peacekeeping operation (Van der Meulen 2004). In practical terms, 
this meant that troops were armed with light weaponry, had to maintain a neutral position, 
and were only allowed to use force in self-defense or in defense of the mandate (Klep and 
Winslow 1999, Vogelaar and Kramer 2000, NIOD 2002).
As from 1992, the Dutch government contributed transport units, whose main tasks 
were transportation of food and other aids for humanitarian purposes. In 1994, it began 
contributing additional troops, who were sent to the ‘Safe Area’ of Srebrenica, declared as 
such in 1993 together with five other areas in what is now called Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
military leadership, though not unanimous, had voiced serious doubts about the feasibility 
of this mission given the quantitative and qualitative constraints with which the troops 
would be deployed (Klep and Winslow 1999, NIOD 2002, Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005). 
Nevertheless, in early 1994, the first battalion of what was called Dutchbat was dispatched. 
Two Dutchbat companies were active in Srebrenica, while the third company was stationed 
just outside the enclave. The core of Dutchbat was the Air Maneuver Brigade. While the Air 
Maneuver Brigade is an infantry unit trained for combat, Dutchbat’s main tasks entailed 
operating observation posts and carrying out social and information-gathering patrols. 
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The two companies deployed within the enclave of Srebrenica had the additional task of 
disarming Bosnian Muslim belligerents (Vogelaar and Kramer 2000, NIOD 2002).
However, these tasks proved difficult to perform. Dutch peacekeepers were greatly 
constrained in their ability to use force, while each local warring party far outnumbered 
them (Klep and Winslow 1999, Vogelaar and Kramer 2000, NIOD 2002). In addition, both 
parties took advantage of the Dutch. Bosnian Serb forces frequently shot over the heads of 
the Dutch troops to intimidate them, and Bosnian Muslim fighters regularly provoked fire 
by Bosnian Serb forces, after which they sought cover with the Dutch (Vogelaar and Kramer 
2000, NIOD 2002). Also, Bosnian Muslim belligerents often left the Srebrenican enclave 
at night to carry out raids in Bosnian Serb territory, returning for protection by Dutchbat, 
which was supposed to stay impartial (Klep and Winslow 1999, NIOD 2002).
As a consequence of these problems, Dutchbat was unable to perform the tasks of their 
original mission. After several unsuccessful attempts to disarm Bosnian Muslim belligerents, 
who generally outnumbered the peacekeepers and seemed unimpressed by their presence, 
Dutchbat soldiers often stopped trying (NIOD 2002, Kramer 2007). Furthermore, as Dutchbat 
II soldiers reported, in order to avoid great risk they tended to avoid dangerous patrol routes 
(Kramer 2007). The battalion found itself ‘in a schizophrenic situation, performing a mission 
in such a way that the mission was actually denied’ (Kramer 2007, p. 192).
Many soldiers became discouraged and frustrated by their powerlessness and by the 
behavior of the belligerent parties. For some, the only remaining motive was to ‘get back 
in one piece’ (see also Vogelaar et al. 1996, Praamsma et al. 2005). Among Dutchbat soldiers, 
and later in the media, rumors started to circulate that Dutchbat II soldiers had given jam-
covered fuel tablets to local children, behaved aggressively to the local population, used 
drugs and received sexual services from local girls and women in exchange for money, 
food or cigarettes (NRC 1995, NIOD 2002, pp. 1245–6). In fact, when Canadian troops were 
stationed in Srebrenica, even before Dutchbat, reports had already come in of local girls 
offering themselves to soldiers or being offered to them by family members (NIOD 2002, p. 
1126). Although several internal inquiries were set up, none led to convincing evidence for 
the allegations (NIOD 2002, p. 1250).
In retrospect, Dutchbat’s mission had all the makings of a ‘mission impossible’, to draw 
on the words used by both journalists and the former commander-in-chief of the Dutch 
army (Klep and Winslow 1999, p. 99, Van de Bildt 2015, p. 119). In the summer of 1995, this 
impossibility materialized in the fall of Srebrenica, which led to the murder of thousands 
of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces, of which the estimated number varies between 
over 7000 and over 8000 (see e.g. NIOD 2002, Karčić 2015). In the beginning of July 1995, 
Bosnian Serb forces laid siege to the Srebrenican enclave, where the third battalion, Dutchbat 
III, was present. On 9 July, Lieutenant-colonel Karremans, commander of Dutchbat III, 
received the following order. ‘You are to use all means at your disposal to establish blocking 
positions to prevent further advances of VRS [Bosnian Serb army] units in the direction of 
the town of Srebrenica. You are to do everything in your power to reinforce those positions, 
including the use of weapons’. The order stated that Karremans could count on all ‘promised 
supplementary resources’, that is, the previously promised Close Air Support (NIOD 2002, 
pp. 1664–5).
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The Dutch troops were now ordered to execute a ‘green order’ (NIOD 2002, p. 1665). 
However, they were still armed with only the light weaponry of peacekeepers, which was 
inadequate for combat situations. In addition, Bosnian Serb blockades had made them run 
dangerously low on fuel, ammunition, food and other supplies. Meanwhile, Bosnian Serb 
forces had stopped many soldiers who had gone on leave from returning to Srebrenica, and 
they took a number of others hostage. As a result, of some 600 soldiers in the third battalion, 
only about 400 were left, including about 200 infantry soldiers (Klep and Winslow 1999, NIOD 
2002, p. 1669, Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005).
The Dutch troops took up blocking positions, occupying strategic positions with armored 
tracked vehicles from which they could fire upon the advancing Bosnian Serb forces. They 
were ordered to return fire over the heads of the advancing Bosnian Serb forces except when 
direct fire was necessary for self-defense, and this is what they did. However, against the 
aggression of an overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serb forces equipped with weaponry that 
included tanks and heavy mortars, Dutchbat commanders felt unable to put up more forceful 
resistance (NIOD 2002, p. 1656 ff., Praamsma et al. 2005). They saw air strikes as their only 
salvation, which they believed would come early in the morning of July 11.1 However, the air 
strikes never came (NIOD 2002, Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005).
In the meantime, a terrified crowd of several thousand Muslim refugees assembled in 
Srebrenica town stormed the small Bravo company compound, which was occupied by 30 
Dutch soldiers. The rest of the company was occupying the blocking positions (NIOD 2002, p. 
1692). After Srebrenica fell, thousands of refugees fled the compound. In this flight, thousands 
of Bosnian Muslim men were either killed at once by mortar fire or captured for execution 
later (NIOD 2002, pp. 1953–4). A number of refugees fled to the second UN compound that 
was inside the enclave of Srebrenica, in Potočari, five kilometers from the compound in 
Srebrenica town. Here, the Charlie Company of Dutchbat was stationed.
The Potočari compound was soon flooded with thousands of refugees, including several 
hundred men (NIOD 2002, p. 2024). There was hardly any food, water or medication, and 
people were in great panic. Women spontaneously gave birth to dead babies; some men 
hanged themselves (NIOD 2002, p. 2125, Praamsma et al. 2005). On July 12, Bosnian Serb 
forces came to deport the refugees by buses. The refugees rushed to get a seat on the buses, as 
many wanted to leave the dire circumstances they were in as soon as possible (NIOD 2002, p. 
2045, Praamsma et al. 2005). The Bosnian Serb forces stated that their aim was to interrogate 
alleged belligerents, and therefore wanted to separate the women and children from the 
men. Dutchbat assisted in the separation and evacuation/deportation of the refugees. By 
assisting, soldiers said later, they were trying to regulate the panic among the refugees, 
mitigate the aggressive way in which the Bosnian Serb forces deported the refugees, and help 
1 Air strikes are not the same as Close Air Support. Commander Karremans requested Close Air Support, which is small-
scale support aimed at threatened positions. However, based on what Karremans announced to the company commanders 
and	the	Bosnian	Muslim	army,	it	seems	he	expected	air	strikes,	which	entails	large-scale	deployment	of	air	power	(NIOD	
2002,	pp.	1699–1705).	 In	any	case,	UNPROFOR	leadership	had	already	decided	and	announced	that	 ‘there	was	not	really	
any	question	of	the	possibility	of	air	strikes	in	July’	(NIOD	2002,	p.	1787	see	also	1662).	It	is	unclear	why	Karremans	believed	
he	had	been	promised	air	strikes	(NIOD	2002,	p.	1789).	Notably,	according	to	documents	uncovered	in	2015,	it	seems	that	
France,	Britain	and	the	US	had	already	agreed	to	suspend	NATO	air	support.	The	Dutch	institute	NIOD	conducted	additional	
exploratory	 research	 into	 this	question.	However,	partially	because	NIOD	was	not	granted	access	by	 these	countries	 to	
classified	information,	it	was	unable	to	draw	new	conclusions	(NIOD	2016).
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as many women and children as they could (NIOD 2002, pp. 2045–6, Praamsma et al. 2005). 
The Bosnian Serb forces later executed the deported men (Klep and Winslow 1999, NIOD 
2002, Praamsma et al. 2005).
In the Netherlands, when it became clear that Dutchbat had not put up robust resistance 
against the Bosnian Serb aggression, heated debates began on who was to blame for this 
tragedy (Klep and Winslow 1999, NIOD 2002, Van de Bildt 2015). While there was sympathy for 
the fact that the Dutch peacekeepers had not been equal to the sheer power of the Bosnian 
Serbs, they were also accused of having been passive cowards and indeed collaborators as 
they had helped to separate the women and children from men. Thousands of local civilians 
had been killed, including the hundreds of boys and men deported from the UN compound in 
Potočari. At the same time, ‘only’ two soldiers died on the Dutch side and Dutchbat soldiers 
stated they had not seen the murders coming. A large part of the domestic public found these 
coupled facts incomprehensible (Klep and Winslow 1999, NIOD 2002, Van de Bildt 2015).
 
Task Force Uruzgan, ISAF
The Srebrenica tragedy damaged the reputation of the Dutch armed forces. The NATO-led ISAF 
mission in Uruzgan, Afghanistan, provided an opportunity to gain redemption (Klep 2011, 
Grandia 2015). This mission was a ‘green helmet’ counterinsurgency operation, meaning that 
soldiers did not have to assume an impartial peacekeeping position but were supposed to 
marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically with a mix of humanitarian 
and combat activities (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2010, Klep 2011, Zaalberg 2013). Compared to the 
UNPROFOR troops, ISAF troops were armed with far heavier weaponry and allowed to use it.
The Dutch government’s decision to contribute troops to the ISAF mission was inspired 
by the desire to present the Netherlands as a trustworthy ally of the United States and the 
‘international community’ (Klep 2011, Grandia 2015). While Dutch troops had already been 
present in Afghanistan since 2002, large-scale Dutch engagement in the region of Uruzgan 
started in 2006, under the header of Task Force Uruzgan. The officially formulated goal of TFU 
was to make a substantial contribution to safety and security, socio-economic development 
and governance. The goals of the mission were thus ambitious but also rather vague (Klep 
2011, pp. 191–2, Grandia 2015, pp. 125; 139).
The decision to contribute troops to the NATO mission met strong domestic criticism 
(Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Klep 2011, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). A large part of both the 
Dutch public and parliament were wary of turning the mission into an offensive operation, 
and some were opposed to participating at all. They warned that the Netherlands should not 
let themselves get hitched to a US war wagon, and insisted that if the Netherlands did join, 
the mission had to revolve around humanitarian activities and reconstruction (Ringsmose 
and Børgesen 2001, Klep 2011, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016).
From the start, parliamentary and public debate centered on the question of whether 
it was a ‘combat mission’ or a ‘reconstruction mission’ (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, 
Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). The Dutch government insisted that it could not be categorized 
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as either one or the other, but at the same time stressed that the emphasis would lie on 
reconstruction of the country (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Klep 2011). The TFU troops 
would engage in combat only if insurgents directly interfered with reconstruction, and the 
Dutch use of force would be less ‘blunt’ than that of the US military (Klep 2011, p. 33). Also, 
Dutch operations would be strictly separate from activities belonging to the US-led Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF), which opposition parties had branded a ‘terrorist hunt’ (TK 2006, 
p. 18, see also Klep 2011, Grandia 2015).2 Generally, the Netherlands would employ a ‘Dutch 
approach’ of subtlety and cultural awareness, and be ‘as civilian as possible, and as military 
as necessary’ (Olsthoorn and Verweij 2012, p. 82). So, while the government did not deny that 
the mission could involve combat, it did frame it in non-martial terms and underlined its 
non-involvement with US-led activities. This created the expectation that the mission would 
revolve around reconstruction and little combat would take place (Ringsmose and Børgesen 
2001, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016).
In practice, the mission could aptly be called a counterinsurgency operation, combining 
humanitarian and combat elements (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Dimitriu and de Graaf 
2010). Though the Dutch government avoided this term because of its martial connotations 
(Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, p. 520, Grandia 2015, p. 147), the Dutch military did indeed 
use the label (Olsthoorn and Verweij 2012). The composition of the Task Force Uruzgan was 
tailored to such a combined approach. Its core components were the Provincial Reconstruction 
Team, consisting of units tasked with reconstruction, and Battle Group units responsible for 
security. Besides protecting the Provincial Reconstruction Team, the Battle Group carried out 
patrols (reconnaissance, social and combat patrols) and tactical operations from forward-
operating bases (Klep 2011, Beeres et al. 2012). Also, frequently under insurgent attack, they 
regularly engaged in combat (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2010, Klep 2011, Beeres et al. 2012).
The image of a reconstruction mission was thus not wholly incorrect. The Dutch troops 
did focus on reconstruction, and although their approach was far less uniquely Dutch than 
the term ‘Dutch approach’ implies, they tried to avoid combat more than their British and 
Canadian counterparts did, for instance (Klep 2011, pp. 40; 151). Especially compared to the 
US-led troops of Operation Enduring Freedom, they had many more constraints (Nagl and 
Weitz 2010). In fact, this applied to ISAF troops in general and resulted in US troops mockingly 
explaining the acronym ISAF as ‘I Saw Americans Fighting’ (Bowman and Dale 2009, p. 
16). This mockery notwithstanding, the Dutch mission was certainly more than merely 
a reconstruction operation. During its course, soldiers had to be ‘as military as necessary’ 
quite frequently. In total, 25 Dutch soldiers died, more than 140 Dutch soldiers were (severely) 
wounded, and many more locals were killed, both insurgents and civilians (Klep 2011, Rietjens 
2012). In other words, although the reconstruction image was more than a myth, it was not 
an accurate representation of reality either. The combat/reconstructing dichotomy existed 
more generally only in the Dutch political and public imagination, not in Uruzgan (Klep 2011, 
Van der Meulen and Grandia 2012, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). As a Dutch major general put 
2 Perhaps interesting to note is that in 2005, the government contributed 250 soldiers to Operation Enduring Freedom 
(Dimitriu et al. 2016, p. 152). While several parties in parliament criticized this decision (ibid), the media did not debate it 
extensively (see e.g. De Volkskrant 2005, Trouw 2005).
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it at the time: ‘Evidently, the operational reality in Uruzgan and the political reality in the 
Netherlands do not always coincide’ (cited in Van der Meulen and Grandia 2012, p. 22).
Besides this discrepancy between framing of the mission and its operational reality, 
there was a gap between objective and resources. The Dutch troop size was too small and 
their mandate too restricted to provide safety and security outside several relatively small 
areas in Uruzgan. In turn, this hampered their undertaking of activities targeting socio-
economic development and governance, and vice versa (Klep 2011, Ruijter et al. 2011). Given the 
resources available, the objective to make a substantial contribution to safety and security, 
development and governance turned out to be overambitious (Klep 2011, Ruijter et al. 2011).
Over the course of the mission, political and public opposition grew. Opposition seemed 
less to do with whether or not the mission’s objectives could be achieved (the situation 
started looking much better toward the end of the mission), and more with increasing 
awareness that the mission progressed differently from what was outlined in advance 
(Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Klep 2011, Van der Meulen and Grandia 2012, Dimitriu and 
Graaf 2016). Public support dwindled because the gap between the expected reconstruction 
mission and the reality on the ground became increasingly clear (Ringsmose and Børgesen 
2001, pp. 520–1, Dimitriu and de Graaf 2010, p. 435). Within political circles, agreed deadlines 
for the withdrawal of Dutch troops and related electoral considerations played an important 
role (Klep 2011, p. 134, Van der Meulen and Grandia 2012, p. 28). In 2010, the Dutch coalition 
government collapsed after a conflict over extension of the mission, which resulted in the 
mission’s termination (Van der Meulen and Grandia 2012). The Dutch soldiers’ performance 
in Uruzgan had been perceived as too soft by their US colleagues, and as too aggressive in 
the Netherlands. 
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Chapter 5. ‘That’s just the way it is’: Uncomplicated Soldiering 
 
Introduction
When a man on a motorbike keeps riding toward the base, ignoring warning shots, when 
should you fire a shot aimed at him? When local men intimidate a local woman, should you 
intervene, even against orders? When local combatants do not abide by any of the laws of 
war, why should you? Given that you will soon leave again anyway, why should you care at all 
about the mission?
The accounts of the interviewed veterans, both Dutchbat and TFU veterans, are full of 
questions like these, revealing the circumstances under which soldiers have to operate and 
the challenges that may come with it. How do soldiers cope with such challenges? For many 
veterans interviewed for this study, reading the above anecdote would bring back disturbing 
memories of similar situations that wounded their minds. However, this would not be the 
case for many other veterans interviewed for this study. They would raise their eyebrows 
at the stressful complexity implied by the anecdote, thinking to themselves that soldiers 
simply have to be able to cope.
In preparation for this study, I attended several military ethics classes. Once, the instructor 
began the lesson by jokingly saying what he knew many soldiers were thinking: ‘oh God, are 
we going to talk about ethics?’ When I spoke with the soldiers in the coffee breaks, about half 
said they found ethics education valuable, but the other half were not that keen on it, not 
only because sitting in a classroom was not their favorite activity but also because they did 
not see the use of it. Although most of the skeptical soldiers had been deployed at least once, 
and agreed that one can experience moral dilemmas on deployment, they said they did not 
see them as ‘real’ dilemmas. ‘You already know what’s wrong and right’, they would say with 
a shrug. ‘You just use your common sense’.
Some of my military acquaintances made similar remarks when I told them about my 
research. Although they agreed that situations with major consequences might cause 
distress, they insisted that they themselves found their job just as uncomplicated as other 
people found theirs. For instance, when I told an acquaintance that I was interested in how 
soldiers deal with the moral side of war, he grinned. He had served six tours and had often 
engaged in combat. ‘Do they never tell you they just like fighting?’ he asked rhetorically, 
reminding me of his excitement when he told me about his deployments.
Interestingly, all interviewed veterans, including those who developed moral distress, 
recounted perceptions of uncomplicatedness. Yet, while most veterans who never 
developed distress still saw their profession as uncomplicated, for those who had found it 
uncomplicated, this view belonged to the past. Their morally distressing experiences had 
irrevocably changed their perception of military practice. To gain comprehensive insight into 
moral distress, it seems important to understand not only veterans’ current perceptions, but 
also the perceptions they held before developing moral distress. Therefore, before zooming 
in on stories of moral distress, as I do in subsequent chapters, here I focus on accounts of 
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moral uncomplicatedness. That is, I focus on the ‘pre-distress’ memories of veterans who 
eventually developed distress, and on the stories of veterans who never did, which turned out 
to be remarkably similar. These accounts will help to gain insight into how soldiers perceive 
their profession in the first place and into the coping strategies they initially use in the face 
of moral challenges. This, in turn, will shed light on how soldiers usually (try to) prevent 
moral distress, which will help to understand why and when moral distress does arise.
This chapter results from an examination of the subquestion: How did Dutchbat and 
TFU soldiers in general interpret and cope with (potential) moral challenges related to their 
profession? First, I discuss how veterans understood their profession in general; second, 
how they interpreted and coped with specific experiences on deployment, and, third, how 
they made sense of their military experience in relation to civil life. Next, on the basis of 
this discussion, I analyze their accounts as ways to maneuver through moral tension, and 
as attempts to cope with potential challenges by relying on the belief that all situations are 
ultimately soluble.
 
The Military Profession
Conscription to the Dutch armed forces was suspended in 1997.1 Thus, TFU units contained 
volunteers (professionals) only. In the case of Dutchbat, soldiers of the Airmobile Brigade 
were all volunteers as well. Of the other Dutchbat soldiers, such as those responsible for 
logistics or communications, some were conscripted at the time they served in the former 
Yugoslavia, but they went on this mission as volunteers. They had been able to choose 
whether they wanted to serve their time in the Netherlands or Germany, or as part of a UN 
mission (see also NIOD 2002, pp. 386; 1010).
All interviewed veterans said they had been eager to serve in their designated mission. 
Why was this? Although their motives and expectations obviously differed, many similarities 
could be found. Contrary to common belief, virtually no veterans expressed any abstract 
ideals. Although all were proud to be deployed, few believed they would serve their country. 
Generally, few had been particularly concerned by any political reason behind their mission. 
Rather, they had been attracted by the idea of adventure, action and comradeship. In the 
words of one veteran, they liked the idea of ‘sports, comradeship, doing things as a team – 
you know, just the military’. Incidentally, expressions like these can be found among soldiers 
worldwide. It has been well-documented that despite buzzwords like ‘serving the country’, 
most soldiers living in countries at peace do not see military service as heroic sacrifice. Their 
primary motives to serve are their affinity with sports, the attraction of comradeship, the 
benefits of a relatively good salary and free education opportunities (see e.g. Bourke 1999, 
Gibson and Abell 2004, Bar and Ben-Ari 2005, Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2013).
1 Suspended means that citizens are no longer forced to undertake military service as long as it is not required for national 
safety.	In	the	Netherlands,	the	transition	from	conscripted	to	all-volunteer	armed	forces	began	in	1991.	The	Dutch	military	
now consists fully of volunteers.
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Yet, it would be incorrect to conclude that soldiers perceive military service as a job with 
no moral dimensions whatsoever. For about half of the interviewed veterans, it had always 
been quite obvious that their profession had a significant moral aspect. These veterans said 
that even if not their primary reason for joining the military, they expected and hoped they 
would be able ‘to help people’ or at least ‘to do something useful’ on their mission. Veterans 
deployed in a medical function voiced this motivation most strongly. At the same time, just 
as many veterans, particularly in the infantry did not mention any altruistic motives and 
insisted they lacked any such motive even when I probed deeper into the issue. For instance, 
if I inquired whether it mattered if the mission had ‘some kind of point’, these veterans 
would shrug in denial, clarifying that although they would have found it ‘a big plus’ if the 
lives of the locals improved, it had not been a motive. They had joined the military because 
they liked sports and adventure, they said, not because they wanted to help people.
Lieutenant Henk’s statements are exemplary of this second attitude. After he denied 
caring about some kind of mission purpose, I asked him whether he at least ‘stood behind 
his missions’, to which he responded ‘not always’ but added that ‘it has nothing to do with 
my job as a soldier’. Like Henk, many veterans said, ‘I just wanted to do what I am trained 
to do’, by which they meant planning, organizing and leading troop activities (in the case 
of officers), or executing their drills and skills in real-life situations (in the case of enlisted 
personnel). Some veterans mockingly called my inquiries about goals or purposes ‘typically 
civilian questions’ and joked that I mistook the military for an NGO. They maintained 
that their job was simply not that complicated, and I was the one making it difficult. More 
seriously, many veterans emphasized that overly idealistic expectations could be dangerous. 
Former NCO Mushin, for instance, said, ‘When a new guy comes in and says “I want to help the 
local population” we immediately say, “Fucker, you’d better not think like that, you’ll come 
back broken”’. As Mushin and others suggested, at the start of their career many veterans had 
already learned that they should rid themselves of the ideal of helping others, as these were 
considered dangerous illusions.
However, when I asked veterans whether they considered themselves comparable to 
mercenaries, they all denied this to be the case. Yes, some said, they were like mercenaries 
in the sense that to them ‘being a soldier is just a job’, and that they did what they did ‘for 
myself’ and ‘for my buddies’ rather than anyone else. But none viewed themselves as people 
who would ‘do just anything for money’. As NCO Boris stated, ‘I just like what I do, but I 
wouldn’t intervene in a country if it didn’t make sense. I’ve got my principles’. Specifically, 
many veterans emphasized that ‘I am not a murderer’. Such a distinction between killing and 
murder was often brought up, just as the distinction between robots and human beings. Even 
amid danger and chaos ‘you’re always there’, veterans stressed, and ‘you always stay human’.
The veterans’ pre-deployment motivations and expectations thus varied from ‘helping 
people’ to ‘putting my training into practice’. However, even the veterans who denied having 
any altruistic motives distinguished themselves from murderers and mercenaries, and 
stressed that soldiers are human rather than robots. The need to do so indicates that these 
veterans also saw their profession as morally significant. They were certainly not opposed to 
the use of force, but they did need it to occur within a framework that gave them justification, 
and they needed to see themselves as moral agents acting out of their own will and values. As 
long as this was the case, they did not find their job morally problematic.
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Challenges during Deployment 
How did these perceptions work in practice? Specifically, how did the interviewed veterans 
interpret and cope with events of tangible violence and suffering on deployment without 
developing distress? Below, I disentangle and explicate the interpretations that featured 
most frequently in their accounts. First, I discuss situations for which veterans did not 
seem to require justifications to cope. Subsequently, I discuss the interpretations veterans 
employed for situations that did need to be justified or at least rationalized.
The Joys of Military Practice: No Justification Needed?
Military talk stands out in its technical terms for manifestations of violence. ‘Troops in 
contact’ and ‘kinetic action’ refer to combat situations. ‘Use of force’ is infliction of harm, 
and ‘to neutralize’ or ‘take out’, specifically, is to wound or kill a person in the opposing 
party. ‘Friendly fire’ or ‘blue on blue’ is the accidental killing of a person in the own troop, 
and ‘collateral damage’ means that people are unintentionally wounded and killed. As 
these examples show, technical jargon not just describes and distinguishes particular 
phenomena, it also euphemizes them into non-emotional and non-moral issues (Bandura 
1999). Consequently, no justification is ever needed for these phenomena.
 Interviewed veterans often used military jargon. Generally, they were often matter-of-
fact about deployment events. Consider the following anecdotes.
A car comes at us fast. It’s about 600 meters away, I give a stop sign. He doesn’t listen, 
keeps on driving. I give him another stop sign, he keeps on driving. At one point, I fire 
into the air, and then at the car. Full on brakes. I hadn’t hit him. He opens the door and it 
turns out it was just two guys who wanted to test how far they could go.
There were days in the Baluchi valley when shit went fucking mad, and at one point a 
message came in over the radio, like ‘anything that moves is the enemy’. From any house 
where they fire at us. (…) That engagement lasted nine hours or so. We fought all day. 
And it was like, the spiral of violence grew tighter and tighter, and when the helicopters 
have to leave at one point to refill their tanks, there’s no air support anymore, things get 
risky, and everyone is then – when you’ve been fighting nine hours, nobody who’s not a 
combatant has any reason to be there. And so the guy running there, he might have just 
put down his weapon, or is just running to a weapon, so he goes down too. Yeah, that’s 
the way it is.
Maybe I did hit a civilian. They were firing at us from between the qalas [housing 
compounds], and from the fields, and you didn’t see anything. I’d find it fucked up if it had 
happened, if I knew it. That’s just shitty. A life is a life. But even if I’d killed a friendly old 
man by accident, it wouldn’t have given me big problems. These things can just happen.
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The veterans who recounted these stories are three of many who spoke about deployment 
events without offering extensive explanations. It’s just ‘the way it is’, and things like this 
‘can just happen’, they would say.
While veterans often employed a factual narrative style, at the same time their accounts 
were usually more ‘raw’ and less ‘clean’ than the texts of military reports. Many TFU veterans, 
for instance, said that they got ‘a kick’ out of engaging in combat.
I found it good, a very special feeling. Combat is just something that… you soar above 
yourself. You become like, if you’re past the fear, at one point, it’s something very unique. 
And something very… primal. Just, warrior, destruction. (…) You feel like some kind of god.
Women and children left the village en masse. And suddenly you heard the first bullets. 
Everybody was actually very excited and we were all laughing, like: ‘awesome-awesome-
awesome!’ And then, you heard mortars slamming. We were like ‘fuuuck!’ [laughs]. 
You’re going to get yourself amped up, like ‘we’re going to fuck them up!’ (…) You can’t go 
and think, like ‘oh they have families too’, you know. (…) You just know what to do. You’re 
not scared of anything.
Look, you’ve got to psych yourself up a bit. The last thing you want is for it to go wrong, 
that you hesitate, that you think: that’s a human being too. At that moment it’s him or 
me. You know, in the past we fought each other with swords. Man is just an animal, you 
know. You have to see yourself as an animal too.
Though not about combat, many Dutchbat veterans also recounted joyful memories. While 
all Dutchbat III veterans (who experienced the fall of Srebrenica), without exception, reported 
deployment-related problems, even many of these veterans said that ‘until mid-May’ – when 
things started to get grim – ‘I had an awesome time’. One veteran said:
For the most part, I had a great time, just what I’d hoped for. (…) Patrolling four, five days 
a week. I was always in front. (…) And having little and bad food. I enjoyed it. Having to 
endure things. I felt on top of the world.Many Dutchbat veterans talked about how they had enjoyed manning observation 
posts and patrolling. Some, moreover, described instances of bullets being fired over their heads as exciting ‘adrenaline rushes’. Even for Dutchbat III veterans, such occurrences were not worrying in the beginning. They were, after all, in a war zone.
I am not the first to note that military accounts are often filled with statements of joy rather than expressions of moral concern. Ferguson, for instance, signals that many of the soldiers of World War One ‘simply took pleasure in killing’ (1998, p. 358), and Gray (1959, p. 28) similarly notes that many soldiers are attracted by ‘the delight in seeing, the delight in comradeship, the delight in destruction’. Bourke (1999) and Bar 
and Ben-Ari (2005), too, argue that once soldiers overcome their resistance to fighting and killing, they often enjoy it. These statements resonate with the accounts of the interviewed veterans. This does not mean, however, that the feelings they described 
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can be put down to ‘fun’. No interviewed veteran called it ‘fun’, but rather used words 
such as ‘good’ and ‘unique’. They often described a confluence of antagonistic feelings, including fear, adrenaline and excitement, reminiscent of how Vietnam veteran and novelist O’Brien describes war stories. As he writes, ‘war is mystery and terror and adventure and courage and discovery and holiness and pity and despair and longing and love. War is nasty; war is fun. War is thrilling; war is drudgery. War makes you a man; war makes you dead’ (O’Brien 1990, pp. 86–87). In a similar vein, Gray states that if ‘we think of beauty and ugliness without their usual moral overtones, there is often a weird but genuine beauty in the sight of massed men and weapons in combat’ (1959, p. 31).What does this mean in moral terms? Again, Gray’s and O’Brien’s writings are illustrative. Gray argues that to look at war in esthetic terms ‘involves a neglect of moral ideals’ (1959, p. 39). O’Brien adds, a ‘true war story does not instruct, nor encourage virtue, nor suggest models of proper human behavior. (…) There is no rectitude whatsoever. (…) Send guys to war, they come home talking dirty’ (1990, p. 76). Indeed, the accounts of the interviewed veterans are not just ridden with ‘sanitizing’ technical terminology and factual descriptions of drills, they are full of raw emotional and dirty language. At the same time, the two languages have something in common. Both technical talk and talk of the bizarre beauty of destruction make moral questions 
look irrelevant, thus rendering justifications and rationalizations unnecessary. Such 
talk makes it possible to think and speak of military practice without justification or rationalization.
 
Justifications and Rationalizations 
The previous section quoted Dutchbat and TFU veterans speaking of deployment events as 
’the way it is’, and as things that ‘can just happen’. In doing so, they did more than merely 
describe their experience. They also made a statement, namely that one cannot and should 
not judge. However, as their distinction between murderers and killers has revealed, this 
does not mean that they believed there is no morality in war whatsoever, that ‘all is fair in 
love and war’. If they did, they would not have found moral explanations for their conduct. 
But just as often as they refrained from explanations, they did explain their conduct as right 
or excusable. Below, I discuss four kinds of justifications and rationalizations that veterans 
offered: doing good, rules and instructions, reciprocity, and numbness.
Doing Good
A first justification veterans offered came in the form of referring to the ‘good things’ they 
had done on deployment. Particularly veterans who hoped they would be able to help other 
people tended to give examples of how they had been able to do good. These examples, 
however, were always rather modest. Both Dutchbat and TFU veterans, from privates to 
senior officers, generally did not point to achievements of their overall mission. In line with 
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expectations, many veterans were unsure if their mission had actually contributed to large-
scale improvements. Accordingly, when they invoked achievements, these would always 
be very specific examples of how they had been able to do something good during their 
deployment.
Dutchbat II veteran Gert, for instance, said that as soon as it was clear that demilitarizing 
the enclave of Srebrenica was impossible, his unit started carrying out social patrols to see 
if there was at least something they could do for the local population. On two patrols, Gert 
helped a woman giving birth. And ‘even though it was against the rules’, he regularly gave 
away ‘food and other stuff’. It gave him a good feeling to be able to help like this, he recalled. 
It was ‘all I could do, and I’m happy that I could do it’.
When veterans related anecdotes like these, they often added statements such as ‘I’ve been 
able to give at least one person a smile on his face’. Such statements suggest that ‘doing good’ 
is not only satisfying in itself, but serves as compensation when bigger accomplishments are 
hard to identify. Yet, even small achievements were relatively scarce in the stories of most 
veterans. The majority of the interviewed veterans did not recall any event in which their 
presence had directly and noticeably helped the local population. So, justifications in terms 
of the righteousness and usefulness of an event were often not at hand. Instead, veterans 
often recounted situations in which harm was inflicted upon people. Still, as became clear 
when listening to their accounts, they had many other ways to make sense of and cope with 
such situations.
 
Rules and Instructions
Besides doing good, another kind of moral explanation that many veterans put forward 
involved rules and instructions. In line with other studies (e.g. Bourke 1999, Grassiani 2009), 
rules and instructions were in the most frequently offered explanation. For example, let me 
consider the ethics class discussed previously. At one point during this class, the instructor 
showed a PowerPoint slide of two pyramids. One stood for a soldier’s ‘personal morality’, the 
other signified a soldier’s ‘professional morality’. Dissatisfied, one sergeant raised his hand 
and asked where the pyramid with ‘instruction’ was, clarifying, ‘We don’t have the luxury to 
act from our personal moralities, we just have to do what we’re told’. This kind of reasoning 
was abundant in veterans’ accounts of their deployment experiences. Veterans from all ranks 
frequently stated that ‘those were simply your drills’, they ‘just had to follow orders’, they 
were ‘bound by the Rules of Engagement’, and that their decisions were ‘dictated by the 
mandate’.
Besides describing institutional constraint, statements like these often also served as a 
coping strategy. Take the following anecdote recounted by Thijs, an NCO in Afghanistan.
We were on patrol, and then we heard colleagues had engaged in fire contact, and that we 
had to go there. And on our way there, we saw a woman with a small child, dead in her 
arms. She asked us for help, but we couldn’t help, because our prio was to go to that fire 
contact. So, yeah, you let a person stand there at the side of the road with a dead child. (…) 
I was the one who said (…) ‘Shouldn’t we do something?’ [but my commander said,] ‘Our 
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prio is to go there, so no, we can’t now’. Well, then there is nothing I can do, you know. 
At least, for myself, I said it.
Thijs had not found the situation easy, but he had been able to come to terms with it because 
he believed he had done all he could; he did not have the power and did not consider it his 
responsibility to do more than what he did.
Many veterans suggested that as long as they followed the rules and instructions, they 
could not be held responsible for their conduct, since they were not the ones who made the 
rules or issued the orders. Moreover, many expressed a belief in the rightness of adhering 
to rules and instructions, stating that even if one does not agree with a decision personally, 
obedience and conformity are still the right thing to do. Former private Jim, for instance, 
said the following.
I was a soldier in the Air Maneuver [Brigade], and there it was like, everyone had their say, 
like, ‘We could also do it like this’. (…) But, it’s not our job to be hesitating all the time, 
like ‘Um… shouldn’t we…’ It doesn’t work. The strength of the military is that you… you 
build a shield together, you strive for the same goal together. (…) I can name eight soldiers 
right now who think differently about things than I do. And exactly because of that, it’s so 
important that everyone sticks to that single task, because we’re all so different. If we all 
chose to go our own way, we’d get nowhere.
Like Jim, many veterans not only claimed that adherence to rules and instructions was all 
they could do in some cases, it was also that they should do. In these cases, the rationale of 
rules and instructions did not mean a rejection of responsibility, but rather the opposite. 
Adhering to rules and instructions, ‘putting aside’ one’s personal beliefs was regarded the 
soldier’s responsibility. Some veterans put forward ‘uniformity’ as an explanation for this, 
others reasoned that they trusted the judgments of their superiors. In both cases, they 
believed it was morally right to withhold one’s own personal verdicts when necessary, and 
instead obey the will of superiors and the military organization. Put differently, they believed 
that an instrumental position was the soldiers’ moral responsibility.
 
Reciprocity
Soldiering cannot always be as straightforward as following rules and instructions. For 
commanding officers, this is definitely not the case: it is their very job to issue orders. Yet, 
the issue is more complicated for soldiers in the lower ranks as well. Even when the rules 
and instructions are clear, they are always indefinite. Consider, for instance, the situation 
of being approached by the driver of a vehicle who could be just as well an innocent person 
as a suicide bomber. In Afghanistan, there were clear instructions for what to do in such 
situations: verbal warnings, then warning shots, then aimed shots. Yet, the instructions did 
not specify when exactly the soldier should take a second warning shot, or even an aimed 
shot, and this decision could make the difference between being called ‘trigger happy’ 
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and accused of endangering the own unit. Rules and instructions are never exhaustive and 
knowing that one has adhered to them is not always enough to ease one’s conscience.
 Hence, besides adherence, veterans often invoked other rationales. One I frequently 
heard was ‘it was him or me’. Unsurprisingly, veterans said this when talking about direct 
fire contact. Yet, some used it for other scenarios, extending ‘him or me’ to ‘them versus 
us’ (opponents versus colleagues), and beyond direct situations of ‘kill or be killed’. A field 
artillery veteran, for instance, used the phrase when speaking about operating a long-
distance howitzer. ‘It’s him dead or me dead’, he said. ‘Well, that’s an easy choice for me. My 
colleagues asked for my support for a reason’. Although the veteran had been in no direct 
danger when operating the howitzer, he still used ‘him dead or me dead’ to refer to the 
opponent versus the infantry colleagues he supported.
 As Bourke also suggests (1999, p. 214), it seems that soldiers may not only use him-
versus-me as a rule of survival, but also as a formula of reciprocity, that is, of ‘doing unto 
the other as he would do to you”. Consider the following anecdote. One day in Afghanistan, 
a Dutch platoon hit an IED [roadside bomb], and although everyone was lucky enough to 
survive, the explosion made a great impact. A few days later, the platoon caught a man 
suspected of being responsible for placing IEDs. One soldier lost his calm and punched the 
man in the face. His colleague, who told me about this incident, completely understood the 
soldier’s reaction. ‘Of course you can give someone a good punch when he wants to blow 
you up’, he told me. ‘War is nasty. Super nice that we’ve got international laws, but war has 
never been anything pretty’. This veteran felt that his colleague had had the right to punch 
someone who had wanted to kill him, even if what he did was strictly against both legal rules 
and military norms. It was a matter of reciprocity, and reciprocity is ‘fair’. Incidentally, the 
rationale of reciprocity could work the other way around, for instance in the case of Dutchbat 
veterans giving food and clothes to local people who they believed deserved support for 
being so friendly, even though it was against the rules.
When the logic of reciprocity could not be applied, it appeared harder to justify conduct, 
as the following example shows. In a digital television program (NRC TV 2009), a Dutch 
veteran recounted having killed an insurgent and a dromedary in Afghanistan. Killing the 
armed opponent never bothered him. ‘He fired at me, I fired at him. I hit him, I won’, he said 
about this. However, the dromedary’s death often gave him nightmares. It had been gravely 
wounded during the firefight, and he had been ordered to shoot the animal to free it from its 
suffering. All the veteran could say was that it was ‘harsh’.
 
Distancing and Numbing
The final explanation that veterans offered for deployment events was emotional distance and 
‘numbness’. They mentioned numbness, for instance, to rationalize negative or indifferent 
behavior to the local population. Let me take some space to discuss this in the context of the 
Dutchbat mission. Most Dutchbat veterans recounted being initially affected by the poverty 
and suffering they saw in Srebrenica, especially seeing children walking around barefoot and 
in dirty clothes. In the course of the mission, many veterans developed a kind of friendship 
with the children who hung around the observation posts. At the same time, many found 
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themselves becoming indifferent – ‘numb’ – to the local people’s suffering. Several veterans 
disclosed, for instance, that they had pushed away children begging for sweets, and openly 
ridiculed adults.
Both Dutchbat and TFU veterans mentioned this numbing process. In line with study 
findings on US and Israeli soldiers (Lifton 1973, Grassiani 2009), the Dutch veterans said that 
their negative behavior to the population was because they had become desensitized to the 
pain of others. Interestingly, however, many interviewed veterans also gave desensitization 
as an example of good conduct. They related having deliberately ‘built a kind of shield 
around myself’ because they needed it ‘to do my job’. Consider what former Dutchbat III 
private Frank has to say.
On social patrols, I didn’t go inside houses. I wanted to keep a distance, I didn’t want to 
bond too much with the people [because] that makes you weaker. I didn’t want to go and 
drink Slivovitz [local brandy] with them. You have to do your job.
Frank had fully experienced the fall of Srebrenica. He felt that because he had kept a 
distance throughout his mission, he had been able to stay alert and keep functioning.
Like Frank, many veterans saw emotional and moral detachment as professionalism. 
Indeed, this is what they had been taught in training, including phrases such as ‘you can 
switch off emotions’. Traditionally, soldiers are trained in ‘disciplining the emotions’ (Bourke 
1998), and in being able to ‘suck up’ feelings that may hinder them in performing well 
(Molendijk et al. 2016). This includes a process of self-distancing and to some extent even self-
dehumanization (Verrips 2004), as is indicated by the names Dutch soldiers call themselves, 
such as ‘bodies’ and ‘carcasses’. As mentioned before, soldiers teach themselves and each 
other to stay aware of the fact that they are ‘just instruments of the state’. Accordingly, the 
interviewed veterans linked emotional and moral detachment to professionalism. Some 
seemed to approach detachment as a goal in itself, others explained it as a way to prevent 
doubts and worries, and yet others seemed to see it as a way to be able to do what they 
thought was morally right: their ‘duty’.
 
The Military Profession in Relation to Civil Life
While the abovementioned justifications may work in a military belief system, they have 
little impact on potential tension between the military belief system and the beliefs soldiers 
have developed as civilians. In the civilian world, justifications such as following orders, 
reciprocity and numbness do not apply as they seem to do in the military. Violence and 
killing, specifically, are not as easily justified in a civilian setting as they are in a deployment 
area, both in legal and in moral terms (cf. Bica 1999, Shue 2005, Bredow 2006). Certainly, 
in both military and civilian contexts, violence is only permitted in certain circumstances. 
However, in the civilian world, these circumstances tend to be far more restrictive and 
violence is not called ‘use of force’ but simply ‘violence’. As Sørensen states, ‘While the social 
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norms governing civilian life prohibit and sanction violence, it is central to the soldier’s 
profession’ (Sørensen 2015, p. 233).
This raises the question of how soldiers deal with such cultural and moral differences. 
While reintegration after deployment may be hard for some, many can clearly make the 
transition to civilian life without significant problems. As various scholars (e.g. Senger 1985, 
Bourke 1999, Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2013) have noted in surprise, after having fought and 
killed without restraint on a mission, many soldiers can pick up their lives afterwards as 
civilians and never use violence again. These scholars wondered: why does war not produce 
aggressive individuals in general, and how can so many veterans re-adapt, on their return 
from deployment?
A frequently offered answer to these questions is that both soldiers and society at large 
distinguish between the civilian and military moral sphere, and accordingly, between two 
distinct role moralities (Senger 1985, Bourke 1998). Hence, it is argued, a distinction is made 
between ‘killing’ and ‘murder’ and between ‘using force’ and ‘committing violence’: the 
context defines the morality of violence. Soldiers are able and willing to fight and kill in war 
without remorse because it occurs in a military context, while in other contexts, their civilian 
morality prevails (Senger 1985, Bourke 1998). This argument is in line with the general notion 
that people always hold multiple beliefs and have multiple identities, without necessarily 
being aware of it (e.g. Ewing 1990, Jones and McEwen 2000, Roccas and Brewer 2002, Zigon 
2008, De Swaan 2015). With respect to conflicting beliefs and identities, it has been noted 
that people may employ fragmentation (Tsang 2002) or compartmentalization (e.g. Roccas 
and Brewer 2002, De Swaan 2015). These mechanisms deal with conflicting beliefs and 
identities by keeping them in separate ‘compartments’ of the self and act on each other only 
in distinct contexts. By not activating incompatible identities at the same time, people can 
maintain each one separately.2
The accounts of the interviewed veterans echo the notion of compartmentalization. In 
typical military parlance, veterans often said they ‘switched mindsets’. One veteran phrased 
it as follows: ‘I always kept in mind, what’s there is there and what’s here is here, period’. 
Many veterans said, ‘I just did my job’ on deployment, and at home ‘I’m just a civilian’. In a 
military context, they did what their superiors told them without needing to fully understand 
the purpose of their assignments, while in a civilian context, they would rather engage in 
discussion before following orders blindly. In the field, they had brothers-in-arms for whom 
they would risk their lives and opponents they would shoot without hesitation, while at 
home, their world was far less dichotomous than a realm of friends and foes. On deployment, 
they may have acted negatively and even aggressively to the locals because ‘that’s just the way 
it is’ over there, but at home, they would not act like that at all.
2 De Swaan (2015) invokes the concept of compartmentalization to examine the question of why so many people in 
history have been willing and able to engage in torture, rape, mass murder and so on. He uses the concept to explain, 
inter alia, how a man can be a cruel torturer and simultaneously a loving husband and father. Crucially, De Swaan argues 
that compartmentalization at the micro-level usually occurs in the broader contexts of social, institutional and political 
compartmentalization, which allowed individuals to mutilate and kill other humans without becoming changed in all 
aspects of their lives.
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Meanwhile, many veterans emphasized that they did not find their job so extraordinary. 
They stressed that soldiering is a job, and away from that job, they are simply civilians.3 Some 
veterans asked rhetorically if their job is so different from that of a police officer. They said 
that just like police officers, soldiers act in the name of the state, exist for the benefit of their 
fellow civilians, and kill only in self-defense or to protect others. Sure, they added, some of 
their fellow civilians are opposed to the use of force, but don’t they have the luxury to oppose 
violence because of the very fact that soldiers take up that nasty job for them? Don’t soldiers 
go to war so that others do not have to? ‘Some men are morally opposed to violence. They are 
protected by men who are not’, several veterans posted on Facebook.
Statements like these suggest that veterans’ multiple mindsets are not simply a matter of 
split identities. Rather, it seems that they should be understood as interconnected mindsets 
that reinforce one another; the military mindset supports the civilian one, and vice versa. 
In the above statements, the veterans implied that like civilians, they find war nasty, which, 
however, would make soldiering a more virtuous instead of a less virtuous profession. Regular 
civilians would enjoy the luxury of judging war from a safe distance without worrying about 
how they can have this luxury in the first place. But soldiers would have the moral courage 
to go to war. By claiming that society needs people to fight for them, and that soldiers are 
the members of society who take up this dirty job, veterans asserted the presence of a ‘yin/
yang’ kind of balance, not only between soldiers and society but also within themselves. 
This allowed them to justify soldiering, not despite the fact that soldiers are also non-violent 
civilians, but because of it. In this respect, considering themselves both soldiers and civilians 
made it easier rather than harder for them to do their job.
 
Maneuvering Through Tensions
The previous sections examined various ways in which veterans made sense of military 
practice, including events of violence. How to interpret these findings in a broader sense? 
Considering military violence, research often takes one of the two following approaches. 
One line research argues that it requires intensive cognitive and bodily conditioning for 
‘normal’ people to be able to use force and kill, (e.g. Bourke 1999, Bandura 2002). These 
studies argue that although humans are generally reluctant to use violence, military training 
helps them overcome their moral inhibitions to fighting and killing. Training drills, strong 
group cohesion and conditioned obedience to military superiors would produce a certain 
moral ‘desensitization’. Military training would alter soldiers’ moral standards in favor of 
fighting, make them select collective interests over individual ones and stop them from 
questioning orders (e.g. Bourke 1999, Bandura 2002). Put differently, these studies argue that 
it is the power of denial, deresponsibilization and justification strategies that allows soldiers 
to perceive the use of force as completely acceptable conduct. 
3	 It	may	be	worth	pointing	out	that	in	the	Netherlands	the	military	does	not	penetrate	a	soldier’s	daily	life	to	the	extent	that	
it	does	in	the	US,	for	instance.	Due	to	the	small	size	of	the	country,	soldiers	do	not	have	to	move	for	their	job;	most	are	able	
to go home every day. There are no military communities that house huge numbers of soldiers and their families, and most 
veterans I interviewed had more civilian than military friends.
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Another line of research states that in many cases even intensive training cannot prevent 
feelings of guilt. For some years after the Vietnam war, it was common to describe trauma 
as ‘a normal reaction to an abnormal event’ (Nash et al. 2009, p. 791, Meichenbaum 2011, p. 
325). Both Grossman (1995) and Bica (1999), in fact, suggest that lack of remorse after killing is 
the abnormal response. Grossman estimates that only two to three percent of all soldiers are 
capable of aggression without subsequent remorse, namely the percentage of ‘sociopaths’ that 
can be found in any male population (Grossman 1995, p. 182). Likewise, Bica explains the fact 
that some soldiers enjoy killing without developing feelings of guilt as ‘a previous psychological 
abnormality, or some uncanny ability for rationalization and pretense’ and asserts that many 
soldiers are ‘profoundly affected by their participation in war’ (Bica 1999, p. 88). 
So, while studies on trauma point to military violence as the source of experiences of 
distress, studies of justification bring forward these strategies as ways in which people 
prevent distress when inflicting harm on others. Despite their differences, the two lines of 
research also have something in common: they both consider violence as something that in 
essence produces inner conflict. In the light of prevailing societal taboos on violence and 
killing, this contention makes sense. But what to make of the fact that many Dutchbat and 
TFU veterans simultaneously denied that their profession is morally complicated, let alone 
problematic? Considered from the view that military practice essentially produces dissonance 
and conflict, their denial would have to be interpreted as a self-deceiving strategy. However, 
I find that interpretation, which seems to say less about veterans’ moral beliefs than about 
those of the researchers studying veterans, partially unsatisfactory. I found that although 
military practice certainly gives rise to tensions, it does not always produce as much conflict 
as one might expect given the circumstances in which soldiers operate. My findings led me to 
a middle ground between the view that soldiers never experience moral challenges and the 
position that they find violence actually highly problematic.
Let me explain my contention. Although the interviewed veterans sometimes drew a 
distinction between being a ‘soldier’ and a ‘human being’, they also spoke of military duties 
and values as personal commitments. Their narratives indicate that having control over life 
and death may not only be disturbing but also pleasurable, that insisting on following orders 
may not only mean refusing to accept responsibility but may also derive from a personal 
conviction that obedience is the right and responsible thing to do, and that shutting oneself 
off to suffering in others may not always imply moral desensitization but may also be 
necessary to continue doing good work. Moreover, the veterans’ narratives indicate that 
although the political objectives of a mission may not give soldiers a sense of purpose, they 
could compensate for this lack of purpose by focusing on military goals (doing one’s job) and 
personal goals (making at least one person smile and/or putting one’s training into practice). 
Finally, the narratives show that while soldiers may experience dissonance between the 
military environment and society at large, they may also experience a sense of balance 
between the two.
That said, the interviewed veterans were not always consistent in their justifications, 
which suggests that although soldiering does not necessarily produce conflict, it is not 
altogether without tension either. In some cases, for instance, a veteran would invoke the 
rationale of rules and instructions as an absolute imperative overriding all other concerns 
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(‘we just have to do what we’re told’; ‘we’re simply bound by the rules of engagement’), 
while in other cases, the same veteran would easily set this commitment aside (giving food 
to locals ‘even though it was against the rules’; ‘nice that we’ve got international laws, but 
war has never been anything pretty’). In these cases, veterans presented themselves as either 
obedient soldiers, autonomous moral agents, or humans with shortcomings pressured by 
the nastiness of war, not as all of these persons at one and the same time.
So, while the veterans’ accounts indicate that the various roles that soldiers assume 
(instrument/agent; civilian/soldier) are not incompatible by definition, the inconsistency 
in their accounts on the whole suggests that these roles do not always co-exist in harmony 
either. When roles do conflict, it seems, soldiers respond by assuming one role and rejecting 
the others. By being inconsistent in this, they do not have to give up any of role. A flexible, 
sometimes inconsistent use of various justifications offers them a way to maneuver through 
the tensions they encounter when their multiple moral commitments turn out to be 
irreconcilable, without experiencing irresolvable conflict and without experiencing a loss of 
one of their self-perceptions.
This mechanism, it seems, is not confined to soldiers. As suggested before, people 
in general tend to see themselves and the world in terms of coherence, which is possible 
because people maneuver through life largely unreflectively (cf. Ewing 1990, Zigon 2008). 
The fact that one does not – and cannot – always behave consistently appears to be an 
unpleasant fact, and people need to deny unpleasant facts in order to protect themselves 
(Ewing 1990, Goleman 1996). That said, denial of tension appears to be particularly strong 
among soldiers, whom the military has taught to rely on a ‘can-do’ attitude and perceive 
doubt, uncertainty and conflict as ‘bad’. Soldiers, it seems, tend to interpret situations such 
that they become uncomplicated and always soluble, while at the same time, they tend to 
deny that the very reason they adopt such an interpretation is because military situations are 
often complicated and without real solution.
 
Conclusion
Soldiers are both service members and civilians, and both instruments and agents. Because 
these roles involve competing moral requirements, one might expect military practice to 
be defined by fundamental tensions. But is this really the case in the experience of soldiers? 
In this chapter, I examined this question, by adopting a more open approach than the one 
that readily reduces justifications to evidence that soldiers actually find their job highly 
problematic. The aim of this approach was not to make a normative argument, but to better 
comprehend why and when soldiers do develop moral distress. I found that the interviewed 
veterans generally did not experience as much conflict as one might expect. Yet, this does not 
mean that they never felt tension, and when they did, they tended to resolve it by relying on 
the belief that all situations are ultimately uncomplicated and soluble. A flexible, sometimes 
inconsistent use of various unequivocal justifications enabled this.
In short, one could say, if one sees something as uncomplicated, it is uncomplicated. 
However, it seems, soldiers may also be confronted by events for which simple justifications 
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turn out to be untenable, especially since military missions are becoming ever more complex. 
Present-day missions are often asymmetrical, not ‘fair play’, and in most situations ‘kill or 
be killed’ does not apply. Contemporary soldiers often have to work among and sometimes 
with civilians, while insurgents may disguise themselves as civilians and use civilians as 
cover, thus increasing the risk of non-combatant casualties. Furthermore, today’s soldiers 
often have to assume both combat and humanitarian roles. They may have to fight, build 
good relations with the local population, and engage in stabilization and reconstruction 
work, all in the same mission, and when these tasks conflict with one another they may leave 
a soldier unsure of the right thing to do. In other words, contemporary missions confront 
soldiers with many moral complexities that seem difficult to simplify and resolve. As I will 
argue in the next chapter, when a soldier is confronted by a high-stake situation that resists 
straightforward justifications, this may produce disorientating inner conflict. In fact, it 
could well be that some of the clear-cut explanations quoted in this chapter were actually 
attempts to stifle latent inner conflicts, which may or may not have turned out successfully.
6
Chapter 6. Moral Disorientation and Ethical Struggles: Moral Distress 
at the Individual Level1
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that soldiers may deal with the complexity of military practice 
by making soldiering less complex. Confronted by moral challenges on deployment, they 
may let one moral commitment override the other. If they do this flexibly, they can maneuver 
through situations without experiencing irresolvable conflict or having to abandon certain 
commitments entirely. With respect to the tension between being both soldier and civilian, 
they may compartmentalize these two selves, prioritizing the former in military contexts and 
allowing the latter to supersede in civilian contexts. If they interpret their two selves in terms 
of a ‘yin/yang’ kind of balance, they can see soldiering as justified, not in spite of the fact that 
they are civilians too, but because of it. Yet, as this chapter will show, these strategies do not 
always work. The complexity of morally challenging situations cannot always be simplified 
and particular actions cannot always be unequivocally justified or excused. In this chapter, I 
examine when and how moral challenges engender moral distress.
As I argued in Chapter 2, the current concept of moral injury conceptualizes moral 
distress as a conflict between a person’s moral beliefs and an act of transgression, but it 
gives no consideration to the possibility that moral beliefs may conflict with one another. 
The implicit assumption seems to be that a person’s moral beliefs constitute a harmonious 
unity (Molendijk et al. 2018). However, a person’s moral beliefs constitute a complex, ‘messy’ 
total of multiple and potentially competing values (e.g. Zigon 2008, Hitlin and Vaisey 2013, 
Tessman 2014, Molendijk et al. 2018). Accordingly, although some events may certainly be 
experienced as unequivocal transgressions of all of one’s moral beliefs, there may also be 
ambivalent experiences. In the previous chapter, I discussed moral tensions between being 
an instrument and an agent, and a soldier and a civilian. Here I explore the implications 
of such tensions for experiences of distress to refine the conceptualization of the potential 
conflicts at play in ‘moral injury’.
This chapter examines the subquestion: Did Dutchbat and TFU veterans report distress 
related to moral challenges, and if so, what did these challenges and experiences of distress 
entail? I begin with two illustrative stories, after explaining why I chose to present my data 
like this. Then I discuss three main themes that emerged in the analysis of veterans’ stories – 
value conflict, moral detachment and senselessness – arguing that each theme demonstrates 
an experience more complex than unequivocal wrongdoing. Next, I examine the impact of 
these experiences on veterans. I show that veterans may come to feel not only guilt and anger, 
but also profound moral disorientation, meaning that they may start to doubt their own and 
others’ ability to do good, and even the very notions of good and bad. Finally, I argue for the 
value of understanding moral distress in terms of an ethical struggle, to go beyond a strict 
1 A	 version	 of	 this	 chapter	 appeared	 in	 2018	 as	 ‘Toward	 an	 Interdisciplinary	 Conceptualization	 of	 Moral	 Injury:	 From	
Unequivocal	Guilt	and	Anger	to	Moral	Conflict	and	Disorientation’	in	New Ideas in Psychology,	51:	1-8.
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pathology-focused understanding toward one that can properly capture moral dimensions 
of moral distress.
 
Two Stories of Moral Distress
Although the accounts of moral distress I heard differed in content, they revealed similar 
themes. At the same time, they showed that veterans’ experiences were always part of a larger 
story. Below, therefore, I will first take the time to relate the stories of two veterans, and 
subsequently discuss several themes that these and the other stories I heard had in common. 
Before doing so, let me explain in some more detail how I came to structure this chapter the 
way I did. 
At the start of my study, I expected that the dissimilar ways in which Dutchbat and 
TFU veterans were exposed to violence would affect their experiences of moral distress 
differently. While Dutchbat troops were mainly bystanders of violence, TFU soldiers often 
had to use force. However, interestingly, the stories of both groups were mostly about failing 
to do something or letting people down, and seldom about active wrongdoing. As Chapter 
7 will note, this similarity can partially be explained by the fact that both missions had 
many restrictions. In general, both groups had remarkably similar stories of moral distress. 
Therefore, it is the similarities on which I will focus in this chapter. 
My findings also turned out to differ from my expectations in another way. Initially, I 
intended to analyze veterans’ accounts by precisely distinguishing the specific values and 
interests at stake, expecting I would be able to identify, for instance, conflicts between a 
military value and a personal value. However, during the analytical process, I found two 
problems with this approach. First, the complex accounts could not be simply disentangled. 
Countless values and interests often played important roles and the veterans were often 
overwhelmingly unclear and uncertain about the specific conflicts they had experienced. 
My intended approach, then, would force the complexity of veterans’ experiences to fit into 
prefabricated boxes. Moreover, it would turn the unintelligible aspects of veterans’ stories 
into a legible overview, while this very unintelligibility was an important reason why their 
experiences made such a profound impact on them.
Further, although veterans’ stories were often about specific events, they were never only 
about these specific events. Not one interviewed veteran invoked just the one disturbing 
event; there were always more. And when they described disturbing events, they typically set 
them in the context of things that happened before, during and after the events. Together, 
all these elements shaped the meaning veterans attributed to each of these events, and it 
is the meaning of an event that does or does not make it disturbing (see e.g. Janoff-Bulman 
1992, Park 2010, 2013). Although some events are more likely than others to produce distress, 
meaning is not a property of an event. It is a subjective appraisal, informed by the context of 
the event (see e.g. Finley 2011, Muldoon and Lowe 2012).
For these reasons, I chose not to disentangle the very specific values and interests at stake 
in morally disturbing situations, but distinguished broader themes. My analysis uncovered 
the themes of value conflict, moral detachment, and senselessness. In addition, instead of 
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breaking down veterans’ accounts directly into these three themes, I opted to first relate two 
stories – from one Dutchbat veteran and one TFU veteran – in their entirety.2 These stories 
serve as contextualized examples of how these themes occurred in veterans’ accounts, to 
illustrate the manifold ways in which all their experiences together shaped the significance 
of specific events. Also, in anticipation of the subsequent chapters, the stories serve to paint 
a picture of how the experiences were embedded in a particular sociopolitical context. 
Following the first two stories, I will weave in the accounts of several other veterans as 
further examples.
It should be emphasized that the way I present the two stories does not entirely reflect the 
fragmented ways in which the narrators and other veterans spoke about their experiences. 
Having tried a fragmented representation of their stories, I chose to follow narrative standards 
of chronological synchronization. Of course, presentation of data always requires some 
synthesis so that the reader can fully appreciate the result (even a fragmented representation 
inevitably would have involved modification). Yet, because complexity and unintelligibility 
are important themes in this and subsequent chapters, it is relevant to explicate this point. 
Instead of giving comprehensive accounts of distressing events, veterans often described 
them in general, distant terms (‘I had to decide whether to approve an order to bomb a qala 
that had both my own troops and OMF in it. That moment is seared in my brain’.) or they 
gave details without much context (‘So there you are. Blue helmet and Uzi. They waved: Bye! 
That’s it’.). Even when they spoke about events in great detail, they often could not give clear 
explanations. Their accounts lacked the ordering structure and explanatory context that 
usually characterize stories. This is well-known in trauma studies, and the explanations for it 
range from unconscious avoidance behavior to neurological malfunction (Herman 1967, Hull 
2002). Also, foreshadowing a finding I discuss further below, it seems that this lack of clarity 
was a manifestation of veterans’ confusion as to what their experience entailed and meant.
 
Bob’s Story: Srebrenica
Bob was one of the last conscripts to the Dutch military. He liked sports, and at the time he 
joined he was unsure of what he wanted in life. After his mandatory service, he volunteered 
to join the newly founded Air Maneuver Brigade, knowing that he would be sent to the former 
Yugoslavia. He saw the mission as a ‘nice challenge’. His basic training was tough, especially 
mentally, but he completed it. He was proud to receive his red beret, which is worn only by 
members of the Air Maneuver Brigade. The preparatory phase for the Dutchbat mission in 
the former Yugoslavia started right after Bob completed his basic training. Bob remembers 
finding the transition between the two trajectories difficult. As an infantry soldier, he was 
drilled for combat in basic training, whereas the preparation for the Dutchbat mission 
focused entirely on his being a UN peacekeeper. It felt ‘contradictory’.
2 To	be	clear,	the	story	I	selected,	from	a	Dutchbat	III	veteran,	is	rather	different	from	those	of	Dutchbat	I	and	Dutchbat	II	
veterans in that they did not experience the fall of Srebrenica. Yet, the selected story includes many experiences similar to 
those	recounted	by	veterans	of	the	first	two	battalions.	Moreover,	as	suggested,	the	similarities	extend	beyond	Dutchbat:	
their	stories	also	have	much	in	common	with	those	of	TFU	veterans.
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In January 1995, Bob was deployed as a private in Dutchbat III. His unit, the Bravo Company, 
was stationed in the town of Srebrenica. Soon, not only the discrepancies between his basic 
training and mission preparation became clear, but also between mission preparation and 
the actual mission. Bob’s unit was trained to confiscate weapons to demilitarize the enclave. 
However:
In one of the first weeks – we were on patrol – we hit a depot. Surely something was in 
there. But the locals threatened us with knives and other weapons. I wanted to go in, but 
I was told: ‘No man, don’t. We got to protect these people’. I thought, we’ve been training 
for this for months, but when we hit a depot (…), we just aren’t allowed to go in. It was 
clear to me real quick: being here is nonsense.
Bob told me that he used to be a mild and kind, especially for an infantry soldier. In 
Srebrenica, whenever he could do something for the local people, he did it. Although it was 
against the rules, he gave away shoes and t-shirts, which he bought on the black market. But 
many things angered him. For instance, he heard that Bosnian Muslims (whom Dutchbat 
solders were supposed to protect against Bosnian Serb aggression) used their weapons (not 
confiscated by Dutchbat) to plunder and even kill in Bosnian Serb territory, and then returned 
to the enclave to be protected by Dutchbat. Bosnian Serbs did not show much respect either. 
Several times Bosnian Serb belligerents fired over the heads of Dutchbat soldiers on patrol to 
bully and intimidate them. As a result Bob thought: ‘What am I doing here?’.
When they all began moving back to the compound, they were stopped by an 18-year old 
Bosnian Muslim boy with a RPG. ‘A local boy could just tell us what to do’. Bob’s unit stayed 
by their vehicle. One night, Bob saw two Bosnian Muslims approaching the vehicle. They 
fired a mortar at a small house near the post. Two Bosnian Serbs came running out; one was 
directly shot in the neck – ‘his throat just went’ – the other crawled toward the wounded 
man, and was killed right after. Bob was on the vehicle, manning a machine gun. ‘I saw it 
happening, and said, let’s shoot the hell out of them. But: “No no, we’re not allowed to do so” 
(…) And that guy [one of the two killers] just waved at us with his gun’. After that happened, 
Bob remembers, while he was preparing noodle soup for his unit, he was surprised by fresh 
gunfire. This time it was Bosnian Serb forces responding to Bosnian Muslim fire, which only 
stopped after Bob’s commander asked them to over the radio. All through this, the soup was 
bubbling away on the camp burner. When the gunfire stopped, Bob and his colleagues ate 
their soup. ‘Weird’, he would later call the situation in my interview with him.
As is now well-known, in July 1995 the entire enclave of Srebrenica fell into the hands of 
Bosnian Serb forces. Bob watched Bosnian Muslim soldiers fleeing the enclave through his 
night vision goggles. ‘These soldiers knew what was coming’, said Bob. ‘They were supposed 
to protect their own civilians, but they just ran off’. Telling me this, Bob visibly got angrier 
and angrier. He told me how his unit eventually left their compound in Srebrenica town 
to go to the compound in Potočari, along with thousands of locals. He made the journey 
partly in an armored vehicle, partly on foot, dragging people along with him. It was ‘one 
big fucking mess’. Constantly under fire, people with no legs crawled on their hands, and 
people in panic left behind family members who could not keep up. Bob finally arrived at 
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the Potočari compound, and heard later that his colleagues had to clean the tracks of their 
vehicle because ‘there was stuff on them’. He is ‘99% sure’ that they drove over people.
Several times in the interview, Bob contrasted how he thought that his deployment would 
go and how it actually went. At one point, for instance, he distinguished the ‘controlled, 
professional’ way in which he believes military action is supposed to happen from the reality 
of ‘mayhem’ and ‘fear of dying’. At another point, he stated the following.
War! War is… um… maybe action, what you see on TV. But here it was panic, misery, and 
crying and screaming and stink. Nothing, nothing like we thought it would be. That was 
definitely the case at the compound in Potočari. It was like a horror movie. The factory 
halls, they were overcrowded. Just people-people-people-people. You would walk over 
people. We had to collect weapons, because they might have weapons with them. (…) 
When I think about it now, I can’t imagine it happened. You walked over people, dead 
ones among them. You just smell that people are dead. The smell of death, have you ever 
heard of it, when people are dead, that penetrating smell? You smelled it everywhere. 
And people lay in shit, in vomit. You walked over that. It’s the worst thing I’ve ever seen. 
Degrading. Like animals. It was like a pig farm, stinking. People screamed, they clung to 
you. They’d make strange offers in return for food, if you know what I mean. I found it 
horrible.
Recounting experiences like these, Bob’s tone and facial expressions switched back and 
forth between calm and angry, and angry and sad.
During the interview, Bob spoke ambivalently about the Bosnian Muslims. For instance, 
he explained that when his colleague was killed by a grenade thrown by a Bosnian Muslim, ‘I 
was done with them’, and that, weirdly, he understood that Bosnian Serb forces ‘were done 
with their plundering and murdering’ (which Bob had heard Bosnian Muslims regularly did 
in Bosnian Serb territory). Yet at other times, he made clear that ‘I cared about them’ and that 
‘we were a disappointment to the people’. At one point, Bob asked himself: ‘Do I feel guilty?’, 
and answered as follows.
You can tell me a thousand times, you couldn’t do a thing, but I was there. We could not, 
did not do a thing. You’re standing there with all your training, which you want to put 
into practice but when it all happened we couldn’t, we weren’t allowed to do anything. 
[Pause.] We couldn’t have saved all those people, I have no illusions about that. It was 
300 men against 6000. If only they’d given us air support. If more people had died, they’d 
have intervened sooner. More people would have been saved, and we would’ve had a 
completely different story at home.
As is well-known, the story at home was harsh.
Back in the Netherlands, Bob started to drink and party a lot. ‘I sought action-action-
action, excitement-excitement-excitement’. He also got angry and aggressive. Bob 
remembered that shortly after his return, he ran into an acquaintance who told him, ‘Hey 
those medals you got, better throw them into the fire’, Bob explained. ‘Yes, that escalated… 
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You can tell people a thousand times that things were different, but some keep on thinking: 
cowards. The government should’ve told the media: we’re first doing an investigation, and 
then we can say something about it. They didn’t do anything for us. They didn’t do anything 
for us over there, and they didn’t do anything for us here. Nothing at all’. 
Bob kept quiet about his experiences for a long time. ‘What can you say? People already 
have their opinion. I was way too scared of confronting questions, of accusations. Like, 
people have said to me, “You let people die over there”. There’s nothing worse you can say to 
me’. Bob surprised me by what he said next. Instead of repeating that things were different, 
he confirmed that he was still troubled by the same thought. ‘Yes… all those people. I still see 
myself dragging people in a cart. Their own families walked away into the hills. Just left their 
own people. I dragged that cart, but I wasn’t mobile anymore [because of dragging the heavy 
cart]. I had to let go. (…) I thought: if I’m dead I can’t do anything for the people here’. It was 
due to such experiences that when people in the Netherlands accused Bob of cowardice, they 
articulated his own doubts. 
Bob vividly remembered something special that happened amid all the inhumanity in 
the fall of Srebrenica. ‘During that flight, I tell a boy to come with us to Potočari, but he says, 
“No, you can’t protect us anymore”. And he gives me a pack of Marlboro. (…) He waves, and 
walks away. I never saw him again. He must have thought, when those bastards catch me, 
they won’t get this. That made a big impression, really a very big impression. Because we 
couldn’t do anything, we were a disappointment to these people, and he still gives me that’.
Shortly after returning from his mission, Bob left the Army and joined the Military 
Police (Marechaussee), ‘so that I could help people’. However, ‘now I had to deport illegal 
immigrants’. Bob became more and more ‘explosive’ at work, both to his colleagues and 
the immigrants he had to deport. He lost his mildness and kindness. He was also explosive 
outside work. Once he did ‘something stupid’ for which he had to appear in court. At home, 
he had countless arguments with his girlfriend. Meanwhile, Bob began questioning his own 
actions in Srebrenica more often. ‘For a long time, I could handle myself: I did my best, I did 
my best. But, because I had to deport those illegals, I saw so much injustice again, things I 
couldn’t grasp, couldn’t control. You start doubting yourself. Am I doing good, or am I just 
putting people into misery? (…) And [the media] makes this image of you, and when things 
happen at work, I just couldn’t handle it anymore’. Eventually, he was diagnosed with PTSD, 
which entitled him to a military invalidity pension.
Bob told me he was still very proud of his red beret, and his medal for wounded veterans 
(received for PTSD). He was proud he could ‘put things in perspective’, and now knew ‘what’s 
really important’ in life. In fact, he was also proud of his deployment, and of ‘what I did 
over there’. At the same time, he felt guilty about everything he didn’t do. While he was 
proud of his red beret, his blue beret meant ‘nothing to me’, because he felt he let people in 
Srebrenica down, just as the UN and the government let all of them down. He felt that the 
mission in Srebrenica ‘was one big charade’. Now he is doing better, but he still battles with 
his experiences. He cannot stand injustice – big or small lights, significant and insignificant 
injustice. For instance, in traffic, he often feels that other drivers are unfair, which makes 
him aggressive. He has learned to stop the car when that happens, to calm down. He is still 
suspicious of people: ‘I quickly think the worst. What do you want from me?’. Yet, most times 
he is actually a mild and soft person ‘always there for others’, who would do anything for 
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people in need. Bob has never worn his blue beret again, but he has not thrown it away either 
because ‘you can’t throw away your past’.
 
Niels’ Story: Uruzgan
A week before my interview with Niels,3 I called him to explain a bit more about my study. 
I told him it was about having to make hard choices, seeing injustice, doing things that 
seem not right, et cetera, and how such things affect soldiers. ‘Ah, so, ethics, dilemmas’, 
Niels responded. ‘Well, yes’, I said, ‘and everything around it’. He laughed. ‘Avoiding big 
words for the soldiers, huh? Well, I’ve had dilemmas’. After summarizing some, which 
often involved local Afghans, Niels made clear that he did not like how the military tends to 
explain dilemmas in terms of moral clashes between civilized Dutch soldiers and immoral 
locals. ‘I really think the dilemma lies in us, not them [the Afghans]’, he says. ‘Like, there is 
a wonderful idea in The Hague,4 in the ivory tower, but in practice it’s very different’. During 
the interview, it became clear what Niels meant.
Niels began his military career with the Marines because ‘I didn’t know what I wanted to 
do’. After some years, he left the military for some months, still not really knowing what he 
wanted. He liked what he had done in the military, but he wanted to do it ‘at another level’. 
And so he became a military nurse. When I asked him why he chose this job, he said:
I think the job chooses you. I’d been a medic in the Marines. I was interested in how the 
body works, and of course you have to have something caring in you. [Jokingly] During 
my nurse training, I had to look after little old grannies. Relaxed afternoons, walking 
round pushing wheelchairs. So yeah, I did have the caring thing.
He described his younger self as jovial, carefree. He had no great ideals, just thought he could 
nurse ill or wounded people.
Niels’ Uruzgan mission was not his first, so he thought ‘I understood war more or less’. 
But once in Afghanistan, he experienced things he could not understand. One impressive 
event occurred just two weeks after he arrived. His unit was on patrol, and as soon as they 
approached dangerous territory, Niels noticed kites and doves in the air wherever they 
passed. It was known that ‘spotters’ used such methods to broadcast the movements of 
patrolling units to the Taliban and other insurgents. A few hours after having seen the kites 
and doves, Niels’ vehicle hit an IED [roadside bomb]. Niels saw ‘a bright flash of light’ and 
heard a blast. ‘It felt like it all happened in slow motion’, he remembered. Covered by a brown 
cloud of gravel and stones, Niels felt his drills kick in. He checked himself for wounds, called 
in on the radio, and checked if his colleagues were hurt. Fortunately, no one had serious 
injuries, or so it seemed. The rest of the day, Niels felt ‘a strange cold mist’ behind his eyes, 
and that night, he could not sleep.
3	 	Niels	has	written	a	book	about	his	experiences	(Veldhuizen	2014).	At	his	request,	I	use	his	real	name.
4  The Dutch government, parliament and Council of State are seated in The Hague.
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The day after, he felt the desire to ‘leave this backward country’. He had wanted to make a 
small contribution ‘to improve the living conditions of the local population’, but all through 
the sleepless night, he could only think of one ideal: ‘making it home in one piece’. At the same 
time, he realized the people here lived ‘in the anus of the world’. In Uruzgan, the problem was 
not just the threat of the Taliban and other insurgents, but also the dire conditions people 
lived in: severe poverty, families and tribes in conflict with one another, and corrupt war 
lords. These war lords and other influential men cooperated with both the coalition forces 
of ISAF and the insurgents, and had bachas (teenage boys) they used (‘molested’) for sex.5 
Moreover, rather than doing something about these ‘assholes’, the coalition forces ‘let them 
govern a valley’ and ‘gave them money’ because these men were valuable ‘partners’.
One day at a police post, one ‘asshole’ offered Niels a bacha, which he refused angrily. 
A few moments later, he saw a local assistant trying to bring a young boy into the police 
post. The boy’s eyes were ‘hollow’ yet ‘full of fear’. Even after Niels told the assistant to take 
the boy back to his parents, he still felt powerless. Although he understands the military 
advantage of cooperating with influential locals, he has never been able to make peace with 
its implications.
Another memory that still disturbs Niels happened when his unit was on patrol after a 
cold winter’s night. An old man approached the unit, carrying his grandson, covered with 
large infected burns. The man was desperate. All night long he had walked through the snow 
with his grandson to find medical care. Niels put an oxygen mask on the child, gave him a 
suppository, and inserted an IV line for fluids. The oxygen mask was adult-sized, as Niels did 
not have one for children. According to the official mission objective, the task of medical 
personnel was confined to treating their own troops, and thus not the locals. While this may 
seem sensible in theory, ‘in practice, it made no sense at all’, said Niels later. At the time he 
told his commander that the child needed to be flown to a hospital. Although this request 
interfered with the commander’s original plans, the commander tried to arrange a helicopter 
for the child. However, they were told that because of snowfall, only a few helicopters were 
available. Niels recalled:
They said there were not enough helicopters for ISAF personnel. So there was a delay. 
Meanwhile we got an order: we had to go find a Taliban fighter. So then you have to take off 
the oxygen mask and take out the IV. For a nurse, it doesn’t make sense. I’d taken an oath 
as a soldier, but as a nurse I also had an oath. But those two promises are incompatible 
over there, you have to choose. In the end I chose soldier.
Niels says that ‘I blame myself in hindsight. I think if we’d have helped that kid… One of the 
goals was to win hearts and minds. If we had helped, if we’d saved that child, then those 
families would’ve looked at us differently’.
Many events that haunted Niels after homecoming involved children. Besides the bacha 
and the sick child, Niels was once offered a baby by a distressed father in return for medical 
supplies. Presumably, he came to believe later, it was a desperate attempt to make life better 
for both this baby and the man’s other child. Still another event involved a severely injured 
5 See e.g. Schut and van Baarle 2017 and de Lind van Wijngaarden 2011 for more information about the practice of bacha bazi 
(also known as ‘chai-boys’ among western soldiers).
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boy he had been treating no longer showing up for treatment. It turned out the boy’s parents 
had sent him to the mountains to die.
When speaking of his deployment experiences, Niels often drew a distinction between 
doing and perceiving something ‘as a soldier’ and ‘as a nurse’, and between doing things ‘as 
a professional’ and ‘as a human being’. He felt that he and his unit had done a good job on 
a military professional level in Afghanistan, but that they had failed on a human level. Even 
with respect to the military level, it seems that Niels is ambivalent. Consider for instance the 
following:
‘Winning hearts and minds’ is really a bullshit phrase. If you want to win hearts and 
minds, you have to create safety at least. And don’t tell me we did, because why didn’t 
people dare go out at night, why didn’t they talk to us? We only made sure there was no 
fighting within a certain radius round the camps. But still, each week we found weapons 
and ammunition inside that circle. Just a big farce, we created a kind of false safety.
Back home, Niels began asking himself how and why the things that had happened could 
have happened, and what should and could have been done. He started to realize that he and 
his colleagues were well trained for combat situations – everybody knew the drill – but they 
‘had not learned how to deal with situations like these’. In his writings, he recounts. ‘Various 
strange ideas and thoughts haunted my mind. Despite everything, I’d done my utmost in 
Afghanistan and I’d acted out of pure ideals, but in bed I couldn’t be at peace with myself’ 
(Veldhuizen 2014, p. 55, translation TM).
Niels developed sleep problems and began relying on alcohol to sleep. When he finally 
fell asleep, he often had nightmares about his deployment. Sometimes his loud screams 
woke his son, which made him feel terrible. He was quickly irritated and became increasingly 
aggressive to colleagues and his friends and family, too. One day, an incident took place on a 
day out with his wife, a couple of friends and all their children. His friends’ son kept hitting 
Niels with a beach ball by accident until, suddenly, Niels found himself dragging the boy 
across the beach, shouting and cursing at him. Furious, he dropped the boy heavy-handedly 
before the boy’s mother. The night after this incident, Niels and his wife talked about how he 
was not himself anymore. For a while, his family, friends and colleagues had seen him acting 
in ways they did not understand, and so had he. His wife insisted he sought professional 
help, which he did.
After finding help, Niels began writing and speaking in public about his experiences. He 
hoped that this would help others understand him better, and also help traumatized colleagues 
understand their own problems. Niels says he is now a changed person, who will never be the 
same again. Most of the changes are negative, he says, but he feels he has developed a broader 
perspective on the world. He now knows the world is not ‘black and white’ but has ‘many 
shades of gray’. He wanted to act differently in Afghanistan, but he is not sure if he could have 
done anything differently. In his writings, he states: ‘I can think back on Uruzgan, but never 
without pain, fear or shame. What we did in that desert was oh so important, but at the same 
time, completely useless’ (Veldhuizen 2014, p. 117, translation TM).
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Morally Distressing Experiences
As Bob’s and Niels’ accounts indicate, all the interviewed veterans told very personal stories, 
and in many ways, they may not be comparable. At the same time, their stories do reveal 
patterns. When veterans expressed guilt and anger, they often did not mention clear-cut 
transgressions, but more complicated situations. Typically, they expressed moral judgments 
and emotions in the context of one of the following three kinds of experiences.
Value Conflict
The first theme to arise in the accounts of many veterans concerns value conflict. For 
instance, Bob wanted to help people in need, but often he could not behave the way he 
wanted because he had to follow orders or he feared for his own life. Put differently, he 
experienced conflicts between the values of protection, obedience and self-preservation. 
Niels, similarly, experienced several value conflicts in Afghanistan, which he explained as 
clashes between his military values and his values as a nurse and a human being. For Niels, 
it was immediately clear that he was confronted by value conflict situations. In Bob’s case, it 
seems his experience of conflict was compounded by the fact that acquaintances and media 
suggested he had done wrong.
Many other veterans recounted similar value conflicts. Dutchbat III veteran Daan, 
for instance, was in the Potočari compound when the stream of refugees poured in. The 
compound, soon filled with human feces, was far too small to house all the refugees, so the 
decision was taken to let only the wounded, the elderly, and women and children in:
Imagine, it was 40 degrees. It was boiling hot, boiling hot. People pressed against one 
another, against walls, all together. Terrified. Terror in their eyes. I’m going to die, these 
people thought. Help me, help me. Old men, women, passed out. So, I threw them into 
the wheelbarrow and drove [them to the compound]. You did what you could. (…) At that 
point, you’re doing it all wrong. Everything. (…) You can’t choose between one human life 
and another. So yes, you always do the wrong thing.
Daan still vividly remembers, ‘it was one big mess’.
Veterans’ accounts of value conflict echo a well-known contention in moral philosophy: 
even when an individual has made the best possible decision in the face of a moral quandary, 
this does not make the decision ‘right’, because a value has still been transgressed (e.g. 
Williams 1973, Hursthouse 1999, Tessman 2014).6 In other words, even when an individual 
gets their hands dirty for the right reason, this does not change the fact that they now have 
‘dirty hands’ (cf. Walzer 1973, Wijze 2005). Indeed, though veterans who experienced value 
conflict knew they could not have avoided violating a value, this did not take away the painful 
6 	This	 is	why	I	avoid	the	term	‘moral	dilemma’	and	use	the	less	specific	‘quandary’	and	‘conflict’.	 In	the	ethics	literature,	
moral	dilemma	typically	refers	to	situations	in	which	neither	option	is	better	or	worse	than	the	other.	Whenever	one	can	
make a best-possible decision, the situation is not a ‘dilemma’.
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realization that others had been wronged because of what they had or had not done. They 
felt they had done their best, but also felt they had done wrong. 
The veterans who experienced value conflict in situations of human suffering seemed 
unable to justify these conflicts with the interpretations discussed in the previous chapter. 
No one said, for instance, that they ‘just had to follow orders’. The high-stake situations forced 
them to choose between incompatible moral commitments, at least in their experience, and 
the fact that one moral commitment conflicted with another did not make either one less of 
a moral requirement. They could not ‘solve’ such situations either by certain behavior or by 
interpreting them in a certain way.
 
Moral Overwhelmedness/Detachment
A second theme the interviewed veterans related involves paradox. These experiences 
concern moral detachment resulting from being highly affected by the moral significance 
of a situation, at least initially. It is a form of denial, which occurs when one is vaguely aware 
that something is so overwhelming that one chooses to switch off to protect oneself. While 
all veterans reported such a mechanism to greater or lesser degree, those who found the 
experience painful had seen how it made them or others engage in what they would later 
come to perceive as cruel behavior.
Many veterans recounted shocking confrontations in situations where all compassion 
for fellow humans seemed to have disappeared, and all people cared for was themselves. 
Bob, for instance, had seen how tremendous fear made people abandon elderly family 
members. He had gone through times himself when all he thought about was staying alive. 
Niels, similarly, had witnessed how inhumane severe poverty made people resort to what 
he perceived as inhumane behavior, and he had found himself thinking that all he wanted 
was to make it home in one piece. Again, many other veterans related such experiences. 
Dutch soldier/novelist Roelen, for instance, wrote on his blog that there ‘is no romance or 
humanity in war. In war, people fight and suffer. Ethics is a luxury which dies a hero on the 
battlefield in the fight to survive’ (Roelen 2010, p. 1, translation TM).
Consider also the experience of Dutchbat III veteran Elisa, then a private. In her interview, 
she still vividly remembered how ‘merciless’ she became on her deployment. Her sympathy 
for the children in Srebrenica slowly changed into indifference, and she began making jokes 
she now defined as ‘cruel’. For instance, sometimes she would throw a single sweet at a group 
of children so that they would jump on each other and fight for it. ‘We were harsh, extremely 
harsh’, she commented later. When the Potočari compound was flooded with refugees, Elisa 
and several colleagues distributed food to a crowd of women standing behind a rope, who 
they called ‘cattle’. ‘They cursed, screamed and spat in your face because they wanted more. 
Sometimes we had to push them back with the rope, and then the women in the back would 
fall to the ground. We just laughed’. In Elisa’s recollection, she did all this because she had 
become ‘completely insensitive’. Later she came to understand her insensitivity as a way ‘to 
keep myself up’, but now cannot imagine how she could ever have behaved like that.
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I heard many stories like these, about how a state of moral detachment led to behavior 
that veterans would later come to see as inhumane.7 At the same time, it is relevant to note, 
most of these veterans kept on trying to help others. Bob tried to take people with him in 
the flight to Potočari; Niels kept on treating sick and injured locals; Elisa distributed food 
to women. These veterans’ temporary ‘moral disengagement’ – as Bandura (1999, 2002) 
famously called it – was not a matter of a complete and total failure to recognize the moral 
aspects of certain situations. The veterans never became entirely apathetic, which is relevant 
to note because it helps to better understand why many feel that they could and should 
have behaved differently. They ‘turned a blind eye’, it could be said, which is neither entirely 
deliberate nor involuntary. It involves being ‘vaguely aware that we chose not to look at the 
facts without being conscious of what it is we are evading’ (Steiner 1985, p. 161). In this case, 
the denial of the moral aspects of a situation is a partial denial (Grassiani 2009, p. 144); it is 
a paradox of ‘knowing and not knowing at the same time’ (Cohen 2001, p. 25). The accounts 
of many veterans seem to convey exactly this mechanism. Their descriptions show a self-
protective moral disengagement without their being fully cognizant of it because of the very 
fact they were morally disengaged. Put differently, their accounts describe a partially chosen 
failure to grasp the moral significance of the suffering of others that existed in tandem with 
a painful awareness of it. The state they describe was thus a dual paradox. First, it was a state 
of feeling-and-not-feeling and of knowing-and-not-knowing. Second, it resulted from the 
choice to switch off without the choice being entirely voluntary.
The previous chapter discussed partially similar mechanisms of ‘numbing’. Yet, whereas 
in the situations discussed in Chapter 5 this ‘numbing’ was invoked to justify or excuse their 
conduct, this was not the case for the situations described here. The veterans quoted in this 
chapter spoke about moral detachment in terms of a distressing revelation of the inhumanity 
that they and others were capable of. Apparently, for the situations described here, phrases 
such as ‘you just become a bit numb’ had ceased to work, because they could not make un-
known the all too human capacity for selfishness and aggression, including their own.
 
 
Senselessness
A third often-heard theme related to the above is senselessness. On deployment, Bob 
remembers asking himself ‘what am I doing here?’, and thinking ‘being here is nonsense’. 
Similarly, Niels felt that their presence in Afghanistan was ‘useless’, and found many things 
he encountered made ‘no sense’. Uttering statements like these, Bob, Niels and many other 
veterans expressed feelings of senselessness in a twofold manner. First, an inability to see 
7 I have not been able to convincingly verify the following, but according to rumor, several Dutchbat II soldiers gave local 
children	in	Srebrenica	‘treats’	that	were	actually	jam-covered	fuel	tablets	(NIOD	2002,	p.	1248).	Also,	I	have	been	told	that	
Dutchbat	III	soldiers	received	oral	sex	from	local	women	‘for	five	cigarettes’.	With	respect	to	TFU	soldiers,	I	have	been	told	
that colleagues spat on local children throwing stones at them, and colleagues slapped children who kept trying to climb 
on	their	vehicles	during	patrols.	None	of	the	veterans	I	spoke	with	said	they	had	done	such	things	themselves,	perhaps	
because	none	had	actually	done	so,	perhaps	because	they	did	not	want	to	acknowledge	that	they	had.	In	the	latter	case,	it	
is conceivable that some behaviors remain too hard to admit to others, possibly even to oneself. Some veterans told me 
that indeed they were not yet ready to talk about ‘some things’ they had experienced.
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the purpose of many things they saw and did, and second, an inability to make sense of those 
things.
The senselessness many veterans described recalls Lifton’s work on US Vietnam veterans 
(Lifton 1973). The veterans that Lifton spoke to were confronted in Vietnam by a reality that 
contrasted drastically with the assumptions and pretenses on which the war was based. 
To cope with the absurdity and meaninglessness of the situation they were in, they began 
pretending that it was something they actually knew it was not. Later they recounted that 
they had been ‘like boys playing soldiers’, pretending to do a good job of killing (Lifton 1973, 
p. 168). On returning home, they came to see the war and their own participation in it as 
‘counterfeit’
The previous chapter showed that many of the interviewed veterans, at least initially, 
tended to dismiss political and other intangible goals as none of their business. Rather than 
pursuing such goals, they tried to find meaning in the directly significant act of being able 
‘to put my training into practice’, and sometimes, in being able ‘to give at least one person 
a smile on their face’. It seems, then, that soldiers do not necessarily need to feel that their 
job has a larger purpose. By defining other personal goals, they can still find purpose in 
their work. However, many accounts show that the veterans were often unable to put their 
training into practice, or actually make people smile. Bob had been unable to do his tasks 
or protect people in need, and Niels was unable to live up to the oath he took as a nurse. 
Bob, Niels and many others turned out to be incapable of doing what they had expected. 
Instead, they experienced value conflicts and moral detachment.8 As a result, they began 
asking themselves, ‘What are we actually doing here?’.
When one is confronted by morally disturbing experiences such as value conflict and 
moral detachment and there is no direct meaning to find in these experiences, an overarching 
purpose seems to become necessary, so that one’s experiences are still meaningful. However, 
sometimes, there is no overarching purpose or righteousness. In this case, Lifton suggests 
(1973), the only option left to find peace may be to acknowledge and condemn the complete 
senselessness of a situation. Yet, people at home may keep holding on to what veterans see 
as justifying rhetoric. Consequently, veterans may feel that the ‘counterfeit universe’ is not 
just ‘over there’ in the war, but omnipresent in the world to which they have returned (Lifton 
1973, see also Shay 1994).
Indeed, many interviewed veterans felt that their mission was ‘one big charade’ (Bob’s 
words), ‘one big farce’ (Niels’ words), ‘pretend play’ and ‘a puppet show’ (the words of 
countless veterans). Some drew some hope from the little things they could do, but they 
remained unable to give meaning to the suffering they had witnessed or caused by tying it 
to a larger purpose. None of it made sense to them. At the same time, political leaders and 
8	 In these circumstances, even the slightest gesture made a great impact. To take Bob’s story as an example. He had been 
deeply	moved	when	 the	Muslim	boy	gave	him	his	 cigarettes.	Bob	 seems	 to	have	experienced	 the	gesture	 as	 a	 sort	of	
understanding or forgiveness, or human kindness at least. At the same time, it underscored the unfairness of the situation. 
Consider,	 also,	 the	 account	 of	 Dutchbat	 III	 veteran	 Daan,	 who	 rode	 elderly	 people	 in	 a	 wheelbarrow	 to	 the	 Potočari	
compound. When children and women were deported by bus, Daan broke into a kitchen cupboard, stole a box of candy and 
started handing the candy out to the children. ‘It was nothing, completely nothing. But it was something’, Daan stammered 
when	recounting	this.	Distributing	candy	seems	to	have	been	his	desperate	attempt	‘to	give	at	least	one	person	a	smile	on	
their	face’.	At	the	same	time,	his	attempt	made	manifest	the	utter	absurdity	of	the	situation.	In	Daan’s	words:	‘These	kids,	
all	smiling,	smiling	faces,	at	that	very	moment	that	they	were	witnesses	to	the	greatest	drama.	Unbelievable’.
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people at home did seem to hold on to the view that it did make sense, by letting them carry 
on with the mission as it was or by saying that things would have turned out well if only they 
had done something differently. As a result, not only their experience of value conflict and 
moral detachment made no sense to them, but on top of that, it made no sense that people 
at home pretended that all of it did make sense.
 
Moral Failure and Moral Disorientation
How can experiences of value conflict, moral detachment and senselessness have such 
a profound impact on an individual’s life? And what impact? In the previous chapter, I 
discussed how veterans ‘resolved’ potential tensions with unequivocal interpretations. 
While these were sometimes inconsistent, the fact that they were tied to separate situations 
or selves enabled veterans to maintain a sense of coherence and consistency. In contrast, 
the accounts described in this chapter reveal the interviewed veterans’ inability to use 
unequivocal interpretations and thus their inability to resolve experiences of conflict. 
Below, I juxtapose my findings on the impact of this inability with the current concept of 
moral injury and philosophical perspectives on moral conflict. This leads me to argue that 
irresolvable moral conflict may result in what I call ‘moral disorientation’.
To recap, the current concept of moral injury describes morally injurious experiences as 
a conflict between a person’s moral beliefs and an act of transgression. It is postulated that 
when an event is radically discrepant with a person’s ‘assumptions and beliefs about right 
and wrong and personal goodness’ (Litz et al. 2009, p. 698), the person will experience severe 
dissonance. That is, acts of transgression produce dissonance because people do maintain 
‘an intact moral belief system’ (2009, p. 701). Dissonance could emerge, for instance, 
between the belief ‘I am a good person’ and the fact that ‘I did something unforgivable’. Such 
dissonance, it is argued, often results in self-condemnation, a loss of trust in the capacity 
to be good and thus in self-punishing behavior and/or efforts to fight (perceived) injustice 
(Nash and Litz 2013, 2013). The concept of moral injury explicitly deviates from models 
that treat guilt and blame as the result of irrational thoughts and inappropriate emotions. 
Instead, it is considered ‘important to appreciate that holding onto the idea of a moral self 
or a moral code may require that a bad act be judged as such’ (2009, p. 703). Central in the 
therapy proposed, therefore, is forgiveness – either of the self or of others – and accordingly, 
the acceptance of imperfection. Integrating a moral transgression into one’s moral belief 
system (e.g. ‘I am a good person, but I do make mistakes’; ‘the world is benevolent, but not 
absolutely’) would reduce the experience of conflict such that one would be able to maintain 
‘an intact, although more flexible, functional belief system’ (Litz et al. 2009, p. 701).
In many ways, the stories of the interviewed veterans fall in line with the current concept 
of moral injury. Many spoke of conflict that unsettled the moral beliefs and expectations 
they had held prior to their deployment. Many struggled with profound guilt. Many 
developed a desire to help people as a way to make reparations or simply because they could 
not stand injustices any longer. Some veterans also turned to self-harm as a form of making 
amends. At the same time, many became so fixated on injustice that they began responding 
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to small perceived injustices with exaggerated anger, sometimes with aggression. Many 
became distrustful of people; they readily thought that people were insincere and had bad 
intentions. Many slid into a negative spiral of doing things that made them feel guilty and 
ashamed afterwards, causing them to do things that made them feel guilty and ashamed 
afterwards, and so on.
Besides this correspondence with the current moral injury model, the veterans’ stories 
revealed something else. When veterans spoke about morally disturbing experiences and 
their resultant feelings of guilt or blame, they rarely did so as unequivocally as suggested in the 
current model of moral injury. Some veterans explicitly expressed uncertainty or confusion 
about the significance of their experience. They said that they ‘can’t work it out’ and ‘can’t 
solve it’, or their experience caused ‘a short circuit in my head’. Others expressed uncertainty 
or confusion implicitly and perhaps unconsciously, uttering ambivalent, even conflicting 
interpretations of their experience. For instance, some veterans constantly switched 
between saying ‘I did wrong’ and ‘I didn’t do anything wrong’. Generally, some expressed 
both profound guilt and great pride with respect to the things they had done. Some switched 
between speaking with resentment about the ‘fucking backward’ locals in their deployment 
area and sympathetically calling them ‘the poor bastards’. Some emphasized that there is ‘no 
right or wrong but only survival in war’ but also said that they blamed themselves or others 
for what they had done on their deployment. Some veterans expressed great suspicion of the 
military and politicians but also said they would give anything to serve in another mission. 
Some accused judgmental Dutch civilians of ‘not understanding shit’ but said they judged 
themselves in the same way. Some said they had learned ‘to put things in perspective’ but 
admitted they could get angry about trivial things. And, some switched between saying ‘I 
can’t stand injustice any longer and ‘I’ve become completely indifferent to it all’.
 Bob, for instance, struggled with the question: am I doing good, or am I just putting 
people into misery? The stories of Bob and other veterans conveyed all sorts of ethical 
questions. How to do right when forced to choose between two evils? What do right and 
wrong mean in the battle for survival? What is goodness when it only confirms the evilness 
of a situation? Was I a good soldier, and is being a good soldier really good? Do my guilt and 
other worries make me a good or a bad soldier, and a good or a bad human being? What do 
good and bad even mean?
Of course, veterans’ statements of non-guilt could just be what they tell themselves, 
while their stated guilt is what they really believe, or vice versa. Yet, keeping the established 
theoretical insight in mind that morality is not harmonious but ‘messy’, I propose another 
view. I contend that in many cases, veterans’ expressions of guilt and non-guilt may both 
be considered genuine, even though they conflict, because when experiencing irresolvable 
moral conflict, it makes sense to feel guilty and not guilty at the same time.
Tessman (2014) calls irresolvable moral conflict situations of ‘unavoidable moral failure’, 
which does seem a more adequate term for irresolvable moral conflicts than words such 
as ‘transgression’ or ‘wrongdoing’. As suggested, when individuals are forced to choose 
between two evils, they may not consider themselves blameworthy but may still feel that 
they have failed morally. Even if they know they made the best choice possible, this does not 
take away the feeling that they have violated a moral requirement, and even if they know 
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they had no choice whatsoever, it does not take away the feeling that they failed to act upon 
their values. Similarly, when the enormity of other people’s suffering, the own feeling of 
helplessness and instinct for self-preservation turn individuals to indifference, they may 
consider it understandable in the light of the circumstances, perhaps even unavoidable, yet, 
they may still feel that they failed to act in a morally responsible way.9 Moreover, having 
experienced inescapable moral failure, individuals may feel that their belief in right and 
wrong failed them.
Of note, it certainly can be (and is) debated whether irresolvable moral conflicts truly 
exist in an objective sense, and if so, whether it is logical to experience negative feelings 
after an unavoidable failure (see e.g. Williams 1973, Marcus 1980, Tessman 2014, Brandenburg 
2018). I must emphasize that when I speak of moral conflict and moral failure, I do not intend 
to make objective statements about morality. Rather, I speak about moral experience. So, 
whether or not irresolvable moral dilemmas exist objectively, in human experience they do. 
And, no matter whether the negative feelings following a moral dilemma are illogical, it does 
not mean that they are unfounded; they are founded when understood from the perspective 
of human experience.
The conflicts experienced by the interviewed veterans cannot be reduced in the way 
that the current concept of moral injury suggests. In the current concept, moral conflict is 
understood as a conflict between a person’s moral beliefs of goodness and an unequivocal 
experience of wrongdoing. Accordingly, accepting being a good yet imperfect person is 
perceived as a way to reduce the conflict. However, the conflicts the interviewed veterans 
experienced messed up their notions of goodness and wrongdoing. In this case, accepting 
personal imperfection cannot help reduce the conflict, let alone resolve it.
What to call these kinds of irresolvable moral conflicts and their psychological impact? 
One veteran told me that he tried to make sense of the conflict he felt by distinguishing 
between ‘culpable guilt’, the result of unequivocal wrongdoing, and ‘non-culpable guilt’, the 
kind of guilt he carried. In a similar vein, two other veterans said they felt ‘responsible’ for 
their actions, but not ‘blameworthy’, because they had done their best. Moral philosophers, 
too, have sought terms for the psychological result of irresolvable moral conflicts. De Wijze 
(2005) suggests the notion of ‘tragic-remorse’, which, he says, differs from typical remorse 
in that it is for one’s actions – or one’s inaction, I should add – without feeling culpable for 
one’s actions. It is remorse about the fact that the morally best option was merely the lesser 
evil, at best.
The notion of tragic-remorse applies well to the conflicts expressed by many Dutchbat 
and TFU veterans. However, it is still too limited a notion, as it evokes the image of an 
individual who acquiesces in the impossible situation he is confronted by, while irresolvable 
conflicts are overwhelming, things that people generally do not expect and are not readily 
willing to accept. Similar to notions of guilt and shame, the idea of tragic-remorse does 
9	 This	point	resonates	with	Calhoun’s	understanding	of	failure.	‘Failure	is	not	the	same	as	culpable	error’,	she	writes	(2016,	
pp.	27–28).	‘Nor	are	failures	simply	excused	errors.	A	good	excuse	gets	one	off	the	evaluative	hook.	To	be	excused	is	to	have	
no reason to think badly of oneself or for others to think badly of oneself. To have failed, by contrast, is to have a reason to 
think badly of oneself and to expect others to do the same’. Calhoun adds that even when failures have been ‘unavoidable’, 
they ‘leave their evaluative mark. They are sources of regret, shame, loss of self-esteem, and of the thought that one’s 
character or life is blemished by falling short of some standard for what lives should look like’ (ibid). 
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not account sufficiently for the profound confusion and ‘short circuits’ that characterized 
many of the stories I heard. This brings me to propose the notion of moral disorientation. 
Besides emotions such as tragic-remorse, it seems, veterans faced by moral failure may also 
be left with moral disorientation. While tragic-remorse is the result of having been forced to 
do wrong, or being unable to do right, moral disorientation is the associated loss of one’s 
previous certainties about wrong and right; it is the loss of one’s moral frame of reference 
and perhaps also of one’s moral self-perception. Moral disorientation means that a veteran 
knows not only that people do not always practice what they preach, but that at times it is 
virtually or literally impossible to practice what one preaches. This knowledge is not easily 
comprehended and accepted. A confrontation with inevitable moral failure messes up one’s 
moral beliefs, leaving one with profoundly unsettling questions about right and wrong. 
 
Ethical Struggle
The distressing experience of moral disorientation may lead veterans to engage in trying to 
restore an orderly world of good versus evil, or alternatively, in viewing the world differently. 
Veterans may try to resolve their doubt and conflict, or find ways of living in a world fraught 
with both. The accounts I heard indicate that in trying to find moral ‘re-orientation’, many 
veterans initially tried to restore a relatively ‘black-and-white’ world, with great exasperation 
and varying degree of success. If they failed, it seems, they eventually turned to accepting a 
more complicated and random world, in which the morally distressing event they experienced 
was not an exception to the rule but a tragic part of the world. How to understand these 
processes? Considering this question brought me back to existing theory on morality and 
ethics and led me to conceptualize veterans’ responses to moral disorientation as an ethical 
struggle.
Specifically, I found Zigon’s anthropological work on morality and ethics insightful for 
veterans’ responses (2007, 2008). As Zigon argues, a person’s moral beliefs must be seen as 
embodied dispositions that one usually enacts without deliberation. Reflection only occurs 
when one’s largely unquestioned moral beliefs and behaviors are forcefully put into question 
by an intruding event. In the situation Zigon terms ‘moral breakdown’, a person starts to 
consciously reflect on and reassess his moral expectations and dispositions, trying to 
resolve the moral questions that have arisen. This reflective process, which entails conscious 
thinking about one’s moral beliefs, is what Zigon calls ethics. Although only philosophers in 
general engage in ethics as a systematic study of morality, everybody engages at numerous 
points in their lives in ethical practice. Yet, for people experiencing moral disorientation, 
more personal issues are at stake than for professional philosophers. It is one thing to bow 
over a hypothetical dilemma for the sake of scientific knowledge, it is another to personally 
experience a moral dilemma with profound consequences. It is probably from this line of 
thinking that Zigon argues that people ultimately engage in ethical practice to return ‘to the 
unreflective mode of everyday moral dispositions’ (2007, p. 138). That is, when people engage 
in ethics, they do so in order to find comfort again.
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Zigon emphasizes, however, that:
this return from the ethical moment is never a return to the same unreflective moral 
dispositions. For the very process of stepping-out and responding to the breakdown in 
various ways alters, even if ever so slightly, the aspect of being-in-the-world that is the 
unreflective moral dispositions. It is in the moment of breakdown, then, that it can be 
said that people work on themselves, and in so doing, alter their very way of being-in-the-
world (Zigon 2007, p. 138).
In other words, when a person’s moral beliefs are forcefully put into question, this inevitably 
changes the person.
Relating my findings to Zigon’s work, I came to conceptualize veterans’ responses 
to the experience of moral disorientation as what I call an ‘ethical struggle’. In line with 
Zigon’s insights, I maintain that we all experience numerous minor moments of moral 
‘disorientation’ and thus ethical ‘struggle’ in our lives. Such moments are generally relatively 
quickly overcome in the flow of everyday life. They allow one’s moral expectations and beliefs 
to evolve slowly over a lifetime as life experience accumulates without engendering distress. 
However, as my findings indicate, a person may also experience major moral disorientation, 
which is far harder to overcome and disrupts his life completely. Whatever was taken for 
granted before, is not anymore. Major disorientation may arise through a single event or 
a longer period in life, and it may arise suddenly or build up over time. In any case, the 
disoriented person may face a long distressing period of ethical struggle. The struggle may 
end in the person finding moral orientation again, or it may be never-ending, making it 
impossible to ever find the complete comfort again of an unreflective mode. In the latter 
case, the person will never be able to get clear answers to such questions as ‘how can you do 
right when forced to choose between two evils’, and nor will he be able to simply ‘get over’ 
such questions. At best, he may find some comfort in accepting that there are no answers to 
these questions.
I find the notion of ethical struggle particularly useful because it helps to capture my 
finding that moral distress may entail profound moral disorientation which in turn may lead 
veterans to reassess their moral beliefs. To recapitulate, Litz and colleagues conceptualize 
moral injury as the result of an act that conflicts with one’s deeply held moral beliefs, which 
are violated by the act but remain ‘intact’. In other words, a veteran’s moral beliefs would 
remain fixed. Yet, my findings showed that while the conscience of morally distressed 
veterans did indeed seem to remain intact at a very basic level (if not, feelings of guilt and 
blame could not arise), their specific moral beliefs may not. Veterans may no longer be able 
to take for granted the aptness of their previous moral beliefs. They may start to doubt their 
prior beliefs about the goodness of people, and, moreover, whether good and bad actually 
exist. Such disorientation forces veterans to find new ways in which to understand their own 
and others’ actions in moral terms, for instance by inventing words such as ‘non-culpable 
guilt’.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the ‘moral’ in ‘moral injury’. Departing from the insight that 
a person’s moral beliefs are ‘messy’ rather than a harmonious system, I investigated the 
possible implications of this complexity for experiences of moral distress. I found that morally 
distressing experiences may not only entail unequivocal experiences of moral transgression, 
but irresolvable moral conflict as well, with particular psychological consequences. A 
morally distressed veteran may feel genuinely guilty and not guilty at the same time, and 
he may genuinely view something as inhumane cruelty and as non-suited for such moral 
judgments at the same time. Accordingly, moral distress may entail not only unequivocal 
moral thoughts and emotions, but also unsettling moral disorientation, involving the loss 
of previous certainties about right and wrong. In response to such moral disorientation, a 
morally distressed veteran may engage in a painful ethical struggle. Although his conscience 
has remained ‘intact’ in the very basic sense that he does not lapse into complete apathetic 
nihilism, his moral beliefs may change profoundly.
As discussed in Chapter 3, in the current concept of moral injury it is stressed that a 
veteran’s moral judgments should be taken seriously rather than approached as misplaced 
interpretations that need correction. In contrast to dominant understandings of PTSD, 
the concept of moral injury is built on the contention that veterans’ moral emotions 
do not always result from distorted thoughts and faulty logic, but may come from an 
appropriate acknowledgment that people are capable of wrongdoing. My findings support 
this contention. They indicate that terms such as ‘mental illness’ and ‘disorder’ fall short to 
describe veterans’ painful awareness of the possibility of moral failure, and to capture the 
moral disorientation and ethical struggle that may come with this realization. This is not to 
say that veterans’ moral struggles might not entail judgments and emotions that could be 
called misguided and misplaced. However, my findings suggest that their confusion should 
not readily (or only) be conceived of as a disorder, but rather (or also) as an ethical struggle, 
and in contrast to frameworks of mental illness, the notion of ethical struggle does not 
begin with disorder but with the experience of crushed moral certainties.
 In fact, in some respects the notion of ethical struggle is even more appropriate 
than ‘moral injury’, because while the concept of moral injury goes beyond conventional 
understandings of mental disorder, it still builds on the medical analogy of injury. Although 
an injury analogy is apt in the sense that something is not whole anymore, and it hurts, it 
also suggests that experiences of moral distress are localized injuries while the rest of the 
moral body has remained – or should remain – the same. To reiterate, the current moral 
injury concept contends that injured veterans maintain an ‘intact moral belief system’, or at 
least, that they should work toward this by appreciating ‘the time-locked context-specificity’ 
of their experiences (Litz et al. 2009, p. 703, see also Paul et al. 2014, Griffin et al. 2017, Held 
et al. 2018). In this respect the injury analogy is potentially problematic. While a physical 
injury and its potential effect on the rest of the body may be healed by focusing on the injury 
itself, this does not seem to apply to a moral injury. A moral injury may entail questions and 
insights about the self and the world that go beyond and deeper than the event. A veteran’s 
experience may have shattered his trust in people’s ability to do right; moreover, it may have 
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shattered his very moral frame of reference with which he used to make judgments about 
questions of wrong and right. He may struggle not only with moral questions such as ‘am 
I/are others good or bad?’ but also with such ethical questions as ‘what is good and bad?’. 
And so, it does not seem sufficient to focus on treating the distress directly related to an 
event (the injury), for instance by making a person capable of forgiving the self or others for 
the event. It also seems necessary to address the more general disorientation and ethical 
struggle that may have been engendered by the event (the changed moral body). To be sure, 
this does not mean that ‘moral injury’ should be replaced by a new term. Any analogy has its 
own problems. Rather, it should be appreciated that moral injury is more than a local injury, 
and thus can leave more than a scar. A morally distressing experience can change a person 
radically and irreversibly.
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7
Chapter 7. Political Betrayal and Reparations:  
Moral Distress in Relation to Political Practices1
Introduction
The previous chapters discussed the motives of Dutch veterans to enlist and serve in military 
operations abroad. Their motives resonate with what has been documented internationally: 
soldiers fight for themselves and their buddies, and are seldom concerned by political 
questions surrounding the mission on which they are sent (e.g. Bourke 1999, Gibson and 
Abell 2004, Bar and Ben-Ari 2005, Finley 2011, Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2013).
The soldiers and veterans I knew prior to this research all reported political disinterest, 
including senior officers working at a political level themselves. Although they did have 
opinions on political topics, they tended to disconnect them from their job. They would 
say, for instance, ‘My job’s got nothing to do with politics’ or ‘Politics don’t matter to me’, 
‘I’m just an instrument of the state’. This is why I initially saw no major problem in the 
depoliticized approach of most research on military trauma. However, my view changed 
when I started to speak to veterans with distress. Many of these veterans turned out to be 
rather concerned by political questions. As discussed in the Chapter 6, for example, their 
experiences of conflict and senselessness had made them consider the overarching purpose 
of their mission. Moreover, closer analysis of the political disinterest of non-distressed 
veterans revealed something more complicated than mere indifference. For one, saying that 
‘my job’s got nothing to do with politics’ because a soldier is ‘just an instrument of the state’ 
is a contradiction in terms. Indeed, it turned out that if being an instrument of the state 
produced morally distressing experiences, soldiers often started to realize that politics had 
a lot to do with their job.
In this chapter I delve into the ways in which soldiers’ jobs are related to political practices, 
examining the subquestion: Did the political practices surrounding the Dutchbat and TFU 
missions play a role in experiences of moral distress among veterans deployed on these 
missions, and if so, how? In contrast to the previous chapter, here I discuss the experiences of 
Dutchbat and TFU veterans separately because I found several relevant differences between 
the two groups. Yet, as will become clear, I identified even more remarkable parallels. While 
the focus is on the accounts of morally distressed veterans, in the final section I will juxtapose 
their experiences with those of veterans who reported no distress at all.
1 A	 version	 of	 this	 chapter	 appeared	 in	 2018	 as	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Political	 Practices	 in	Moral	 Injury:	 A	 Study	 of	 Afghanistan	
Veterans’ in Political Psychology,	(E-pub	ahead	of	print).	DOI:	10.1111/pops.12503:	1-15.
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I begin by discussing several general political characteristics of the Dutchbat and TFU 
missions, reflecting on the extent to which these characteristics may have either reduced or 
increased soldiers’ vulnerability to developing moral distress. In the subsequent sections, 
I zoom in on the Dutchbat and TFU missions, examining the experience of Dutchbat and 
TFU veterans in the context of the particular political practices that shaped their missions. 
The discussion of each mission is divided in two parts. In the first I describe the interviewed 
veterans’ experiences; in the second I discuss what happened at the political level to facilitate 
these experiences, building on the literature on the political practices that characterized the 
Dutchbat and TFU missions. Then I compare the two missions and relate my findings to the 
concept of moral injury. The two missions, despite being very different in several aspects, 
turned out to be quite similar at the fundamental level, not only regarding the surrounding 
political issues but also the ways in which veterans experienced and responded to these 
issues. Subsequently, I propose to add the notions of ‘perceived political betrayal’ and 
‘seeking reparation’ to the concept of moral injury. Finally, I reflect on how the concepts of 
PTSD and moral injury themselves have particular political significance.
 
Some General Characteristics of the Missions
Ha-ha, that’s a typical civilian thing, asking about the point of the mission. I’ve never 
heard a soldier say, what’s the purpose of this, are we doing something useful? No. [short 
silence] Look, the downside is, of course, you only start asking yourself this kind of 
question when someone close to you dies. See, and then: what’s the point? You know. 
For those shit Afghans, when we leave again, everything is fucked again. (…) But yeah, do 
you have to stand behind your mission? No. (…) I’m nothing but an extension of politics, 
and politicians have some interests somewhere, and that’s what we’re for. No, look, if 
you’re really idealistic, you’ll get such questions, if you really have that illusion, because 
I see it as nothing but an illusion, when you think, okay, I’m going to make the world a 
better place. (…) If a guy said something like that, here, during an intake, it would mean 
he has no idea what the job is about.
 (Infantry sergeant, basic training instructor)
Many interviewed veterans recounted that prior to their deployment, they already expected 
not to agree with all the political aspects of their missions, but they saw this as inherent 
to their profession. What aspects? In this section I sketch several general political features 
that the Dutchbat and TFU mission, and many other recent Dutch missions, had in common. 
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I reflect on how these features may have both decreased and increased the risk of moral 
distress among Dutchbat and TFU veterans and discuss several coping strategies that the 
interviewed veterans adopted to deal with anticipated political problems, even at the start 
of their military career.
In Chapter 2, I cited several studies describing how in the past disillusioned soldiers felt 
betrayed when they realized they had been given with false images of the enemy (e.g. ‘gooks’ 
in Vietnam) (Lifton 1973, Shay 1994, Bica 1999), false self-images (e.g. ‘noble warriors’) (Lifton 
1973, Bica 1999), and a false idea of the mission’s cause (e.g. national security or liberation) 
(Gutmann and Lutz 2009, Sherman 2011) or a questionable mandate (e.g. far-reaching 
authorization for the use of force) (Shay 1994, Boudreau 2011). While I would not want to 
argue that the interviewed veterans for this study were deployed in ways that corresponded 
neatly with the reality they would encounter, it does seem that their expectations were more 
reserved than described by the abovementioned authors. I heard no veteran say or suggest 
that he was taught to hate his opponents, or any other people in the area of deployment. Some 
veterans did report feeling hate for opponents or hostile civilians, but their hate developed 
during rather than prior to their deployment. Also, while many veterans reported feeling 
guilt, no one ever spoke of previous self-perceptions in terms of heroism and nobleness. 
Only a couple of veterans said they had used force legally but, in hindsight, immorally. 
Finally, I met only one veteran who had become anti-war, incidentally without developing 
psychological difficulties.2
Many explanations are possible for the differences in the accounts of the interviewed 
veterans and the studies cited above. One is that most studies focus on anti-war veterans, 
and it is likely that their experiences and interpretations differ from those of veterans who 
do not oppose to military intervention. Even among traumatized veterans, only a minority 
become anti-war (see e.g. Drescher et al. 2013). Another explanation may be that these studies 
focus on US veterans deployed on war operations in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. These 
troops operated under more permissive Rules of Engagement than other militaries did (Cole 
2009, Weitsman 2010), with images of heroic warriors promoted in both military and civilian 
society (Lifton 1973, Bica 1999, Finley 2011, Farnsworth 2014).
The Dutch troops in Afghanistan – whose mission was not a conventional war operation 
– were far more restricted than their US colleagues were (cf. Cole 2009, Nagl and Weitz 
2010, Weitsman 2010, Klep 2011). In general, although recent Dutch operations such as the 
2 This	Afghanistan	veteran	now	 looks	at	his	mission	and	 the	military	 as	 follows:	 ‘They	 [Afghan	people]	die	 in	 their	own	
country, in their own house, because some force is employed to serve the interests of a small group of people. That’s 
aggressive.	But	if	I	behave	aggressively	in	the	Netherlands,	it	is	condemned,	even	in	the	military’.	He	does	not	feel	troubled	
by his new-found understanding. He does not regret his mission or feel guilty because, as he told me, he was young at the 
time and did not understand the implications of his mission. In fact, he feels that it is due to his deployment experiences 
that he is able to see what he sees now. 
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mission in Afghanistan did involve combat, they were not typical war operations, but rather 
‘operations other than war’ or ‘peace support operations’ (Pugh 2018). In line with this, in 
recent Dutch missions political leaders refrained from describing the warring parties in 
terms of evil and the mission in terms of being ‘either with or against us’ (cf. NIOD 2002, 
Van der Meulen 2004, Klep 2011, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). Further, although political leaders 
generally spoke positively about the Dutch troops – at least in advance of the missions – they 
did not frame them as hero-warriors, which is in line with the Dutch national self-image as 
non-martial and conflict-aversive (Klinkert 2008, Zaalberg 2013). Dutch political narratives, 
then, refrained from promoting overly martial self-perceptions and demonic constructions 
of others. This reserve, together with the practical restrictions that the Dutch political 
leadership imposed, arguably decreased the incidence of force in ways the Dutch troops 
would later come to regret. Put differently, it seems that the political practices of recent 
Dutch missions carried a lower risk of morally distressing situations than, for instance, those 
of recent US missions.
That said, I have two important remarks. Restrictive mandates and reserved narratives 
are coins with two sides. First, restrictive mandates may not only protect soldiers from 
doing things they might later come to regret, but also leave them powerless in situations 
where robust intervention does seem required. Likewise, reserved narratives may not only 
discourage soldiers from resorting to violence, but also leave them unprepared for the 
violence they do face. Second, while the pre-deployment attitudes and expectations the 
veterans recounted were partially in line with the political narratives of their mission, in 
several important respects the two also stood in contrast to each other. In fact, the veterans’ 
attitudes and expectations partly seemed a counter-reaction to perceived political illusions.
Later on in this chapter I will elaborate on how the political narratives and mandates 
of the Dutchbat and TFU mission had substantial downsides. Here, let me expand upon 
the remark that many soldiers seemed to reject part of these narratives and mandates 
prior to deployment. At the political level, the objectives of the Dutchbat and TFU mission 
were framed in altruistic and relatively ambitious terms. The mission in Srebrenica was 
a peacekeeping operation to help protect a Safe Area (Honig and Both 1996, Klep and 
Winslow 1999, NIOD 2002), and the mission in Uruzgan was supposed to make a substantial 
contribution to safety and reconstructing the region (Klep 2011, Ruijter et al. 2011, Grandia 
2015). In contrast, as mentioned before, the vast majority of the interviewed veterans had 
far lower, more self-oriented expectations. About half did believe they would be able to help 
the local population, but when they did, they thought of very specific contributions such as 
helping to build a school. The other half did not wonder if their activities would be of value 
to the local population. They focused on personal military goals such as ‘putting my training 
into practice’ and ‘doing my job under pressure’, and thought of local benefits only as ‘a big 
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plus’. Besides a matter of personal preference, these attitudes may be considered a counter-
reaction to perceived political illusions. Remember, for instance, Mushin explaining how 
he warned idealistic newcomers: ‘Fucker, you’d better not think like that, you’ll come back 
broken’. Also, consider the words of Anton, who remembered his commander telling him 
with a laugh that his mission would be ‘hopeless, in a valley, that can’t be defended’ and 
thus ‘another typical UN operation’. Expressions like these indicate that, even before their 
mission began, many veterans anticipated a gap between political reality and military reality.
So, most veterans did not go away with complete faith in the design and presentation of 
their mission at the political level. Yet, rather than turning them against their mission, this 
skepticism reinforced their focus on their military duty. Specifically, it seemed to engender 
an indifference to politics, a pragmatic ‘can-do’ attitude and relatively low expectations. 
Political disengagement can then be understood as a preventive coping mechanism for self-
protection. However, as the following sections will show, political disengagement cannot 
fully prepare soldiers for morally challenging situations. For one, being mentally prepared 
for something is not the same as bodily and emotionally experiencing it. Moreover, as 
Chapter 6 showed, many interviewed veterans found themselves unable to fulfill even 
their relatively modest goal of putting their training into practice. When they did, political 
questions surrounding their mission suddenly became very relevant.
 
Dutchbat and TFU
The following sections focus on the Dutchbat and TFU missions, to examine experiences of 
moral distress in which political practices seem to have played a contributing role. As explained, 
the Dutchbat and TFU mission are discussed separately, with each discussion first taking time 
to recount the veterans’ experiences and then connecting them to issues at the political level.
Dutchbat, UNPROFOR: On the Ground
Many of the Dutchbat veterans interviewed shared the sentiment with the Dutch public that 
something had to be done about the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, considering 
their limited means, few believed that it was possible to make a huge difference. At the same 
time, they all did think it would be possible to simply perform their tasks, such as disarming 
belligerents and carrying out patrols. However, reality turned out to be different. 
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‘Pretend play’: Powerlessness and Senselessness
Many veterans said that soon after they arrived, when they drove from the airport in Croatia 
to their compounds in Bosnia, they were confronted by the fact that as UN peacekeepers 
they had little to say. At each of the many checkpoints and roadblocks that the Bosnian Serb 
army had set up, they had to stop, line up and wait to be checked until they were eventually 
given permission to continue (see also NIOD 2002, p. 231). Consequently, the journey to 
Srebrenica became a first clear sign that as UN peacekeepers they were ‘toothless paper 
tigers’ without authority. In the course of their mission, this was confirmed time and again. 
For instance, both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims regularly shot over their heads, the 
former to intimidate them, the latter to provoke fire by the Bosnian Serb forces. As a company 
commander of Dutchbat I later recalled: ‘it sometimes seemed as if the notion of a “safe area” 
only existed in the media!’ (cited in Klep and Winslow 1999, p. 104). 
Dutchbat II veteran Karel, a private in Srebrenica, said this about powerlessness.
We couldn’t do a thing. Our weapons and munitions were not in order. (…) Morale 
plummeted because of that. No maintenance, no hand grenades, I could go on and on. 
You had nothing. I could just as well have walked round with a water pistol, because it 
doesn’t do anything. (…) In The Hague they made these pretty orders, and you have to 
carry them out. For instance, the Muslims were not allowed to have weapons. There 
you are, you spot a group of twenty belligerents, and you’re with seven. And they [the 
belligerents] are all armed. And then? Just go and disarm them? [He laughs bitterly.] With 
twenty rounds, you have to take weapons away – in practice it just doesn’t work. These 
people walk away, just ignore you. Actually, considering the number of people they had 
[compared to the Bosnian Serb belligerents], I can’t blame them. (…) We weren’t allowed 
to fire. To yell: stop or I’ll use force, and then aim your weapon. [He laughs bitterly.] People 
knew that we wouldn’t shoot. (…) In the beginning [you’re] serious about it. ‘It can’t be 
possible’. Slowly, you start saying, ‘well we had a nice walk, spoke to some civilians, got 
information’. (…) If you try ten times to take weapons off people, and you can’t, well you 
just can’t. Then you have to try something else, collect information, to still be useful.
 
Like Karel, several other veterans related how the restrictions imposed on them caused them 
to develop their own initiatives, sometimes against the rules. Frustrated by the prohibition 
to fire back when belligerents fired over their heads, for instance, they sometimes did it 
anyway, without asking or reporting it to their commanders at the compound. Still, such 
alternatives ‘didn’t change anything’, one veteran remarked. 
In any case, none of it could eliminate the profound ‘complete pointlessness’ many veterans 
started feeling. Consider the account of Dutchbat II veteran Gerard, then a corporal. One day he 
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saw Bosnian Serbs execute some Bosnian Muslims in front of their home. He was not allowed 
to intervene, and when he reported what he had seen, his commanders ignored him.
It moved me very, very deeply. I saw something terrible, so inhumane, that you execute 
other people consciously, and nothing gets done about it. I reported it, a couple of times 
actually, and they just dismissed it as, ‘Oh well, an incident’, and ‘Maybe something else 
happened, did you really see what you think you saw?’
According to Gerard, his entire mission was like this. ‘Patrols, patrol reports… it all disappears 
in a drawer’. As a result, he said, ‘You start doubting. Yourself first, of course. Then the leaders, 
the reason why we were there, the mandate’. Gerard was not alone in this. Many veterans said 
that they began to feel powerless and senseless. Specifically, they developed the sense that 
the mission was a ‘charade’ in which Dutchbat was forced to engage in ‘pretend play’.
 
‘Left to our fates’: Abandoning and Being Abandoned
Besides powerless and senseless, many veterans said they felt they had let the local population 
down, and felt ‘abandoned’ and ‘left to our fates’ in turn. By way of illustration, the following 
memory, posted by former NCO Ramon on a Facebook page by and for veterans, is worth 
quoting at length (with permission).
In the beginning the patrol goes smoothly and no extreme things take place. The fact 
that a person reloads his AK47 and points it at me is not special anymore. [But] all of a 
sudden, a mother approaches us and gives me a baby. I look at the little thing and see that 
it’s sick. Before I can react, the mother is gone and comes back a bit later with a second 
baby. She asks us if we want to take the babies with us to a safer area, because there are 
signs that their village will be attacked soon and that nobody will survive. (…)
When we go on a mission we are dealing with ‘Rules of Engagement’. You could say [these 
are] the rules of the game determined by the UN. One of these rules is that we cannot 
take locals in our vehicles. Cannot move [people]. The counterparty could accuse us of 
being biased, of ethnic cleansing. So here is the urgent request of a mother with two sick 
babies and there are the Rules of Engagement. What should I do? I’m a soldier and follow 
the Rules of Engagement or I’m human and take the mother with the two sick babies to 
a hospital. (…)
Eventually we decide, by mutual agreement, that we will take the mother and two sick 
babies and bring them to a hospital. On our way to the hospital, we have to pass a roadblock 
of the other party [Bosnian Serbs]. This group of over 40 people will not let us leave with 
their ‘enemy’ just like that. While a colleague is negotiating with the commander of the 
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group, one of them walks over to me and points his gun at me. Without thinking I draw 
my own and point it at him. (…) He looks at me pugnaciously, sticks up his middle finger, 
turns around and walks away. Slowly I hide my weapon back in my holster.
After a long time of negotiating, we are finally allowed to leave the area with the mother 
and babies. A little later we leave [them] at the hospital and head back to the headquarters. 
As usual we need to report after each ride/action. I report to an officer and he yells at me. 
‘Who do you think you are? Billy the Kid? Who gave you permission to ignore the Rules of 
Engagement? Are you Mother Theresa?’ (…)
At that point I didn’t realize the effect this would have on me. Years later in the Netherlands, 
I didn’t dare make any more choices in my job. Suppose I had to choose again. I might 
make the wrong decision and be condemned again. For years I wondered: The man who 
follows the Rules of Engagement, is he a better soldier than me? Am I a better person than 
the soldier who follows the Rules of Engagement?
Clearly, Ramon’s story speaks of a dual feeling of abandoning others and being abandoned. 
Again, he was not the only one; many soldiers developed this feeling.
Consequently, many soldiers became demoralized. For some, the only remaining motive 
was to ‘get back in one piece’. As part of the black humor that developed, the song ‘We gotta 
get out of this place’ became a favorite sing-along, and such graffiti as ‘UN, United Nothing’ 
and ‘No teeth…! A mustache…? Smel [sic] like shit…? Bosnian girl!’ was scrawled on the 
compound walls. Also, as discussed, some soldiers started to pull cruel jokes on the local 
population, such as throwing sweets at groups of hungry children so that they would fight 
each other for them.
The stories of Dutchbat III veterans convey especially intense sentiments of abandoning 
others and being abandoned. The diary of a Dutchbat III soldier quoted in the study by Honig 
and Both (1996, p. 136) offers direct insight into the mood of soldiers in June 1995.
9 June: At the end of six months. I ask myself the question: what was the point of our 
presence? I have no answer.
10 June: We all feel the same. A great lack of understanding at the higher levels. We are 
being forgotten.
11 June: The Muslims are provoking the fighting. ‘Get out of here as quickly as possible’, 
the lads are saying. The people in The Hague don’t know what’s happening here. 
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As is well-known now, Srebrenica fell a month a later. All Dutchbat III veterans I spoke to 
vividly remember the morning of July 11. The massive air strikes they expected, about which 
the Bosnian Muslim population had also been informed, never came. Only later in the day, 
two F-16s came (see also NIOD 2002, p. 1700). Former private Klaas is one of the veterans who 
recounted, in a choking voice, the hope he felt that morning. ‘It’s very special what it does 
to you’, he related. ‘It gives you a good feeling. Support’s coming, help’s coming’. When it 
turned out the air strikes would not come after all, he was devastated. ‘For the umpteenth 
time, you feel yet again that you can’t make it happen, that as the UN you can’t help people 
the way you promised you would’. As was the case for Klaas, the lack of air strikes and the 
fall of Srebrenica that followed made many veterans feel both utterly disappointed and 
completely deserted.
 
‘A knife in the back’: Feeling Suckered in the Mission’s Aftermath
The end of the Dutchbat mission in July 1995 did not end the soldiers’ sense of abandonment. 
In contrast, the aftermath of the mission only amplified it and fueled the sense of being 
‘suckered’. Initially, however, it seemed that the opposite would occur. After the soldiers of 
Dutchbat III had left Srebrenica, they stayed briefly in a UN compound in Zagreb, Croatia, 
where they were warmly welcomed by the then Dutch crown prince and several politicians. 
The Dutch media also hailed them as heroes initially (see also NIOD 2002, p. 2331, Klep 2008, 
pp. 82–3). Yet, at the end of July, when more information about what had happened came to 
light, the picture began to change drastically.
Former private Anton recounted the following about this. In Zagreb, he said, ‘they all 
wanted to have their picture taken with us’. Yet, back home, he read in a magazine that 
several politicians said that they had actually not wanted to go to Zagreb but felt pressured 
because the Dutch crown prince was going. Anton knew one of these politicians. He called 
him, confronted him with the statement and said: ‘I saw you, you were all too happy to take 
a picture with everybody’. The response was – Anton still remembered the exact words – 
‘That’s politics’. It made him furious. ‘First, they want to take a picture with us, because 
you’re a hero. And then a week later, when it turned out to be murder, “No, we only went 
because we couldn’t stay behind”. Piss off. It made an impression on me… “That’s politics”…’.
Many veterans remembered the strongly worded calls from parliamentarians to explain 
what had happened in Srebrenica (see also NIOD 2002), which they experienced as ‘a knife 
in the back’ and ‘betrayal’. Parliament had encouraged the government’s decision to send 
troops to Srebrenica, and had initially welcomed them back as heroes. Now, it demanded 
explanations for the fact that Dutchbat had not prevented the mass slaughter in Srebrenica. 
Several veterans described these demands as ‘trying to pass the responsibility onto Dutchbat’. 
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Many veterans did recall support from the Dutch Minister of Defense, who kept emphasizing 
that Dutchbat had been unable to prevent the tragedy and the responsibility lay with the UN 
and the international community (Klep and Winslow 1999, NIOD 2002, p. 2232). They were 
also angry that the Dutch government took no responsibility for sending them to and then 
‘abandoning us in Srebrenica’.
The public and parliamentary calls for explanations led to debriefings by the Military 
Police (Marechaussee) (NIOD 2002, p. 2332), which were done in such a way that several 
veterans experienced them as another ‘stab in the back’. Instead of ‘being allowed to vent 
some emotions’, they were ‘interrogated like criminals’. Several veterans remembered 
being ordered by their superiors to remain silent about what they had witnessed. Take Isaac, 
who had taken the initiative in Potočari to search for evidence of war crimes committed 
by Bosnian Serbs. He said that instead of ‘being thanked for risking my life to do my duty, 
even more than my duty, I was treated as a nuisance’. Later he found out that elements of his 
declaration never appeared in the debriefing report.3
Notably, Dutchbat I and II veterans also felt attacked by the commotion surrounding 
the Srebrenica tragedy, as well as Dutchbat III veterans who were on leave (and prevented 
from returning by Bosnian Serb belligerents) during the fall of Srebrenica. Like Dutchbat III 
veterans, they had been intimidated and witnessed violence and suffering, and felt unable to 
do anything about it. Consequently, the mistreatment of Dutchbat felt personal.
 
‘Doesn’t somebody have to pay for the mistakes?’ Demanding Truth and Compensation
In 2002, shortly after the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) presented 
its much-anticipated report on the Srebrenica mass murders, the cabinet resigned. Prime 
Minister Wim Kok gave a statement in which he acknowledged that the Netherlands, ‘as 
a member of the international community (…) shares political responsibility for bringing 
about a situation in which such an act was possible’ (quoted in Van den Berg 2014, p. 110). 
Also, he insisted that the soldiers of Dutchbat ‘were not responsible for what happened there’ 
(ibid). In 2006, moreover, the Ministry of Defense bestowed an insignia on the soldiers. To 
many veterans, however, it was all ‘too little, too late’. Most reported mixed feelings. They 
saw the insignia, for instance, both as ‘a sign of recognition’ and as ‘a fake gesture’. As one 
veteran explained, it was like ‘if we give them a badge, they will keep quiet, we won’t hear 
from them anymore now they feel recognized’. As another veteran emphasized, ‘I didn’t 
need a medal. We need to be compensated for the misery, for the betrayal, that’s what we are 
3	 The	debriefing	reports	led	to	no	prosecutions	of	Dutchbat	veterans	(De	Volkskrant	1999).	However,	several	official	inquiries	
followed,	with	differing	conclusions	on	how	much	Dutchbat	could	be	held	accountable	for	the	tragedy	(see	NIOD	2002,	Van	
den	Berg	2014).	Several	 legal	 claims	were	also	filed	against	 the	UN,	 the	Dutch	state,	and	Dutchbat	 leadership	 (see	e.g.	
Eigenraam 2014, Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2015). 
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waiting for’. Many veterans stated that rather than an insignia, ‘we need the truth to finally 
come out’ and ‘we need answers’. Their general feeling was that Dutchbat had been punished 
disproportionally, while the political leadership was merely concerned with safeguarding its 
own interests and reputation.
Around the turn of the millennium, dozens of Dutchbat veterans diagnosed with PTSD 
filed a personal injury claim against the Dutch Ministry of Defense, stating that the Ministry 
had offered insufficient aftercare and thus had breached its duty of care. Several of the 
interviewed veterans had filed a claim. All said that they had done it partly because they felt 
they had been offered inadequate care, but mainly because they generally felt ‘left to our 
fates’ and ‘abandoned’ from the start. Many veterans denounced the Ministry of Defense for 
‘going to great lengths’, including appealing to higher courts, to avoid paying out the claims.
On Veterans Day, 2016, the then Minister of Defense declared that the Dutchbat mission 
‘was – already in advance – impossible to accomplish’ (NRC 2016).4 Several veterans saw this 
as an important statement that made them feel ‘finally recognized’. Others, however, felt 
it was still ‘too little, too late’. Some of these veterans joined a new collective lawsuit that 
resulted from the Minister’s statement. One lawyer assisting in this claim argued that the 
Minister’s statement had ‘expanded Dutchbat’s judicial playing field’: Dutchbat veterans now 
were no longer forced to limit their complaints to aftercare and therefore no longer needed 
a PTSD diagnosis to claim government compensation (NOS 2016). While the personal injury 
claims that several Dutchbat veterans filed concerned insufficient aftercare, this new claim, 
rather, entailed that the Dutch state had knowingly sent Dutchbat soldiers on a ‘mission 
impossible’ and had failed to admit this afterwards when the soldiers were the subject of 
public accusations (BNR 2016, NRC 2016). An ex-Dutchbat officer explained his motive to 
join the claim as follows: ‘Doesn’t somebody have to pay for the mistakes back then? The 
only way you have is to demand compensation’ (quoted in Koelé 2016, translation TM). In 
2018, the group of veterans joining the claim had grown to 230 (Van Joolen 2018), one third 
of the former battalion. In 2018, the Ministry of Defense announced a study into the needs 
of Dutchbat III veterans with respect to healthcare and recognition, in response to which 
the group withdrew their claim. Their lawyer explained that ‘it was never about money 
for Dutchbat’, but that the financial claim was intended as ‘leverage’ to enforce adequate 
aftercare and societal rehabilitation (Van Joolen 2018).
Dutchbat, UNPROFOR: Political Practices
4	 Although	the	then	Minister	of	Defense	said	something	similar	in	2013	(‘Dutchbat	soldiers	[were]	saddled	with	an	impossible	
assignment’)	(NRC	2016),	this	was	the	first	time	the	political	leadership	admitted	that	the	infeasibility	was	clear	in	advance,	
thus	implying	that	the	government	could	have	known	better.
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This section attempts to place the accounts of the interviewed Dutchbat veterans in a broader 
political context. First, it discusses their deployment in the context of political conflicts and 
compromises made before and during the mission. Second, it discusses their homecoming 
in relation to the political silence and ambiguity in the aftermath of the mission.
 
The Mission: Conflicts and Compromises
As the previous section showed, the distress of Dutchbat soldiers related directly to an utter 
inability to carry out their tasks and responsibilities. What they wanted to do they could not 
do, and what they did do often seemed to have no point. As a result, many developed strong 
feelings of powerlessness and senselessness, specifically a sense of ‘pretend play’. Many felt 
they had abandoned the local population, but also felt abandoned themselves by the Dutch 
government and the UN. This was especially the case for Dutchbat III soldiers.
In part, the soldiers’ difficulties can be related to problems in their mandate. As has been 
documented, there was a great mismatch between the objectives and military capabilities in 
Dutchbat’s mission (e.g. Honig and Both 1996, Klep and Winslow 1999, Vogelaar and Kramer 
2000, NIOD 2002, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2003, Rapporteur Report 2015). The 
soldiers of Dutchbat were deployed without adequate resources to do their job of patrolling 
and demilitarizing the area, sent as peacekeepers to an area where there was no peace to 
keep. Accordingly, the declaration of Srebrenica as a demilitarized Safe Area was violated not 
just when it was under direct attack, but on a daily basis. Before the mission started, several 
civilian and military experts, including the UN Security Council, estimated that several 
thousand fully armed ground troops at least – not just several hundred lightly equipped 
soldiers – would be needed to protect Srebrenica from Bosnian Serb attacks (NIOD 2002, pp. 
573; 740; 777; 822; 1842, Rapp 2015, p. 9).
Besides the discrepancy between goals and resources, Dutchbat’s mandate contained 
vague wording. Dutchbat and other UNPROFOR troops were mandated ‘to deter attacks 
against the Safe Areas’ and ‘promote the withdrawal’ of forces other than those of the 
Bosnian government, but no explicit authorization was given to ‘defend’ Safe Areas and 
‘secure’ or ‘enforce’ the withdrawal of belligerents (Faix 2010, p. 142). This vagueness arose 
from ambiguity in the newly developed concept of ‘Safe Area’. In contrast to ‘safe haven’, 
for instance, ‘Safe Area’ was defined as requiring the permission of both warring parties for 
that area while the deployed peacekeepers took an impartial position. This definition caused 
ambiguity in the mandate because it implied that a Safe Area could not be coerced even if 
deemed necessary for the safety of the area (NIOD 2002, p. 601, Rapp 2015). As a result, it was 
unclear what exactly was expected in the case of intimidation or attack (Kroon et al. 1997, p. 
61, Klep and Winslow 1999, p. 104, Faix 2010, p. 142). It was also unclear what ‘self-defense’ 
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entailed and what the member states of the UN would do in the case of escalation (Kroon et al. 
1997, pp. 60–61, NIOD 2002). Shortly before the fall of Srebrenica, the soldiers of Dutchbat III 
were explicitly authorized to resort to force (NIOD 2002, p. 1665), but they still had only few 
troops and little resources, and they never gained significant support from other militaries 
or substantial air support (Honig and Both 1996, NIOD 2002, Rapporteur Report 2015).
What caused the mismatch between goals and resources, and the ambiguity in the 
mandate? While many different factors played a role, two root problems appear to have been 
particularly significant. First, there was a tension between the UN and several member states’ 
desire to intervene in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the unwillingness to get involved in a war in a possibly doomed mission (e.g. Honig and Both 
1996, Westerman and Honig 1998, NIOD 2002, Rapporteur Report 2015). While many countries 
voiced the need for intervention, many were unwilling to send their own troops. In practice, 
they left ‘peacekeeping operations on the ground to other countries’ and/or provided ‘arms 
to the Bosnian government so that the Bosnian people could do their own fighting’ (NIOD 
2002, p. 869). Also, there was much disagreement on the approach to take to the conflict (e.g. 
Honig and Both 1996, Westerman and Honig 1998, NIOD 2002, Rapporteur Report 2015). As 
a result, the establishment of Safe Areas may have ‘had less to do with the reality of Bosnia-
Hercegovina than with the need to achieve a compromise in the Security Council and with 
the wish to diminish the tensions that had arisen between the United States and Europe 
concerning the right approach’ (Blom 2002, p. 1, see also NIOD 2002, Rapporteur Report 
2015). Establishing Safe Areas was seen as ‘better than nothing’ (Westerman and Honig 1998, 
p. 15). In hindsight, involved officials called the declaration of Srebrenica as a Safe Area ‘a 
fake solution’ intended mainly ‘pour la galerie’ (Rapporteur Report 2015, pp. 13–14). According 
to former UN official Tharoor, ‘one of the fundamental problems we had throughout this 
operation is that diplomatic drafting conducted with great finesse and aplomb by very skilled 
diplomats served as an end in itself. It was not linked to operational realities on the ground’ 
(Rapporteur Report 2015, p. 14). So, political disagreements were resolved by compromise, 
and the discrepancies and ambiguities that characterized Dutchbat’s mission seemed at least 
partially a result of these compromises (cf. NIOD 2002, p. 373). 
Second, there were tensions between, on the one hand, the desire of both the Dutch 
government and a large part of the Dutch parliament and public to address the humanitarian 
emergency in the former Yugoslavia and, on the other hand, objections (voiced by other 
parliamentarians, media commentators and military experts) that the proposed mission 
risked failure and undesired consequences of escalation (e.g. Honig and Both 1996, 
Westerman and Honig 1998, Blom 2002, NIOD 2002, Rapporteur Report 2015). Critics 
pointed out, for instance, that the establishment of Safe Areas ‘would cross the line between 
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement’ and the operation would require many more 
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troops and international involvement (NIOD 2002, p. 822 ff.). While the Dutch government 
said it understood the criticism, it persisted in its intention to deploy Dutch troops with 
the support of broad parliamentary and public agreement (e.g. NIOD 2002, p. 534). This 
persistence should be understood in the context of a strong sense that ‘something had to 
be done’ (e.g. Honig and Both 1996, Westerman and Honig 1998, Blom 2002, NIOD 2002). 
Rumors of concentration camps and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia brought back 
images of World War II and the associated feeling of ‘never again’ fueled the urge to intervene 
(NIOD 2002, pp. 534, 3385). So the question of intervening seems to have become a case of 
‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ (NIOD 2002, p. 126). The Dutch government decided 
on ‘do’, and deployed troops to Srebrenica without being properly able to oversee potential 
consequences (Westerman and Honig 1998, Blom 2002, NIOD 2002).
Throughout the mission, national and international tensions continued. At the UN level, 
conflicts were resolved with compromises and at the Dutch national level, disagreements 
were solved by letting perceived moral obligations prevail over objections to the potential 
consequences. Also, rather than that an overarching plan was agreed on, ‘a mix of stop-
gap measures’ and ‘short-term policies’ kept being adopted (Rapporteur Report 2015, pp. 
42; 43). Accordingly, the policy-making process drifted into a ‘muddling through’ scenario 
(Blom 2002, NIOD 2002, pp. 671, 1371–1471). Accordingly, the policy-making process drifted 
into ‘muddling through’ (Blom 2002, NIOD 2002, pp. 671, 1371–1471). The mission remained a 
peacekeeping operation, under persistent political disagreements over the use of force and 
importance of impartiality (NIOD 2002, p. 1368, Rapporteur Report 2015). Thus the political 
reality became Dutchbat’s reality: muddling through.
The Aftermath: Offering Closure or Closing Off?
As for Dutchbat’s homecoming experience, a theme that emerged in the accounts of virtually 
all the interviewed veterans was feeling ‘suckered’ and let down. Specifically, many veterans 
came to regard both the mission and its aftermath as a political ‘charade’, and as ‘a knife 
in the back’. In their experience, the political leadership was less concerned with offering 
‘closure’ to the veterans and more with ‘closing off’ the debates surrounding Srebrenica. 
This, in turn, triggered a search among veterans for ‘the truth’ and compensation from the 
political leadership.
 What was the political context of this experience? On the one hand, both the UN 
and the Dutch government put much effort into bringing Srebrenica’s events to light and 
learning from them. At the international level, the Srebrenican tragedy and other failed peace 
operations in Somalia and Rwanda led the UN to extend the options and activities of peace 
missions, as documented in reports published in 1995 (‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’) 
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and 2000 (‘Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’). Among other recommendations, 
these reports advised that peace operations should be more ‘robust’, meaning that 
peacekeepers should be authorized to defend not just themselves but the mandate as well, 
and they should be properly equipped to execute and defend their mandate (Johnstone et 
al. 2005). At the national level, the Dutch government commissioned NIOD to conduct 
extensive research into the events in Srebrenica, and meanwhile began to apply the ‘lessons 
learned’. Among these lessons were new requirements for clear rules on decision-making 
surrounding peace missions (TK 2000, Wessel 2008) and improvements to military aftercare 
(TK 2003, Vermetten and Olff 2013). Moreover, as mentioned above, the government assumed 
responsibility by resigning after the publication of the NIOD report, explicitly emphasizing 
that Dutchbat was not responsible for the events (Van den Berg 2014).
However, taking these measures freed the Dutch government from accountability in 
other ways. Commissioning the NIOD investigation allowed the government to refuse to 
comment on the Srebrenican tragedy until the findings came out, while resigning after 
the report was published in 2002 meant that the government did not have to discuss the 
findings or its implications in political debate (Veteraneninstituut 2002, Klep 2008, Van den 
Berg 2014). As Klep (2008, pp. 162–5) argues, the government’s response to the NIOD report 
was a defense mechanism ‘in triplicate’. First, it endorsed the report’s general conclusions; 
second, it commented critically on parts of the report; and third, it stated that the report’s 
conclusions resonated with the ‘lessons learned’ that the government had already drawn and 
applied previously. Falling back on this defense mechanism instead of instigating a sincere 
discussion, Klep contends, the government neglected to address its responsibility for the 
failure of its policy. As Van den Berg puts it, the Dutch government’s actions were primarily 
aimed not at sincere engagement with either Dutchbat or the Bosnian Muslim survivors but 
at ’damage control’ and ’closure’ of the Dutch political debate on Srebrenica (Van den Berg 
2014, pp. 114–5).
Whether or not it can be said that the government failed to take adequate responsibility, 
the abovementioned studies offer a context in which the experiences of Dutchbat soldiers can 
be understood. It took seven years before the government officially assumed responsibility 
for the failed mission, and in these years, Dutchbat veterans had to undergo painful 
debriefings and were repeatedly confronted by public debates and accusations against their 
conduct. When the government eventually accepted responsibility in 2002, it did so elusively 
(‘as a member of the international community’) (Van den Berg 2014, p. 110), while subsequent 
governments would deny further responsibility. In lawsuits filed by Dutchbat veterans, for 
instance, the government insisted that it bore no guilt for the circumstances in which the 
Dutchbat soldiers had ended up and that it had not breached its duty to care (Outeren 2011, 
Centrale Raad van Beroep 2013, Koelé 2016). In short, in the many words it did express, the 
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Dutch government remained both vague and reserved about the question of responsibility 
for the events of Srebrenica. Moreover, because it did not literally remain silent, it was able 
to assert that it had done the opposite. Understood as such, it becomes comprehensible why 
Srebrenica’s political aftermath amplified the feelings of powerlessness, senselessness and 
abandonment that many Dutchbat veterans had already developed on their mission, and 
why it led many veterans to demand ‘the truth’ to be found and be given both symbolic and 
financial compensation.
 
TFU, ISAF: On the Ground
In 2006, 11 years after the fall of Srebrenica, four years after the Dutch government resigned 
over the Dutchbat mission, the Task Force Uruzgan mission began. Different from Dutchbat’s 
peacekeeping mission, TFU was part of a NATO-led counterinsurgency operation. While 
the Dutch public and parliament debated whether TFU would involve reconstruction or 
combat, the soldiers about to be deployed to Uruzgan all knew that they would likely engage 
in combat. As a former private put it, ‘Of course we knew. We trained for it, we had Rules 
of Engagement, we had the material and the Battle Group was far bigger than the PRT 
[Provincial Reconstruction Team]’. Virtually all the interviewed veterans said they looked 
forward to the prospect of fighting. After all, action was one of the reasons they had joined 
the military, and they had been trained in combat for a long time. The next section examines 
their deployment and homecoming experiences in detail. First it discusses the experiences 
and then places them in the broader political context.
No Permission to Fire, ‘Just make sure the flag is planted’
Former NCO Julian was one of the veterans lamenting this reticence. In illustration, he 
offered an anecdote of how he and his colleagues had once observed a man digging a hole. 
IED’s (‘roadside bombs’) were responsible for a high rate of casualties in Afghanistan, and 
it seemed obvious that this man was about to bury one. Still, they were not allowed to do 
anything about it. The next day, much to their chagrin, they did find an IED where the man 
had been digging. According to Julian, ‘Often those Battle Group commanders, they’re 
afraid. They want to become a colonel afterwards [and] they can’t have it on their resume 
that something went wrong. You really see it. They really don’t want to take any risks’. Clearly, 
Julian referred to a fear of the political risk of casualties rather than the risk of casualties as 
such.
Many veterans told stories similar to Julian’s. Daniel, for instance, who was an NCO 
in a mortar platoon in Uruzgan. He was always at work, even at night and felt extremely 
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responsible for his colleagues, especially since he felt he could not count on his superiors. 
Once, without waiting for permission, he took it upon himself to provide fire support to 
colleagues engaged in heavy combat.
They only had a few rounds left, and they called for help on the radio: ‘Guys we won’t 
make it, it’s over’. And we were so busy trying to get permission to fire. (…) And at one 
moment (…) I put down the phone and said: ‘I’m going to fire now’. (…) At that point the 
Taliban were throwing hand grenades over the wall, that’s how close they were. (…) I said, 
‘I’m just going to do it, it’s over. And we’ll just stand in front of that green table [military 
court]. But we’re going to defend this one. We could let it go wrong (…) and see how the 
Netherlands would respond’. And that day, we made it. It cost us only one dead guy… 
Could have been lots more if we’d done it differently. (…) There was always fear – that 
wasn’t said aloud – but always fear at the higher level: what political consequences will 
this have? And that assessment was always made. They never said it directly, but I always 
felt it. Political consequences. Like, this is not why ‘The Netherlands, Inc’ went here.
Back home, Daniel’s life became ‘a living hell .´ He said: ‘Everything was an obligation for 
me. Every decision I made, I made it in my head with the same weight as, will I fire or won’t 
I fire? (…) Each time I put that weight in. Well, you can’t keep doing that’. Eventually, Daniel 
collapsed and had to seek professional help.
Officer Ted was a commander at the level that Daniel and other veterans complained 
about. Yet, like Daniel, Ted spoke with frustration about confrontations with reluctant 
superiors, for instance, when he initiated a particularly offensive operation in order to clear 
a certain area from insurgents and increase safety. The Chief of Defense was against the 
operation because of the high casualty risk involved, for both the own troops and the local 
population, but Ted convinced him by insisting that bringing safety would actually prevent 
casualties. Still, a general was sent out from the Netherlands to tell him that ‘if things go 
wrong, you’re accountable’. Ted felt they probably did this ‘so that they could say, we sent 
someone’. Dryly, he remarked, ‘So I had a sleepless night because of that “support” from the 
Netherlands’. He recalled what he was told just before he went to Afghanistan:
‘Don’t move too much, just make sure the flag is planted’. That is really what was said to 
me. Then, you realize that this is actually the only thing of interest that counts back in the 
Netherlands: scoring internationally. (…)Kick the can down the road; plant the flag; the 
Netherlands are in the game. What do we want to achieve in this country? That’s not an 
interesting question for politics.
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In Ted’s experience the Dutch military leadership did not care about the situation in 
Afghanistan as much as it cared for political support.
Similarly, officer and then Battle Group commander Mark voiced frustration about being 
prohibited from cooperating with a militia leader who had turned out to be corrupt and 
violent to people from tribes other than his own (see also De Munnik and Kitzen 2012, p. 157). 
‘You can’t work with [him], because the Dutch government called him a criminal, but on the 
ground you see he’s an important partner with (…) about a thousand well-armed soldiers’, 
Mark told me. ‘What do you do? Do you say, I won’t pay you anymore, you’re not my partner 
anymore? Just like that? Knowing that afterwards I’ll get IEDs in my area every day, while he 
always stuck to our agreements and made sure that we could drive from A to B safely?’. Mark 
said, ‘I understand the Dutch government’s idea, and I have similar values and norms, but on 
the ground it just looks different from what it looks like in political The Hague’.
 Complicating the situation further, some veterans maintained that the Dutch 
should have cooperated even less with dubious local figures than they did. Military nurse 
Niels, for instance, could not see cooperating with corrupt warlords who abused local boys as 
a way to win ‘hearts and minds’. At the same time, he believed that the Dutch had not always 
fought hard enough.
If you don’t have to fight, you should talk. But if you have to fight, you should fight hard. 
In the Netherlands, in politics, you can’t say that out loud. (…) Those moments when we 
had to fight, I believe, we should have either fought harder or outmaneuvered [fighting]. 
One of the two. Now it was just putting Band-Aids on bullet holes.
Although Niels’ view of the approach they should have taken somewhat opposed Mark’s, both 
maintained that going half-way was the worst thing to do. Like Mark, Niels concluded that 
‘there is a wonderful idea in The Hague, in an ivory tower, but in practice it’s very different’.
‘Is this winning hearts and minds?’
Alongside imposed reticence, many TFU veterans were frustrated by the strategy of winning 
‘hearts and minds’. Though most believed in the importance of getting the local population 
on your side, they could not get their heads round the ‘stupidity’ of some of the ‘winning’ 
things they had to do. As then Marine Donald for instance cynically related, some units had 
to patrol highly dangerous routes and ‘hand out pens-and-shit in remote villages’. Several 
veterans, discovered that even after they had won the population’s hearts, ‘you [still] don’t 
have their minds’. Former private Lars put it as follows.
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They don’t want to talk to you, or they lie to you. (…) You would rather side with someone 
who kicks you than with someone who gives you a cookie. That’s what these people did. 
And who can blame them? (…) What does ISAF do? Well, ISAF walks around, maybe builds 
a water pump, and then we leave. The Taliban don’t leave.
Due to such complexities, many veterans were unsure about the extent to which their approach 
truly helped get the population on board, wondering ‘is this winning hearts and minds?’
Meanwhile, the veterans who did have confidence in the chosen approach also disproved 
of certain politically imposed obligations. Ted, for instance, lamented ’the idiocy’ of the 
Dutch government prohibiting Dutch soldiers to cooperate with the US-led troops on 
Operation Enduring Freedom. While it was supposed to ensure that the Dutch focused on 
reconstruction and stayed out of the US War on Terror, according to Ted, the result was 
counterproductive. He explained that US troops would often be ‘pounding through villages’ 
where he had been planning to carry out reconstruction, remarking that ‘you create your 
own Taliban like that, rather than trying to conquer hearts and minds’. To prevent these 
troops ‘from doing things that’d spoil my operations’, he had to ‘streamline our operations’. 
Therefore, he frequently went against the mandate to cooperate with OEF’s commander 
anyway, which helped him to ‘create something long-term’. Still, when a parliamentary 
commission visited him in Uruzgan, he noted with disappointment, the commission was 
mainly interested in ‘how many water pumps we had installed’, because, he suspected, 
‘that’s nice for national consumption’.
The story of then private Servie offers a tangible example of how confusion about the 
way the Dutch tried to win ‘hearts and minds’ aggravated an already distressing deployment 
experience. In a Dutch TV series (Kruispunt TV 2016), he recounts that when he was stationed 
in a house compound, every night he was on watch duty he heard a boy of about fourteen 
crying. He was a bacha – known as a ‘chai-boy’ to Western soldiers – a boy sold to wealthy, 
powerful men for entertainment and sex (see also de Lind van Wijngaarden and Rani 2011, 
Schut and van Baarle 2017). During the day, Servie often saw the boy watching him.
 I often thought to myself, he’s asking for help. And you couldn’t do anything. You 
couldn’t say, like, let’s just take him with us and protect him. And then you’re sitting at 
your post in the evening and just hear the kid crying. What a harrowing sound. And… you 
feel… so fucked up. You come back, and then the colleague who takes your place tells you 
that that kid shot himself in the head with an AK that day. Then you think to yourself, I 
should’ve done something. But, I wasn’t allowed to. And later you come home, and you 
start looking into it – maybe I should’ve done that sooner – but then you start hearing 
that it was not allowed under the Taliban regime. Abusing boys, you’d get killed for that. 
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We put a police chief there, under our NATO regime, and it could happen all over again. 
These things are so contradictory, they eat at you.
(Kruispunt TV 2016, translation TM)
Ten years later, Servie wrote the following on his Facebook page (quoted with permission): 
‘I/we didn’t do nothing to stop the injustice this boy was subjected to....... instead I obeyed 
orders like a good soldier. (...) I just closed my eyes and pretended it didn’t happen. Now 
this boy is one of the demons that haunts my dreams every night for the past 10 years’. Back 
home, Servie felt great sadness, which soon changed into anger and paranoia: he suspected 
his close ones of trying to do something to him (Bulters 2016). Eventually, Servie sought 
help. He was diagnosed with PTSD and was given an assistance dog, which now wakes him 
up before he wakes himself with his own screams, dreaming of the events in Afghanistan. In 
his nightmares, the boy and other dead people still approach, asking ‘Why did this happen?’ 
(Kruispunt TV 2016).
‘The bigger picture’: Denial of One’s Experience
Many veterans said that the higher levels had not taken their views seriously, both during and 
after the mission. Instead, they said, their superiors frequently evoked ‘the bigger picture’ to 
dismiss differing opinions. Several former privates, for instance, voiced frustration about senior 
officers’ insistence that TFU had made much progress regarding safety, despite what they had 
seen in Uruzgan. As one put it, the safety of which higher levels spoke was a matter of ‘false 
safety, false virtue’ (‘schijnveiligheid, schijnheiligheid’). Senior officers criticized the fact that while 
they tried to understand the government’s interest in maintaining international alliances and 
public support, the political realm did not take their own insights and concerns seriously. 
In a Dutch documentary filmed in Afghanistan in 2006 (Franke 2006), a NCO utters the 
following cynical words. ‘Many soldiers, and I’m thinking mainly of commanders, are quickly 
forced to do politics at their level instead of practicing their profession. (…) Now you see 
that permission has to come from The Hague for almost every assignment; (…) the armchair 
warriors have an opinion on everything’ (translation TM). In the same documentary, an 
intelligence officer voices the following criticism.
When 90% of the soldiers here say, like, listen, there is a buildup of Taliban, then you 
should take it seriously. And the situation is (…) that The Hague decides, no, that’s not the 
case, and so nothing, nothing’s done about it (…) because their intelligence says it’s not 
needed and it isn’t all that bad. [Our intelligence] is partially put aside and they make up 
a politically sound story to sell to parliament, with all the possible consequences for the 
men on the ground here (translation TM).
126
Pa
rt
  2
    
  S
ol
di
er
s i
n 
Co
nfl
ic
t 
Ch
ap
te
r 7
   P
ol
iti
ca
l B
et
ra
ya
l a
nd
 R
ep
ar
at
io
ns
On the day the intelligence officer said this, a Dutch unit hit an IED.  
The criticism voiced in this documentary resonates with what many veterans told me. 
Then private Maarten, for instance, said that even if he knew in advance that political stories 
were often different from reality, he was still surprised by how big this difference was. ‘That 
it would be censured that much, I really didn’t know’, he told me. ‘At one point, we had 
moments when it really went crazy. But then I called my parents, and they said “We just saw 
on the news how well it’s all going over there”. Then I thought, how is this possible! A crazy-
ass war is going on here, and in the Netherlands, it’s all fine’.
Several veterans said that they had been ordered to keep quiet about their experiences 
when they phoned home because information ‘could fall into the wrong hands’. According 
to then NCO Daniel, however, those ‘wrong hands’ were not only the Taliban’s but also ‘the 
media’s hands’ because, meanwhile, he and his colleagues read in a newspaper that their 
commander had said, ‘There have been sporadic engagements but it’s not that bad’. As Daniel 
said, soldiers tell each other that ‘our biggest enemies are not outside the gate, but above us, 
that’s who our biggest enemies are’. Many veterans spoke of similar experiences, in which 
they felt ‘betrayed’ by the higher levels. Though they agreed they were not in the best position 
to judge issues, such as how much their mission had contributed to the reconstruction of 
Uruzgan, they felt that what they had seen had often been denied or distorted under the 
guise of ‘the bigger picture’.
A Desire to be Taken Seriously
The veterans who eventually sought help to cope with the distress they developed nearly 
all remembered the help-seeking process as a struggle. It took most veterans a battle ‘to 
finally admit to myself I needed help’, and another battle ‘to actually get help’. On the one 
hand, many veterans praised the fact that in recent decades, significant strides have been 
made with respect to aftercare. On the other, many were angry about the many things that 
had gone wrong in their case, including no response to their requests for help, lost files, 
and ‘being sent from pillar to post’ in general. Speaking of this, a good number of veterans 
said that they thought the military organization at large was more concerned with financial 
interests than their personal well-being.
Several veterans emphasized that most of the military mental health care workers they 
met had good intentions, but good intentions were not enough to keep the system from 
failing. Former NCO Bas, for instance, told me that ‘you first have to cross a gigantic dead-
end labyrinth to eventually hear that you should have taken another labyrinth’. He could not 
understand that in Afghanistan, he could be sent ‘to look at the stone where a Tali-dress [a 
man wearing traditional dress code] had called his mother’, whereas in the Netherlands, the 
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organization seemed unable to keep sight of its own veterans. He felt that in return for his 
loyalty to the military, he had received only ‘slices of crap in my neck’.
On several occasions I directly observed tension between veterans and an organization, 
for instance at a symposium for military professionals where I was invited to speak about 
moral injury. At one point, a veteran in the audience asked why moral injury is not an 
officially recognized illness, to which I responded that it is still a relatively new concept and 
that an additional challenge pertains to whether or not moral injury should be understood 
as a mental disorder. A military officer then stood up and said that he often had to deal with 
veterans without PTSD who demanded a PTSD diagnosis only because they wanted money, 
and that he thought this was the downside of turning something into an official diagnosis. At 
once, another veteran jumped up. He exclaimed angrily that he would give back his military 
invalidity pension straight away in return for an accurate diagnosis of his problems. As was 
the case for this veteran, underlying expressions of anger about the military mental health 
care system generally were the veterans’ anxious call to be taken seriously in their problems.
 
TFU, ISAF: Political Practices
The above section showed that while TFU soldiers were in considerably better circumstances 
than their Dutchbat colleagues, the TFU mission was certainly not without its problems. This 
section tries to understand these problems in their political context. First, it discusses the 
deployment experience of TFU veterans in the context of political conflicts and compromises 
made before and during their mission. Second, it discusses their homecoming experiences 
in relation to political silence in the aftermath of the mission.
The Mission: Conflicts and Compromises
When TFU veterans experienced distress, it often involved an inability to act in the face of 
human suffering. Similar to Dutchbat veterans, TFU veterans mentioned powerlessness and 
senselessness, and confusion as to whether they had actually helped or abandoned the local 
population. They also spoke of feeling abandoned by the political leadership. In contrast 
to Dutchbat veterans, however, they did not direct blame primarily at formal restrictions 
such as their Rules of Engagement. Instead, they blamed the informal influence of political 
desires and sensitivities. Many veterans felt they had only been sent to Afghanistan ‘to plant 
the flag’ and do things ‘nice for national consumption’, not to actually achieve anything in 
the country.
What happened at the political level to make this possible? The soldiers’ difficulties can 
partly be related to the lack of clarity on their mission objectives. In the decision-making 
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process leading up to the mission, what exactly was supposed to be achieved in Uruzgan 
was never properly addressed (Klep 2011, Grandia 2015, Amersfoort 2016, Hekman 2017). 
The decision-making process centered on how Dutch troops would be deployed to Uruzgan 
before the decision-makers properly discussed what they would need to achieve in the 
region and why they would want to go there in the first place (Grandia 2015, pp. 121–5; 206). 
One decision-maker later acknowledged, ‘It was more important to provide troops for at 
least two years instead of achieving a certain objective like a stable environment’ (cited in 
Grandia 2015, p. 135, translation in original). Consequently, troop size, budget and time 
frame determinations were based not so much on the mission objectives and the situation 
in Uruzgan – still unclear – but on the political situation in the Netherlands (Grandia 2015, 
pp. 121–5; 206, Kamminga 2015).5 The first rotation of soldiers was sent to Uruzgan without 
an overarching plan, which was left up to the commanders in the field to decide (cf. Grandia 
2015, pp. 139–40, Amersfoort 2016, Hekman 2017).
Besides lack of clarity regarding the mission objectives, the experience of TFU veterans 
can be connected to a discrepancy between the political framing of the mission and Uruzgan’s 
operational reality. While the Dutch government pointed out from the start that the mission 
could not be categorized as either a combat or reconstruction operation, it also insisted that 
the emphasis would lie on reconstruction (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Dimitriu and de 
Graaf 2010, Klep 2011). In theory, the dichotomy of combat versus reconstruction existed only 
in Dutch debates, but because it had become political and public reality, the consequences of 
the dichotomy affected the military reality (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Klep 2011, Grandia 
2015, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). There were formal consequences – such as the imposed non-
cooperation between ISAF and the US-led OEF troops – and informal consequences, namely 
the fear of political repercussions that was generally not explicated but felt at all levels of the 
military organization. The veterans’ stories indicate that the reticence of many commanders 
not only prevented casualties but also created risky situations. For instance, as an evaluation 
of the mission also points out, it ‘resulted in time-consuming verification procedures to 
make sure that Dutch conditions had been met before (air) support could be given’ (Ruijter et 
al. 2011, p. 47). Moreover, it caused commanders to withhold information to the Netherlands 
about what really took place in Uruzgan.
As in the Dutchbat mission, the problems in the TFU mission (lack of clarity on mission 
objectives and discrepancy between political framing and military reality) can in turn be 
linked to two larger unresolved issues. To start with the first, the objectives of the mission 
seem to have remained vague because, both nationally and internationally, its purpose 
5	 It	might	be	worth	noting	that	the	limited	number	of	TFU	troops	was	a	‘self-inflicted	wound’,	as	initially	the	military	staff	
demanded no more than 1000 troops. However, it is also worth noting that this was done to ensure political support for the 
mission (Grandia 2015, p. 122).
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remained unclear, and it is virtually impossible to formulate clear goals without having a 
clear purpose. At the international level, the contentious relationship between the ISAF 
mission and War on Terror produced confusion. Although the ISAF mission and its allegedly 
humanitarian objectives were officially separate from the War on Terror, it existed only on 
account of the US invasion in Afghanistan and the US-enforced regime change (Ducheine 
and Pouw 2012, Pounds et al. 2018), which made its legitimacy questionable and purpose 
ambiguous.6 At the Dutch national level, this lack of clarity was compounded by a lack of 
political consensus on the reasons for sending Dutch troops to Uruzgan. The decision to 
send troops to Afghanistan was motivated by the desire to present the Netherlands as a 
trustworthy partner of NATO and the US, but the specific purpose of being in Afghanistan 
was less clear (Klep 2011, Grandia 2015). Among those involved in the decision-making 
process, the assumed purpose varied between ‘prevention of terrorism on Dutch soil, the 
development [of] Uruzgan, eliminating the Taliban, support for the facilitation of democracy 
in Afghanistan, etcetera’ (Grandia 2015, p. 125). According to military historian Klep, it was 
more important for the Dutch government ‘that the Netherlands was present in southern 
Afghanistan, than that it was clear what exactly had to happen’ (Klep 2011, p. 191 emphasis in 
original, translation TM).
Notably, since 1995 the Dutch government has used a decision-making framework 
specifically designed to prevent ill-considered decisions on military intervention. This 
‘Assessment Framework’ (‘Toetsingskader’) was introduced just before the fall of Srebrenica and 
revised in 2000, partly because of that tragedy (TK 2014). However, the framework was not used 
as intended. In theory, it should guide the decision-making process with a range of political 
and military questions, concerning the mandate, feasibility of the mission, use of force, and 
safety issues with regard to the Dutch troops (Wessel 2008). In practice, the decisions regarding 
whether and how to deploy troops to Uruzgan had already been taken, and the Assessment 
Framework was mainly treated as a checklist procedure. The framework thus became an end in 
itself rather than a means for decision-making (Klep 2011, p. 191, Grandia 2015, p. 149).
Besides lack of clarity on the mission’s purpose, a second unresolved issue concerned the 
tensions between the government’s wish to send troops to Uruzgan and the parliamentary 
and public fear that the mission would become a war-like operation. Throughout the mission, 
parliamentary and public debates centered on whether it would be a ‘combat mission’ or a 
‘reconstruction mission’ (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). Increasing 
criticism that it was a combat operation disguised as a reconstruction mission eventually played 
6	 In	2001,	shortly	after	the	infamous	9/11	attacks	claimed	by	al-Qaeda,	US-led	troops	invaded	Afghanistan	and	overthrew	
the	Taliban	government.	Although	the	US	justified	the	invasion	as	a	legitimate	self-defense	under	UN	Charter,	it	occurred	
without	UN	authorization.	After	the	Taliban	government	was	toppled,	the	UN	did	authorize	the	establishment	of	ISAF	and	
its objective to secure the environment in and around Kabul and help with the reconstruction of Afghanistan in support of 
the	newly	established	government	(Grandia	2015,	pp.	81–7,	Pounds	et	al.	2018,	p.	211).	
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a significant role in its termination in 2010 (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Dimitriu and de 
Graaf 2010, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). Yet, importantly, it was not only aversion to fighting that 
engendered this criticism, but the government’s failure to provide a compelling explanation of 
the mission (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Dimitriu and Graaf 2016). The persisting criticism, 
then, seems partially a result of the first issue of lacking clarity on the mission’s purpose.
The Aftermath: Seeing the Bigger Picture or Closing one’s Eyes?
As for the aftermath, one of the biggest problems revealed in veterans’ accounts was the lack of 
political acknowledgment of the problems they had faced. While their deployment had left them 
wondering how far political intentions had gone beyond ‘just plant the flag’, they felt that critical 
questions about their mission were too often avoided or dismissed by references to ‘the bigger 
picture’. Likewise, with respect to mental health problems, they felt that the political leadership 
was more concerned with saving face and money than taking their problems seriously.
Indeed, in debates on whether or not the mission had been successful, the government 
has always rejected criticism and insisted that progress had definitely been made (see e.g. 
De Volkskrant 2011, Wansink 2015, Hekman 2016, Lighthouse Reports 2016). With respect 
to criticism about the discrepancy between political rhetoric and military reality, however, 
politicians did agree that that ‘haven’t been convincing enough’ (quoted in Grandia 2015, 
p. 148). That said, they also sidestepped other criticism. As Van der Meulen and Grandia 
argue, ‘to suggest that in essence it was a failure of strategic communication is indirectly 
to claim that deep down the cause itself and its translation in a lengthy military operation, 
was or should be beyond doubt and discussion’ (Van der Meulen and Grandia 2012, p. 29). By 
pointing out and taking responsibility for failing to represent the mission properly, political 
leaders implicitly dismissed criticism of the mission itself as invalid.
In relation to this, it might be worth considering a previously discussed instance in 
detail. The previous section quoted an intelligence officer stating in a documentary that, 
‘in The Hague’, local intelligence was sometimes dismissed as ‘it’s not that bad’ in favor of ‘a 
politically sound story (…) with all possible consequences for the men on the ground’. This 
documentary led to parliamentary questions, which the government answered by declaring 
that both ‘in the area of  operations and elsewhere, the aim is to get as complete a picture 
as possible of the situation in the area’ and that the Special Forces ‘are a special unit with 
a specific education and tasks’ which ‘sometimes can lead to less insight into the more 
nuanced and sometimes more reserved method of the commander of the TFU in Uruzgan’ 
(TK 2007, pp. 129, translation TM). While it seems justifiable to state that soldiers on the 
ground cannot see what actors at higher levels do see, using ‘the bigger picture’ like this 
invalidates the perceptions and criticism of the lower ranks.
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With respect to veterans’ complaints about the military’s mental health care system, the 
non-availability of information on this issue makes it harder to analyze their experiences in 
a broader context. Clearly, over the years, the Ministry of Defense has considerably improved 
its mental health care system (Vermetten and Olff 2013). Yet, it has also been acknowledged 
that notwithstanding the improvements made, in 2012 the mental health care policy was 
still ‘too fragmented’ and so veterans were often still sent from ‘pillar to post’ (TK 2012, p. 
4). Since then, it must be noted, many additional regulations7 have been set in place, but the 
experiences of most veterans date from before these regulations went into effect. In general, 
it is important to note that military mental health care by definition is a practice in which 
personal concerns may conflict with organizational and political interests (Bourke 1999, 
Pols and Oak 2007). The task of mental health professionals in the military has always been 
more complex than simply serving the interests of soldiers. Historically, their main task was 
to maintain combat readiness (Bourke 1999, Pols and Oak 2007). While recent decades have 
seen increased attention for the care of individual soldiers as clients, it seems that military 
mental health care will always have the dual aim of serving both the soldier-client and the 
military organization, which may lead to conflict.
 
 
 
Parallels between Dutchbat and TFU: Perceived Political Betrayal, 
Seeking  Reparation
Having zoomed in on the Dutchbat and TFU missions separately, in this section I compare the 
two cases and reflect on several overarching issues that both the missions and the veterans’ 
responses to them had in common. This leads me to suggest that perceived political betrayal 
and resultant searches for reparation are important elements to consider in moral injury theory.
Unresolved Issues
 
Almost all the interviewed veterans from Dutchbat and TFU, both with and without distress, 
spoke about how political problems and failures had adversely affected their mission. Yet, 
the way in which they did differed. Veterans who had not directly experienced disturbing 
situations that they related to political problems spoke about it with only mild frustration 
or even in a shoulder-shrugging manner, but those scarred by such experiences expressed 
7  In 2012, the Veterans Act (‘Veteranenwet’) was signed into law, solidifying the government’s special duty of care of veterans, 
including soldiers with deployment experience still in active service, and the Veterans Decree (‘Veteranenbesluit’) of 2014 
formulated rules for this duty. A	national	office	for	veterans	(‘Veteranenloket’) was also established in 2014, ensuring that 
veterans have somewhere central to go for coordinated assistance. 
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profound pain and anger. Regarding the differences between Dutchbat and TFU veterans, 
the former generally reported a stronger sense of political failure than the latter, both with 
respect to deployment and aftercare issues. These differences partially explain why many 
Dutchbat veterans filed judicial claims against the Dutch state while most TFU veterans did 
not, and why the veterans who filed a claim had all developed distress.
 Apart from these differences, the stories of Dutchbat and TFU veterans were remarkably 
similar. Speaking of morally distressing situations, both groups often mentioned the inability 
to act in the face of human suffering. This experience engendered feelings of powerlessness 
and senselessness, and confusion as to whether they were actually helping or rather letting the 
local population down. Both groups also spoke of feeling abandoned by the political leadership. 
With regard to the aftermath, one of the biggest issues that emerged in the accounts of both 
groups was the lack of political acknowledgment of the problems they had faced. Consequently, 
both groups voiced demands for ‘truth’ or at least a desire to be taken seriously, with Dutchbat 
veterans filing judicial claims to demand recognition and compensation.
In short, there were more similarities than differences in the stories of the Dutchbat 
and TFU veterans. This is remarkable considering that at first glance, their missions were 
different. Dutchbat was a ‘blue helmet’ peacekeeping mission while TFU’s mission was a 
‘green helmet’ counterinsurgency operation involving combat. The TFU mission had a clearer 
mandate and more resources and opportunities available. However, further analysis of the 
missions showed that, at a fundamental level, they did indeed have far more in common 
than not (see also Table 3).
Both Dutchbat and TFU missions demonstrated:
• discrepancies between the why (overarching purpose), what (objectives) and how 
(resources and opportunities) of the mission;
• ambiguity regarding the why, what and how of the mission;
• discrepancies between soldiers’ operational experience and political narratives, 
before, during and after the mission;
• lack of political acknowledgment of the issues and thus of the role of political 
practices in distressing experiences.
The Dutch government, international actors, parliament, the public and the military 
leadership all played roles in these issues. All had different interests and perceptions, 
which led to actual conflict or risked conflict. The conflicts were often avoided or resolved 
by compromises, for instance, by caveats or intentional ambiguity in the mission mandate. 
While compromises smoothed the disagreements between actors, they did not truly solve 
the problems, but only created new ones, such as those listed above. That is, in practice, 
compromises often did not mean that actual synthesis was achieved – that conflicting views 
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and interests were truly reconciled – but rather, that conflicting views and interests were 
handed down or left to the lower levels to deal with. 
Besides conflicts and iatrogenic compromises, there was the problem of silence. In the case 
of the Dutchbat mission the political leadership initially kept quiet about problems with the 
mandate, and only acknowledged its own responsibility when it could declare it had ensured 
that future soldiers would no longer be deployed under an impossible mandate. That is, the 
political leadership acknowledged the problems in a manner that limited their responsibility 
to avoiding the same problems in future missions, turning them into outdated ‘lessons 
learned’ already applied in policy. These issues were taken out of a narrative of blame and 
inserted into a narrative of progress (see also Rijsdijk 2014). Likewise, for TFU’s mission, the 
political leadership evaded criticism by evoking ‘the bigger picture’ and rephrasing problems 
as ‘we haven’t been convincing enough’. In both missions, moreover, criticism was avoided 
by refocusing deployment-related distress on mental health care. Mental health care is about 
better training, good aftercare, and if necessary, therapy, and not about improving a mission’s 
mandate or the political narrative of the mission. Looked at through a mental health care 
lens, the solution, and thus the problem, lies in soldiers’ resilience, not in political practice. 
Table 3: Political problems regarding the Dutchbat and TFU mission
Dutchbat, UNPROFOR TFU, ISAF
Veterans’ experiences
‘Pretend	play’:	powerlessness	and	
senselessness
‘Left	to	our	fates’:	abandoning	and	being	
abandoned
‘A	knife	in	the	back’:	suckered	and	let	down	
in	the	mission’s	aftermath
Demanding truth and compensation
No	permission	to	fire,	‘just	make	sure	the	flag	
is	planted’:	powerlessness	and	senselessness
‘Is	this	winning	hearts	and	minds?’:	
abandoning and being abandoned
‘The	bigger	picture’:	denial	of	one’s	
experience	in	the	mission’s	aftermath
Desire to be taken seriously
Unresolved issues 
regarding the mission
Discrepancy between goals (demilitarization, 
etc.) and resources (resources for 
peacekeepers)
Ambiguity regarding the mission (what is a 
‘Safe Area’? what are we allowed to do?)
Lack of acknowledgment of these problems 
and their micro-level impact
Discrepancy between mission frame 
(reconstruction) and operational experience 
(reconstruction and combat)
Ambiguity regarding the mission (what to do 
besides	plant	the	flag?)
Lack of acknowledgment of these problems 
and their micro-level impact
Larger unresolved 
issues
National	and	international:	conflicts	
between felt moral obligations (‘something 
must be done’) and fear of undesired 
consequences (‘unfeasible mission’)
National	and	international:
conflict	and	diffusion	as	to	the	mission’s	
purpose	(national	security,	NATO	obligations;	
the Afghan people, etc.) and nature 
(reconstruction	and/or	combat)
Political Betrayal and Reparations
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Considering the veterans’ experiences in relation to the above issues makes it possible to 
better comprehend their responses. When problems at the political level remain unresolved, 
they are likely to affect soldiers at the micro-level. As the previous section discussed, many 
interviewed veterans said that on deployment they developed the feeling that they were 
acting in a ‘charade’ or ‘puppet show’, a feeling which Lifton has aptly called the experience of 
a ‘counterfeit universe’ (1973). For veterans who experienced disturbing situations, this meant 
an inability to find meaning in specific experiences of injustice and a sense that they had been 
done wrong, whereas the political leadership denied this. Accordingly, they felt ‘abandoned’, 
‘suckered’ and ‘betrayed’.
Trauma scholars Smith and Freyd (2014) recently introduced the notion of ‘institutional 
betrayal’, which applies well to the experiences described here. The scholars define 
institutional betrayal as ‘experiences of violations of trust and dependency perpetrated 
against any member of an institution’ (2014, p. 577), a concise definition worth breaking 
down. Dependence is the reliance on a person or institution for one’s well-being and safety 
(Freyd 1996, Smith and Freyd 2014). Trust is the expectation that this other will be benevolent, 
or at least do no harm, while, by definition, it also means uncertainty regarding the other’s 
ability and willingness to do so (Lewis and Weigert 1985). Dependence and trust, thus, 
occur in relations of inequality and reinforce one’s state of vulnerability (Hosmer 1995). 
Betrayal, finally, is the willing violation of this social relation, and moreover, the violation 
of fundamental moral principles: it is a betrayal of ‘what’s right’ (Shay 1994). Interestingly, 
research indicates that people’s aversion to betrayal is so great that they prefer to run greater 
safety risks than subject themselves to the possibility that an agent promising to protect their 
safety may violate this promise (Koehler and Gershoff 2003).
To work as a soldier is to work as an instrument of the state in war zones, which, thus, is to 
put oneself in a state of great vulnerability and to relinquish a great deal of control over one’s 
safety to the political leadership. Though most of the interviewed veterans went on their mission 
with a good amount of political skepticism, they did expect the political leadership would try 
to prevent traumatic situations. Doing their job thus implied dependence and required trust, 
which in the experience of some veterans was violated. In line with the words veterans used, 
this might be called ‘institutional betrayal’, or, to be specific, ‘political betrayal’.
In response, many interviewed veterans began seeking symbolic and material reparation 
in the political domain. All felt strongly that the political leadership owed them compensation 
for the conditions in which they had been placed. Some, moreover, became preoccupied 
with a search for ‘the truth’ that would force the government to admit its failures. Also, 
many veterans were angry about errors in the military mental health care system. They had 
experienced these errors as another act of negligence when they were particularly dependent 
135
Chapter 7  Political Betrayal and Reparations
Part  2      Soldiers in Conflict 
and vulnerable. Some veterans could not accept their PTSD diagnosis and the accompanying 
invalidity pension as sufficient compensation. They believed the government owed them 
more than a military invalidity pension – certainly more than a regular disability pension – 
because their suffering entailed more than that. To them, their suffering was not caused by 
risks that are simply part of the job, but by avoidable political failure. This belief led so many 
Dutchbat veterans to file a lawsuit against the Dutch state.
Note that the sense of betrayal was generally not without doubt and disorientation. To 
many interviewed veterans, their mission was not just about political betrayal, it was also the 
best experience they had ever had; many would give anything to go on another mission. Also, 
while they felt the political leadership had done wrong, they did not always know what the right 
course of action would have been. They seemed unsure of the extent to which responsibility 
for their actions was internal or external. Still, just as their guilt, though often accompanied 
by profound confusion, had triggered an urge to make amends toward others, their sense of 
betrayal caused a need for the political leadership to make reparations toward them.
  
 
‘PTSD’ and ‘Moral Injury’ as Double-Edged Swords
As various scholars argue (e.g. Shephard 2001, Withuis 2010), recent decades have seen a shift 
from a tendency to accept pain as a tragic part of life to the idea that, when a bad thing 
happens, someone is responsible for it. Accordingly, a shift has taken place from the view 
that suffering is to be endured quietly to a ‘trauma culture’ of openly assuming victim status 
(e.g. Shephard 2001, Withuis 2010). At first glance, then, veterans’ judicial claims against 
the Dutch state may seem a symptom of this cultural development. Such an explanation, 
however, while valid in a general sense, is too simple. Veterans’ claims generally did not 
start from the notion of trauma, but from a sense of betrayal. Usually they accepted their 
PTSD diagnosis with great reluctance and mixed feelings, and used it to demand recognition 
and compensation not only because they thought that PTSD deserves recognition and 
compensation, but also because they believed that their particular problems were caused by 
political failures. That is, the PTSD label offered them a culturally accepted way to appeal to 
political leaders to take accountability for these failures. To repeat the words of a Dutchbat 
veteran quoted earlier: ‘Doesn’t somebody have to pay for the mistakes back then? The only 
way you have, is to demand compensation’. Ironically, the medical language of PTSD allowed 
veterans to go beyond the individualizing and depoliticizing boundaries of medical models 
and sue the political leadership for their suffering. These veterans, then, should not only 
be regarded the product of a ‘trauma culture’, but as political agents strategically using the 
culturally acknowledged concept of trauma as a political weapon.
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At the same time, once veterans accept labels such as ‘trauma’, ‘PTSD’ and ‘moral injury’, 
these labels may come to influence their self-understanding. Diagnoses have become idioms 
of distress, and idioms inevitably shape the ways in which people experience themselves and 
the world (see e.g. Kleinman 1988, Good 1994, Lock and Nguyen 2010). In fact, a diagnosis may 
even become an identity (Hacking 1986). The chance of ‘PTSD’ becoming an identity seems 
particularly high in military settings, as accepting the diagnosis that opens the way to self-
understanding, recognition, help and compensation also means abandoning a sense of self 
in terms of stoic toughness. Consider, for instance, the following: ‘I couldn’t make myself 
believe that I had received a medal of valor and was now sick at home. Evidently I couldn’t 
handle stress. My masculinity was gone’ (quoted in Veteraneninstituut.nl 2017). Especially 
when a veteran’s self-perceptions of soldier, partner and parent center on a single self-image 
of toughness, it seems, accepting a PTSD diagnosis may result in a great loss of identity, as 
it means that he has to say goodbye to the idea that good soldiers can do their job without 
having problems and good partners/parents never get sick and helpless.8 When this is the 
case, ‘PTSD’ may come to substitute the veteran’s lost positive self-image completely.
A PTSD diagnosis is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, because ‘PTSD’ has 
become formally and socially a legitimate condition, accepting a diagnosis can increase 
understanding and recognition from the social environment and offer the opportunity to 
demand compensation. Moreover, accepting ‘PTSD’ as part of oneself, although it requires 
accepting having a mental disorder, can help transform a self-image of bad person into a 
less negative self-image of a good soldier, partner and parent suffering a bad condition. 
However, on the other hand, the social, financial and psychological advantages of the 
diagnosis may also impede recovery, because recovery would mean the end of these benefits. 
In psychological circles, this paradox is known as ‘primary gain’ and ‘secondary gain’, which 
refer to the direct and indirect benefits of symptoms that may perpetuate the symptoms and 
thus hinder recovery, often without the person in question being aware of it (Fishbain et al. 
1995). It seems that especially when veterans lose all their previous self-images and are left 
with ‘PTSD’ as their sole identity, they run the risk of getting stuck into a vicious circle of 
victimhood and helplessness. Unlike ‘PTSD’, the concept of moral injury allows veterans to 
have a damaged conscience rather than a disease. At the same time, it does carry the same 
risk of getting stuck, and perhaps even more so since it frames veterans’ suffering as possibly 
appropriate. As such, moreover, it may make veterans believe that recovery and happiness is 
unhealthy and undeserved.
Conclusion
8	 See	also	Linville’s	theory	of	‘self-complexity’,	which	contends	that	when	an	individual’s	‘self-aspects’	are	closely	associated,	
he	is	more	vulnerable	to	negative	affect	and	self-appraisal	in	response	to	life	events	(Linville	1987).	
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This chapter examined the role of political practices surrounding military intervention in 
experiences of moral distress. As discussed, many interviewed veterans were little concerned 
with political questions when they joined the military, and it seemed that their time in the 
military initially only reinforced their political disengagement, offering them a preventive 
coping mechanism to deal with potential clashes between political reality and their 
deployment experience. However, political disengagement could not take away the fact that 
their profession is directly linked to political practices, and it could not fully protect them 
from developing distress. 
Virtually all interviewed veterans said political failures had adversely affected their 
mission. Yet, it was only those who related facing disturbing situations due to political failures 
who expressed anger and a painful sense of betrayal. Comparing Dutchbat veterans with TFU 
veterans, their stories turned out remarkably similar with respect to political dimensions of 
their experiences, and further analysis revealed that these similarities related to the fact that 
at the political level, too, the Dutchbat and TFU missions had much in common. Contrary 
to expectations, a morally distressing inability to act emerged as a major theme in the stories 
of both Dutchbat and TFU veterans, and in both cases, this inability could be related to 
political restrictions and problematic compromises. Consequently, veterans of both groups 
had developed strong feelings of political betrayal and had sought symbolic and material 
reparations from political leadership, including efforts to find ‘the truth’ about the events 
that had caused their suffering
These findings show that political practices are crucial to consider as potential factors 
in moral distress. Doing this helps one gain much-needed insight into both contextual 
sources of moral distress and the veterans’ responses. Current studies on ‘moral injury’, 
for instance, mainly emphasize the infliction of harm and killing as morally distressing 
experiences, which seems to be the result of these studies’ focus on conventional combat 
operations. As current research does not attend to the wider context of veterans’ deployment 
experiences, it has gone unnoticed that other veterans may suffer from experiences other 
than inflicting harm and killing. Moreover, it has gone unnoticed that moral distress may 
engender reactions directed at political leadership. As my findings make clear, not only active 
engagement in combat but also an inability to act may engender moral distress, and moral 
distress may not only involve feelings of guilt and shame, but also a sense of political betrayal 
and a consequent search for reparation. These elements, therefore, should be incorporated 
in the concept of moral injury.
To be sure, as long as there is war, soldiers will be confronted by moral quandaries. In part, 
this is due the fact that as long as there is war, the political leadership will be confronted by 
moral quandaries. They will have to decide whether to send soldiers to a human emergency 
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even if it might have disastrous consequences, or whether to collaborate with local warlords. 
Such dilemmas may constitute scenarios of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’. That 
said, political practices can also adversely affect soldiers in ways that are not completely 
unavoidable. This, however, is not always acknowledged by either the political leadership 
or in current models of PTSD and moral injury. The problem of such silence is twofold. First, 
it means that insufficient attention is paid to the ways in which political practices can cause 
or prevent distressing situations. Second, it means that the biggest part of the burden of 
military suffering is loaded onto the shoulders of individual veterans, which may be felt as 
(yet another) political betrayal and thus cause or amplify moral distress.
In the final section of this chapter, I considered the concepts of PTSD and moral injury in 
terms of primary and secondary gain for veterans. But equally important is the question of 
what is the ‘gain’ for political leadership? Although PTSD’s official status as a work-related 
disability makes the government responsible for symbolic and material support, as a medical 
concept, it decontextualizes veterans’ suffering as a disease resulting from the stressors of 
war. It keeps the focus on the psyche of the individual soldier and away from the political 
leadership sending soldiers to war. The lawsuits filed by Dutchbat veterans against the Dutch 
state illustrate this well: as long as Dutchbat veterans based their complaints on diagnoses of 
PTSD, they could only call out the government for failures with respect to aftercare, not for 
the direct ways in which its practices contributed to their problems. With respect to the causes 
of veterans’ suffering, ‘PTSD’ releases the government from blame. The concept of moral 
injury, in contrast, enables veterans to claim that political practices have contributed to their 
problems. However, ‘moral injury’ is not (yet) an officially recognized medical condition, 
and this is where the dilemma of medicalization re-emerges. While the medicalization of 
‘moral injury’ would make its judicial recognition as a work-related disease possible, this 
very development would likely re-disconnect it from its political context.
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Chapter 8. Societal Misrecognition and (Self-)Estrangement:  
Moral Distress in Relation to Public Perceptions1
Introduction
‘Have you ever been deployed?’
‘Have you killed anyone?’
‘Do you have any problems now?’
Numerous veterans told me that people typically asked these three questions upon hearing 
they had served in the military. Generally the veterans tried to avoid answering, finding the 
questions a rude testament to civilian misunderstanding of military practice.
It is well-documented that veterans often avoid speaking about their deployment. Some 
studies understand this silence resulting from the fact that, unlike civilians, veterans are 
not just eyewitnesses to war but also acquire knowledge of war ‘with their flesh’. Being a 
‘flesh witness’, it is argued, translates into feeling that ‘those who were not there cannot 
understand it’ (Harari 2008, p. 231) and in the sense of a military ‘us’ versus a civilian ‘them’ 
(Sørensen 2015). Another line of studies points to war’s potential for trauma as a reason for its 
‘unspeakability’. These studies show that traumatized veterans often (subconsciously) try to 
banish their traumatic memories (see e.g. Herman 1967), thus regarding their silence as a type 
of avoidance behavior, which is one of the official symptoms of PTSD (DSM-V 2013). Shame is 
also known to be a reason for silence (Lee et al. 2001, Herman 2011). Further, trauma studies 
describe a belief among traumatized individuals that no one is capable of understanding 
their pain, which some scholars suggest is misplaced fear (Tedeschi and Calhoun 1993), 
while others assert that pain, as an utterly ‘interior’ experience, simply resists linguistic 
expression (Scarry 1985, p. 5). The idea of trauma resisting linguistic expression is supported 
by research in the field of neurobiology, which indicates that neurological malfunction (e.g. 
decreased activity in Broca’s area) may play a role in people’s incapability to attach semantic 
representations to traumatic events (Hull 2002).
The accounts I heard from veterans resonate with theories of avoidance behavior, feared 
misunderstanding and the linguistic resistance of overwhelming suffering, as well as with 
analyses pointing to a more general tendency among veterans to claim non-transferable 
knowledge of war. Yet, while all these explanations thus seem valid, they are limited to the 
veteran’s psyche, and as the previous chapter demonstrated, contextual factors should also 
be considered when examining veterans’ experience. With respect to moral distress, society 
obviously constitutes a relevant social context. On returning home from deployment, a 
soldier may recall the values he held as a civilian member of society and accordingly realize 
he has violated these values. Alternatively, he may initially be certain that he acted according 
to society’s moral standards and may only start to doubt himself after public condemnation.
1 A	version	of	this	chapter	appeared	in	2018	as	‘Moral	Injury	in	Relation	to	Public	Debates:	The	Role	of	Societal	Misrecognition	
in	Moral	Conflict-Colored	Trauma	among	Soldiers’	in	Social Science & Medicine,	211:	314-320.
142
Ch
ap
te
r 8
    S
oc
ie
ta
l M
isr
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
an
d 
(S
el
f-)
Es
tr
an
ge
m
en
t
Pa
rt
  2
    
  S
ol
di
er
s i
n 
Co
nfl
ic
t
In this chapter, I focus on the subquestion: Did public perceptions of the Dutchbat and 
TFU missions and of the military in general play a role in experiences of moral distress 
among veterans deployed on these missions, and if so, how? As in the previous chapter, 
here I focus on the accounts of morally distressed veterans, but in the last section juxtapose 
their experiences with those of veterans who reported no distress at all. I start by sketching 
the wider societal context in which Dutch veterans are embedded, discussing prevailing 
Dutch attitudes toward the military in general. Then I turn to the specificities of the two 
case studies. First, I examine the public criticism of the Dutchbat mission. Second, I analyze 
the mixed responses that the TFU mission received. The case studies will show that, despite 
the differing public responses, I identified more striking parallels than differences in the 
experiences of both Dutchbat and TFU veterans. As will become clear, both public criticism 
and admiration may be experienced as misrecognition. In the final sections I reflect on these 
findings, explaining the similarities I found by considering the common one-dimensionality 
of the public perceptions surrounding the missions. I argue that the experience of societal 
misrecognition may directly and indirectly contribute to moral distress; indirectly, by 
amplifying feelings of guilt, anger and/or moral disorientation, and directly, by engendering 
a sense of estrangement from society and oneself.
 
Dutch National Attitudes toward the Military
The military is not a rabble of armed bandits. It is an organization granted power by the state 
to operate as ‘people with arms’ in the name of the ‘people without arms’ (Rukavishnikov 
and Pugh 2006, p. 131). At least in democratic societies, this means that although the public 
may support or oppose particular operations, they consent to the existence of the military as 
such. In any case it means that soldiers have good grounds to claim so. Yet, the way in which 
society relates to its armed forces varies from one country to another.
In the Netherlands, opinion polls conducted since 1963 show that a steady majority of the 
public supports the armed forces (Schoeman 2008, Blauw Research 2012). At the same time, 
the Dutch public seems ambivalent toward the military. Between 20 and 35 percent consider 
the armed forces a ‘necessary evil’, and between 10 and 20 percent believe it is ‘unnecessary’ 
or ‘hardly necessary’(Schoeman 2008, Blauw Research 2012). This seems partly because the 
Dutch public does not see the current military as ‘serving our country’ (Ministry of General 
Affairs 2006, Motivaction 2018). Also, it has been argued, the image of military violence does 
not sit well with the national self-perception of being a ‘civilized’ nation (Dudink 2002, Van 
der Meulen and Soeters 2005, Soeters et al. 2007).
In line with self-perceptions, Dutch society’s prevailing view of its armed forces is as a 
relatively non-martial military that favors peaceful solutions over violent ones and generally 
acts in morally responsible ways (Sion 2006, Zaalberg 2013). Images are seldom one-on-one 
representations of reality, and this also holds for the Dutch self-image. Considering recent 
missions, for instance, it can be said that many national militaries focus on non-violent 
strategies of diplomacy and development (Olsthoorn and Verweij 2012, Zaalberg 2013), 
whereas the Dutch also used force (Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005, Zaalberg 2013).
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Nevertheless, the powerful image exists. As a famous sociological expression goes: ‘if 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas 
1928, p. 572). A national self-image shapes public and political perceptions. For instance, a 
past image of Dutch non-martial humanitarianism informed the creation of a dichotomy 
between US ‘terrorist hunts’ versus Dutch ‘friendly’ methods (TK 2006, p. 18), which have 
been proudly but somewhat inaccurately labeled ‘the Dutch approach’ (Klep 2011, Zaalberg 
2013, Grandia 2015). This image, in turn, has become a target of criticism in the Netherlands. 
Dutch media commentators used it to describe ‘us’ as being overly preoccupied with 
maintaining a sense of ‘moral superiority’ while caring too little about the reality (Dudink 
2002, p. 44, NIOD 2002, pp. 123–4). Similarly, the Dutch Association of Infantry Officers used 
the image to criticize the army for losing its warrior spirit and becoming averse to risk (Van 
Bemmel 2011).
As this chapter will discuss in more detail, it seems that Dutch societal attitudes to the 
military are characterized by a degree of discomfort and uncertainty as to whether the armed 
forces are mostly ‘necessary’ or mostly ‘evil’. In the case of Dutchbat, soldiers were criticized 
for having failed to do the ‘necessary’. The Srebrenica tragedy came to be seen as testifying to 
Dutchbat’s unwillingness to fight, and even to ‘us’, the entire Dutch nation, being ‘too sweet 
for war’ (Van der Meulen 1998, pp. 37–38). In contrast, the mission in Afghanistan showed 
Dutch soldiers willing to engage in combat, but their fighting generated both praise and 
criticism for being unnecessarily aggressive (‘evil’).
Chapter 5 showed that soldiers may cope with tensions between the military and society 
by interpreting the two worlds in terms of yin and yang, as opposites that exist only by 
virtue of each other. In doing so, they simultaneously affirm and bridge a gap between 
the military and civilian world, which seemingly enables them to reject potential public 
criticism without completely separating themselves from society. However, such rejection 
cannot eliminate the influence of public opinion on political decision-making and thus on 
the missions soldiers are sent on. Also, as will become clear, yin-yang constructions cannot 
entirely protect soldiers from the effects of harsh critiques directed at them, and they cannot 
always prevent inner conflict developing, as they cannot take away the fact that the person 
moving between the military and civilian worlds, however flexible he may be in negotiating 
the two, is still the same one person.
 
Public Perceptions and Morally Distressing Experiences
 
This section discusses the experiences of Dutchbat veterans with public perceptions of 
their mission and, subsequently, those of TFU veterans, by focusing on two events that 
each sparked much societal attention: the fall of Srebrenica and the Battle of Chora in 
Afghanistan. While these two extreme events are not representative of all Dutchbat and TFU 
veteran experiences, they are illustrative in the sense that their extremity manifests public 
expectations and beliefs that surrounded the missions in general.
The following two discussions – of the fall of Srebrenica first, then of the Battle of Chora – 
are each divided into three sections. The first part describes the public responses to the event 
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in question, the second part examines how veterans experienced these public responses, 
and the third part reflects on how the veterans’ personal experiences related to public 
perceptions and on why public perceptions took shape the way they did.
 
Dutchbat, UNPROFOR: The Fall of Srebrenica
In the Netherlands, there was a clear ‘public mandate’ for intervention in the former Yugoslavia 
(Van der Meulen 2004, p. 34). Opinion polls held in 1992 indicated that 68% of the Dutch 
public thought that humanitarian intervention in Bosnia was justified; 63% believed that 
military force was permitted to enforce peace (Ten Cate 1998, p. 86). Dutch media repeated 
and reinforced this attitude. From mid-1992 on, media commentators began making highly 
morally charged comparisons of the situation in Bosnia to World War II and the Holocaust, 
thus strengthening the imperative that something had to be done (Wieten 2002, pp. 3382–3, 
Algra et al. 2007). For a whole year after 1993, one current affairs television program invariably 
closed with the words: ‘And still there is no intervention’ (‘En nog steeds wordt er niet ingegrepen’) 
(NIOD 2002, p. 746). Forceful military intervention never happened but the UN did decide to 
establish several ‘Safe Areas’, of which the Srebrenica enclave was one.
The massacre in 1995 meant the end of the UN mission, and unsurprisingly brought 
about heated debates throughout Europe but especially in the Netherlands because of the 
involvement of Dutchbat. The drama confirmed the opinion of those who had called for 
robust military intervention, while it forced those who supported a peacekeeping mission to 
reevaluate their views (cf. Van der Meulen 1998, Klep and Winslow 1999). In the Dutch media, 
the narrative emerged ‘that the Netherlands had been put back in its place, never having 
been a military-minded country, and had been punished for its overly idealistic ambition of 
wanting to be “the best student in the international class”’ (Klep and Winslow 1999, p. 116). 
Beyond all this, the Srebrenica debacle led to sharp criticism of the Dutch soldiers involved.
Initially, the soldiers of Dutchbat III were hailed as heroes. The Dutch Minister of Defense 
immediately emphasized and would keep emphasizing that the soldiers bore no blame 
in the tragedy. But the mass murder in Srebrenica soon raised questions, and constantly 
emerging scandals about the conduct of the Dutch peacekeepers – of which the Minister 
was unaware – led the media and parliamentarians to question their innocence (NIOD 2002, 
pp. 2327–8). While statements defending the soldiers did appear, criticism dominated the 
media, including claims of Dutchbat having been ‘passive’ and ‘cowardly’ (Van der Meulen 
and Soeters 2005, Van de Bildt 2015). Most criticism conveyed the view that Dutch soldiers, 
members of an allegedly idealistic non-violent country, had had good intentions but had 
also been unprepared, naïve and driven by self-preservation (Van der Meulen 1998, Klep and 
Winslow 1999, NIOD 2002, Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005).
Among the revelations leading to public controversy was a video recording of Dutchbat 
commander Karremans making a toast with Mladić, the commander of the Bosnian Serb 
forces, at a meeting that took place just before the fall of Srebrenica (NIOD 2002, p. 2024). 
Another shocking revelation was an evacuee list prepared by the deputy commander of 
Dutchbat during the fall of Srebrenica, and a roll of film containing photos of Bosnian 
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Muslim corpses taken by a Dutchbat soldier (NIOD 2002, p. 2287). Yet another infamous image 
entailed video recordings of drinking, dancing and partying Dutchbat soldiers at a UN base 
in Zagreb, Croatia, where they had been sent after the fall before being flown back to the 
Netherlands (NIOD 2002, p. 2275). In Zagreb, moreover, Commander Karremans spoke the 
soon-to-be infamous line that in this war one could not distinguish between the ‘good guys’ 
and ‘bad guys’ (NIOD 2002, p. 2259). Then there was the story of Dutch troops driving over 
Muslim refugees, which Prime Minister Kok said ‘dismayed’ him, stating that there could be 
‘no question of understanding whatsoever’ if this incident had really happened (NRC 1998) 
– which later turned out to indeed be the case (NIOD 2002, p. 2380). These and other stories 
came to signify cowardice in public narratives; indeed ‘Dutchbat’ soon became synonymous 
with ‘cowardice’ (Van der Meulen 1998, NIOD 2002, pp. 2024; 2245). The scandals fueled 
doubts that the Dutch soldiers had not just been cowards but had even been accomplices in 
the mass murders (Van der Meulen 1998, De Graaff 2006). Meanwhile, the Dutch government 
refused to take the blame for the drama (Van den Berg 2014).
By end 1995, public and parliamentarian focus shifted to the Dutch government, the 
UN and the international community (NIOD 2002, pp. 2330–1). These levels confirmed that 
significant constraints had been imposed on the Dutch soldiers who had also been denied 
international support in the fall of Srebrenica despite repeated requests (ibid). In the following 
years, the image of the Dutch troops shifted from ‘cowards’ to ‘powerless victims’, reinforced 
by additional revelations offering more context to the scandals that had dominated the public 
debate. In 1999, uncut footage of the Karremans-Mladić toast was shown in public, revealing a 
an aggressive Mladić uttering threats at an exhausted Karremans, thus fostering the belief that 
Karremans had actually had little chance to negotiate with Mladić (NIOD 2002, p. 2024). As for 
the footage of the partying Dutch soldiers, it became clear that many had been crying rather 
than dancing, and for other soldiers, dancing had been a form of release from the tension that 
had built up in the previous days and weeks (NIOD 2002, pp. 2276–7). The incident of an YPR 
driving over refugees also came to be seen in a new light, as an accident that happened in the 
immense chaos and panic of collective flight following the fall of Srebrenica, when the YPR 
was under fire (NIOD 2002, p. 2374, Trouw 2002).
Although public feelings of understanding and even sympathy for Dutchbat’s ‘mission 
impossible’ began to develop at the end of 1995 (Klep and Winslow 1999, p. 117), the soldiers 
were not entirely let off the hook. In 1996, for instance, a satirical play called ‘Srebrenica!’ 
portrayed them as dumb and racist, driving over Muslims without a care (Kieskamp 1996). 
And in 2000, 40 well-known Dutch writers and media commentators wrote an open letter 
demanding that the Dutch government should take responsibility for the ‘blatant disgrace’ 
that ‘Dutchbat had not made a serious effort to save lives’, (Giphart et al. 2000).
Some critics saw Dutchbat’s failure to prevent the tragedy as representative of the 
Netherlands at large (Van der Meulen 1998, Westerman and Honig 1998). They came to the 
conclusion that ‘we’ are ‘too sweet for war’ and ‘always yielding’ (Van der Meulen 1998, pp. 37–
38). Some compared the Dutch soldiers’ alleged passivity to ‘our’ ‘spinelessness’ in World War 
II (De Swaan 1995, Van der Meulen 1998, pp. 37–38). Moreover, as members of Dutch society, 
some felt jointly responsible for the events of Srebrenica and thus ashamed, not on the 
soldiers’ behalf, but ‘personally ashamed’, as Dutch sociologist De Swaan said about himself 
(De Swaan 2004). A Dutch journalist said he felt that ‘we put them on the train to Auschwitz 
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again’ (Van den Boogaard cited in De Graaff 2006, p. 44). With articulations like these, critics 
explained the fall of Srebrenica as an outcome of a moral weakness that all Dutch citizens 
possessed: cowardice (cf. Van der Meulen 1998, De Swaan 2004).
The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) published a much-anticipated 
report of the events of Srebrenica in 2002. Besides extensively documenting the events, 
the report included a detailed analysis of how the Dutch media had become involved in 
‘a somewhat one-sided fixation on incidents and on the “scandal” element of Srebrenica’ 
(Wieten 2002, p. 3416). Within days of the publication – even before the government resigned 
in response – various media commentators published mea culpas in agreement, looking 
critically back on their own writings. The editor-in-chief of De Volkskrant, for instance, stated 
that ‘we, and you and I have shaped a rather stereotypical image of the Bosnian conflict and 
the Dutch involvement in it. We, some more than others, have offered too much morality, 
too few facts, too many opinions, too little analysis and too much emotion’ (Broertjes 2002, 
cited in Rijsdijk 2012, p. 116). The chief-editor of Trouw wrote a similar acknowledgment, that 
at the time of the conflict, ‘journalists who persisted to draw a more complex reality came 
under pressure within their own circle. Also in this newspaper’ (Van Exter 2002).
In 2006, all Dutchbat III veterans were decorated with a ‘Dutchbat III insignia’, not to 
reward them, it was emphasized, but as a sign of recognition. A large part of the public 
seemed to approve this decoration, but several protests were organized as well, indicative 
of the still lingering suspicion of veterans (Van de Bildt 2015). Television programs treated 
the decoration as a subject deserving satire. One show, for instance, jokingly depicted a 
Dutchbat veteran saying ‘if only we’d known that we would get decorated for this later, we’d 
have given away women and children as well’ (Dit Was Het Nieuws 2006). The Dutch public, 
thus, seemed divided on the issue.
Over the decades, a large part of the public seems to have become sympathetic to the 
soldiers of Dutchbat III (Algra et al. 2007) and recent media coverage of the Srebrenica tragedy 
has mostly been supportive (see e.g. Müller 2010, Outeren 2011, Lindhout 2012, Koelé 2016). 
Yet, articles still appear that accuse the soldiers of lacking willingness to fight (see e.g. 
Koelman 2015). Though most people now seem to agree that Dutchbat had no other option, 
some still believe that the soldiers should have tried anyway and fought themselves to death 
(cf. De Graaff 2006, Telegraaf 2016).
Dutchbat, UNPROFOR: Veterans’ Experiences
Frustration and Anger
The stories that circulated in the media about Dutchbat after the fall of Srebrenica stood 
in stark contrast to the veterans’ personal experience and therefore engendered frustration 
and anger. The stories infuriated many veterans, especially those about the party Dutchbat 
troops allegedly held after they arrived in Zagreb, and the Karremans-Mladić toast, filmed 
just before the fall of Srebrenica. Consider for instance the following two quotes.
Well, it wasn’t a nice party! Why weren’t we allowed to be glad we survived? It’s those press 
mosquitoes saying, thousands of people die and Dutchbat celebrates. Just think before 
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you say something like that. Just go and see one of us, [you’ll see us] sitting at home, 
crying at four in the morning. They really hurt people. (…) The same thing happened with 
Karremans. ‘Toasting with Mladić’. Yes, it all depends on the context. Sure, it wasn’t the 
smartest thing to do, but it’s not like he had anything to do with it [the fall of Srebrenica]. 
(Bob, then a Dutchbat III private)
It wasn’t a party. It was a release. People had just come back, they were crying, they were 
broken. (…) And that [picture of] Karremans’ toast, you can’t fix that. You always see that, 
never pictures of Karremans requesting air support, for instance. (Arie, then a Dutchbat 
III platoon commander)
Many veterans told me it still infuriated them when articles appeared stating that they had 
‘surrendered without a fight’, or been ‘unwilling to fight’, that people had been ‘murdered 
before their very eyes’, or that ‘the blue helmets stood by and watched the mass slaughter’ (see 
e.g. Koelman 2015, Telegraaf 2016, Trouw 2018). Similarly, editorials considering the question 
‘would those men still be alive if another military had been there?’ infuriated them (see e.g. 
Koelman 2015). Exasperated, they told me that Dutchbat ‘did resist’ by taking up blocking 
positions. ‘We tried to help the women and children’ and that people were ‘murdered under 
the eyes of Dutchbat is bullshit!’. One veteran commented, ‘All these years, that’s how it’s 
been, and when you keep repeating a lie, it becomes a reality’.
Many veterans said that media criticism had influenced their interactions with friends 
and acquaintances. Dutchbat III veteran Tim, in Srebrenica a private, related the following.
All of a sudden it was in the news, Dutchbat III were cowards, and had abandoned the 
enclave. And all your friends, who’d spoken about you with appreciation, a week or two 
later, suddenly started making jokes about you. (…) People have all kinds of opinions of 
you, people who can’t make a proper judgment at all. Everybody had their opinion. At first 
only the media confronts you with it, but later when you go out to a bar, it happens there, 
too. That people have their opinions. Yes, that became harder and harder to bear. (…) ‘Oh, 
you’re one of those cowards who gave up their weapon?’ Yes, and I’d get aggressive… I 
hated it. I really felt personally attacked.
Like Tim, several other veterans admitted that when directly accused or mocked by people, 
they were not always able to control their anger.
Notably, some veterans also said that their initial welcome as heroes did not feel right 
either. Take the account of former NCO Huib about Dutchbat III’s reception in the UN 
compound in Zagreb, where they were sent after the fall of Srebrenica.
I don’t have the best memories of Zagreb. (…) Strange mixed feelings. You arrive in Zagreb. 
Well, you arrive, and you’re received as heroes. It’s the very last thing I felt I was. A hero. 
I’m not a hero. (…) I felt a certain powerlessness, that’s what dominated. (…) They sent out, 
probably well-intended, some tree huggers [mental health professionals]. [One] says, ‘So 
how does it feel to be a hero?’. I say, ‘What makes you think I’m a hero?’. And then he says, 
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‘How does it feel now that it’s over?’. I say, ‘Those are your words. First, I’m not a hero, I 
don’t feel like a hero. Second, it’s not over’.
Huib remarked, ‘This man can’t have been too pleased with me’.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the group of veterans feeling attacked by public 
criticism was not limited to those directly involved in the fall of Srebrenica. Dutchbat I 
and Dutchbat II veterans also felt attacked by the commotion surrounding the tragedy, as 
well as Dutchbat III veterans on leave whose return had been prevented by Bosnian Serb 
belligerents. Like the directly involved, they also experienced this as personal mistreatment.
In relation to this, many Dutchbat veterans seemed to feel that there were only two 
diametrically opposed positions to choose from: pro-Dutchbat and anti-Dutchbat. Several 
explicitly expressed this feeling, others did so implicitly in their comments. While some 
veterans agreed with public criticism of Dutchbat III commander Karremans, many forcefully 
defended him, emphasizing that like all Dutchbat soldiers, he was bound hand and foot, 
and that the criticism of him was typical of how Dutchbat as a whole was misunderstood. 
Similarly, while many veterans were furious with the Dutch government, some also became 
angry when others pointed fingers at the government. They expressed anger, for instance, 
about the legal claims Bosnian Muslim survivors filed against the Dutch state, emphasizing 
that, like them, the Bosnian Muslim belligerents – ‘their own people’ – had fled in the face of 
the Bosnian Serb attack. As this comment illustrates, some veterans felt that the legal claims 
against the Dutch state were attacks on themselves. Others, empathizing with the claims, 
noted that the survivors filing claims and those lamenting them were both angrily accusing 
each other of not understanding their side.
 
Silence
While there was much frustration and anger in the accounts I heard, there was more. Many 
veterans (Dutchbat I and II veterans included) told me that they had refused to talk about 
their experiences for a long time. When I asked why, most mentioned a combination of 
things, which, in the words of Dutchbat III veteran Anton, made a ‘poisonous cocktail’. Like 
many of his former colleagues, he first mentioned the mental ‘short circuit’ being powerless 
in Srebrenica caused, second, being abandoned by the UN and the Dutch government, 
and, third, the many scandals in the media which ‘repeated the fucking images endlessly’. 
Anton explained, ‘Put all that together, I stop talking’. The following quotes reveal similar 
explanations.
You’re being called a war criminal. I didn’t dare tell people that I’d been there. (Piet, then 
a Dutchbat III private)
In the local supermarket, you’d get: ‘How could you let that happen?’ Well there you are, 
tongue-tied. You want to react physically, but you know that’s no good either. At the 
time, I was in a mode that it [reacting violently] actually could’ve happened. (John, then 
a Dutchbat II private)
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You can’t defend yourself. And then, you bottle it all up, and, yeah… Nowadays (…) I have to 
respond. When I read something, I can’t control it, my heart beat goes up. I just struggle 
with that. (Matthijs, then a Dutchbat I NCO)
I had a jacket that said ‘Srebrenica’. I was called a coward on the street. (…) I walked on, 
took off my jacket, I’ve never worn it again. (Anton, a Dutchbat III private)
Public accusations, coupled with veterans’ fear of being unable to control their anger, led 
many veterans to keep quiet about their experience. This unwillingness to talk also emerged 
in my research directly. Many veterans told me that, five or ten years ago, they probably 
would have declined my interview requests because they would have been too afraid I was 
going to distort their stories. They felt that people had become milder toward Dutchbat 
over the years, and as a result, they said, they now dared speak up. Still, many of them were 
suspicious at first. Several veterans admitted they had searched my name on the internet 
before agreeing to an interview. Moreover, two veterans I contacted angrily refused to be 
interviewed because ‘they were done with people twisting the story’.
Many veterans not only remained quiet in public about their experience, but did not 
tell their families either. They did not want to bother family members with their problems, 
whom they believed would not be able to understand anyway. Several veterans suggested 
that at home, it was not the fear of accusations that made it hard for them to talk, but that 
questions of blame were waved off altogether. As one veteran explained, family members 
would often say things like ‘don’t worry so much, it wasn’t your fault’, or, ‘it was over there, 
not here’. Consequently, he said, ‘You don’t want to admit you’re suffering. You’re angry with 
everyone, but you don’t want to admit that you have problems yourself’.
 
Disorientation and Alienation
In addition to anger and silence, public criticism had a more profound effect on the 
interviewed veterans. Many of the accounts I heard suggested that it amplified or perhaps 
even caused moral disorientation and a sense of alienation from society. Take Bob’s account, 
for instance, which was discussed in detail in Chapter 6. To repeat a quote drawn upon before:
What can you say? People already have their opinion. I was way too afraid of confronting 
questions, of accusations. Like, ‘you let people –‘, people have said this to me – ‘you let 
people die over there’. There’s nothing worse you can say to me. (…) Yes… all those people. 
I still see myself dragging people in a cart. (…) I dragged that cart, but I wasn’t mobile 
anymore. I had to let go.
According to Bob, media criticism only ‘added to my guilt’.
Dutchbat III veteran Erik, who was a private in Srebrenica, related a similar experience.
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Imagine King’s Day [a national holiday in the Netherlands]. All the streets are packed. 
People everywhere, along the canals, people everywhere. A family falls in the water. 
Father, mother, two children. You’re the only one to jump in the water to help them. 
Nobody moves, nobody does anything. You save the mother and children, the father 
drowns. You get out, and everybody points at you: it’s your fault the father drowned. 
That’s Dutchbat. You did your utmost and [his eyes well up] still, you’re blamed. I guess 
older soldiers are maybe better at putting things in perspective, but a boy of 20 [himself], 
just out of diapers, he can’t handle that. (…) Now people know far more about what really 
happened so I don’t have to blame myself as much as I used to.
The next day, Erik sent me an email in which he elaborated on some of the things he had said 
during the interview, including the analogy above.
Just to come back to the canal example. If all those people thanked you for saving the 
woman and children and didn’t blame you for the drowned man, you’d feel far less 
miserable! Then you’d have done your utmost and you’d be appreciated! Then you’d feel 
less guilty, maybe not guilty at all!
Erik’s email seemed to indicate outrage and lingering self-doubt and disorientation, feelings 
he confirmed on enquiry.
To explain how public criticism had affected them, veterans sometimes used historical 
analogies. Dutchbat III veteran Philip was on leave during the fall of Srebrenica but still felt 
accusations of Dutchbat III were direct attacks on him. He compared Dutchbat’s experience 
to that of Vietnam veterans, to criticize the way Dutchbat III had been treated, saying that in 
both cases the public had quickly shifted from support to condemnation. Yet he also admitted 
that public criticism had led him to doubt himself, and when he did so, he compared himself 
to the soldiers of Nazi Germany in the aftermath of World War II.
I get stuck in that I think, emotionally, should I have refused [going to Bosnia]? Was I… - I 
wasn’t on the wrong side at all but at one point I got the idea, like, yeah now I know what 
it’s like to come back like a Wehrmacht soldier after World War II and find out that you’re 
in the wrong club. And I know it’s exaggerated, and doesn’t make any sense, but that’s 
what it feels like.
Philip told me that he had been angry ‘for 19 years’. He had had many sleepless nights, 
‘not because of nightmares, but because I was always watching documentaries, trying to 
understand things’. He wanted to know ‘which story is the right story’, but he could not find 
one that matched his experience. The fact that the only stories he could find felt distorted 
not only made an impactful in itself, it also seriously hindered him from examining his 
own feelings. Public criticism made him furious, but he did not want to give in to his anger 
because it felt egotistical ‘that I’m whining about this while 8000 people died over there’. He 
felt guilty, but could not let himself be guilty because ‘if I asked myself questions, I felt, like, 
I was like the rest of the Netherlands attacking Dutchbat with unfounded accusations. I can’t 
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do that either’. As a result, Philip said, ‘I can’t find …, yeah, I hate the word, but I can’t find 
closure. And it still keeps on festering’.
Like Erik, Bob and Philip, many veterans admitted that people’s allegations infuriated 
them, on the one hand because they thought that the people had it ‘all wrong’, and on the 
other, because at the same time they were haunted by the fear that these people were actually 
right.
Tragedy versus ‘Whodunit’
The previous sections showed that the public debates following the fall of Srebrenica affected 
the Dutchbat interviewed veterans in several ways. Many Dutchbat veterans were frustrated 
by the voiced criticism, experiencing it as distortions of what had actually happened. At 
the same time, the criticism exacerbated or perhaps even caused feelings of guilt and 
disorientation in many of them. No prevailing story matched their experience, which 
rendered the veterans silent and complicated their efforts to make sense of their experience, 
not only due to the accusatory nature of the stories, but also because of the stories’ simplicity. 
This section attempts to better understand the difference between the veterans’ perceptions 
and prevailing public stories, and to reflect on why the public narratives took shape the way 
they did.
The veterans’ accounts were about the utter inadequacy of putting ‘right’ and wrong’ 
in neatly demarcated boxes. The ways in which veterans framed their experiences can be 
seen as a tragedy. A tragedy acknowledges that inescapable situations may arise in which 
people, as a result of cruel bad luck and human vulnerability and error, become part of evil 
(cf. Golden 1975). A tragedy reveals ‘a glimpse of something that men cannot accept: the 
truth of their own violence’ (Pellón 1988, p. 40). It unmasks as an illusion the notion that 
good character prevents people from wrongdoing and instead tells a story of fragility and 
violence as inherent to the human condition. This does not mean that a tragedy absolves 
perpetrators from responsibility and blame. On the contrary, an aspect of classic tragedy is 
that the wrongdoer is eventually punished by the gods. A tragedy conveys the message that 
people are all flawed and capable of wrongdoing.
While the accounts of the interviewed veterans can be called a tragedy, the narrative that 
dominated public debates is reminiscent of a ‘whodunit’, that is, a detective story that begins 
with a murder and proceeds by unraveling the facts and solving puzzles, which eventually 
leads to the resolution of the crime and the identification of the murderer. Instead of relating 
human vulnerability to evil, a whodunit attributes weaknesses and violence to particular 
actors labeled ‘guilty’. As discussed, even before the mission started the public debate tended 
to interpret the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in a framework of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’, 
with comparisons to World War II and the Holocaust as symbols of ultimate exceptional evil 
(Wieten 2002, p. 3414, Algra et al. 2007). While Dutch peacekeepers were ‘good guys’ before 
and during the mission, shortly after the drama, which category they actually belonged to 
became an urgent question (Wieten 2002, p. 3414, Algra et al. 2007). To be clear, with the 
whodunit analogy I do not intend to ridicule the Dutch debates, nor to deny that on many 
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levels failures seem to have taken place, but to capture how public debates came to focus on 
scandal and addressed the question of blame in sometimes too simplistic terms. For part 
of the public, Dutchbat were simply lamentable victims, for another part, they were simply 
blameworthy perpetrators, but generally they were not something in between or both at the 
same time (Wieten 2002).
Of course, given that the media is tasked with oversight of government, combined with 
the necessity to hold audience attention, journalists are compelled to find and report ‘scoops’ 
of misconduct with a certain degree of simplification (Griffin 2010, pp. 8–9, Dimitriu and 
Graaf 2016, p. 17). Yet, the appearance of whodunit narratives seems to have another reason, 
namely the fact that Dutchbat’s failure to prevent mass murder shocked the Dutch public, 
including journalists, especially since they had come to interpret the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia in terms of World War II. The debacle assaulted collective assumptions that Dutch 
soldiers would not allow war crimes to take place. It flew in the face of the conviction that 
‘we’ would not let something like the Holocaust happen ‘ever again’ (Dudink 2002, NIOD 
2002, p. e.g. 123-4; 564; 865; 3414, Algra et al. 2007). A UK newspaper put it as follows. ‘The 
nation that saw itself as the protector of Anne Frank and the inheritor of a great tradition 
of tolerance was confronted with the possibility that its sons and daughters had become 
accomplices to some of the most heinous war crimes in Europe since the Second World War’ 
(quoted in Algra et al. 2007, p. 404).
Violent events such as the fall of Srebrenica, then, may damage not only the expectations 
and beliefs of the people directly involved, but those of society at large. Consequently, 
society tends to create particular national narratives to remove this threat to the status quo 
(Tal 1996, Edkins 2003). It defends its present order ‘by reducing a traumatic event to a set 
of standardized narratives (twice- and thrice-told tales that come to represent the story of 
the trauma) turning it from a frightening and uncontrollable event into a contained and 
predictable narrative’ (Tal 1996, p. 6). That is, a society reconstructs events that threaten the 
social fabric into stories that offer ‘closure’ and ensure continuation of the existing state of 
affairs (Tal 1996, Edkins 2003).
The unsettling discomfort that the Srebrenica debacle engendered in the Dutch 
public seems to have provoked a desire to expel this discomfort. One way to do so was by 
restructuring it into a legible story of exceptional violence for which certain actors are 
responsible. A tragedy offers no clear answer to the events it conveys, but a whodunit does, 
and in providing answers a whodunit gives the notions of good versus bad meaning again. 
While explanations such as ‘cowardice’ are embarrassing, they do make sense. 
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Even explanations that include society as a whole, and thus oneself, in the cowardice 
equation seem less uncomfortable than no explanation at all. 2
So how exactly does this public response relate to Dutchbat’s experience? According 
to Rijs, the Dutch ‘journalist was more like [the] Dutchbat soldier than he wants to admit’ 
(Rijs 1998). The Srebrenican debacle has been widely referred to as a ‘national trauma’ and 
an ‘open war wound’ (Wieten 2002, p. 3414, Praamsma et al. 2005, Rijsdijk 2012, pp. 115–6). 
Indeed, like Dutchbat veterans, the Dutch public felt their own moral disorientation and 
(self-)doubt, as they struggled with questions as to what happened in Srebrenica and whom 
to hold accountable. In both groups, one might say, the events disrupted a sense of security 
and disturbed the self-images, and the ruptured assumptions drove both groups to try and 
overcome the unsettling questions that emerged from it.
However, the variance between veterans’ accounts and public narratives (tragedy versus 
whodunit) also indicates an important difference in the ways the two groups responded 
to the ‘national trauma’. Perhaps better said, it shows that terms such as ‘trauma’, though 
insightful, are somewhat inadequate to describe the experience of Dutch society as a whole. 
Let me briefly recap the experiences of moral failure and disorientation described in Chapter 
6. Many Dutchbat veterans, although they tried initially, were unable to restore disrupted 
assumptions of good versus bad; they could no longer trust in the benevolence of the world 
or their own benevolence. They had lost their ‘cloak of safety’, to use the evocative metaphor 
that psychiatrist Shay uses in the context of trauma (1994, p. 185). In contrast, while the 
Dutch public also appeared shaken in their moral assumptions by the events in Srebrenica, 
they were still able to interpret these events as something that must have been caused by 
identifiable and exceptional factors, making it possible to keep wearing the cloak of safety.
TFU, ISAF: The Battle of Chora
This section turns to the TFU mission in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. Public narratives on this 
mission were generally more diverse than in the Dutchbat case. But as will become clear, they 
still posed problems for the veterans who served on this mission. The Dutch contribution 
to the ISAF mission in Uruzgan never enjoyed broad support, but it was never opposed by a 
broad majority. When the mission started in 2006, opinion polls indicated that between 38% 
and 47% of the Dutch public supported it while between 24% and 28% opposed it (Ministry of 
Defense 2010). The following years witnessed a slow but steady decrease in supporters and an 
2	 The	 lengthy	 report	 on	 Srebrenica	 by	 the	 Netherlands	 Institute	 for	 War	 Documentation	 (NIOD)	 can	 perhaps	 also	 be	
understood as a narrative of tragedy. The accounts of many Dutchbat veterans and the report are both overwhelming. 
Both	convey	the	view	that	you	cannot	single	out	specific	factors	or	actors	responsible	for	the	events.	Historian/psychologist	
Runia	 (2004),	noting	the	overwhelming	complexity	of	 the	NIOD	report,	explains	 it	as	deriving	 from	a	subconscious	 re-
enactment	of	traumatic	Dutchbat	experience.	Runia	argues	that	the	NIOD	researchers	exhibited	avoidance	behavior	as	
they wanted both to address and (subconsciously) avoid the question of what happened in Srebrenica. In contrast to Runia, 
my	findings	lead	me	to	conclude	that	if	anything	could	be	interpreted	as	avoidance	behavior,	it	is	the	tendency	in	public	
debates	to	restore	an	orderly	world	by	simplification	rather	than	an	unwillingness	to	simplify	complex	events.	In	any	case,	
the	NIOD	report	does	convey	immensity	and	inconclusiveness,	which	can	be	interpreted	as	an	expression	of	a	sense	of	
tragedy.
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increase in opponents. In 2010, when the mission was terminated, opponents (41%) slightly 
outnumbered the supporters (33%) (Ministry of Defense 2010).
As noted before, the government’s decision to contribute troops to the ISAF mission 
was not so much the result of public calls to intervene in Afghanistan as of international 
alliances (Klep 2011, Grandia 2015). Still, public opinion played a role in the decision-making 
process. Among other factors, anticipated public criticism of the ‘war mission’ of the US in 
Afghanistan (TK 2006, p. 17) resulted in the formal separation of TFU and OEF activities (Klep 
2011, Grandia 2015). At the same time, it was paradoxically expected that the mission would 
refute the reputation of the Dutch as ‘too sweet for war’ (Klep 2011, p. 77, Grandia 2015, p. 114). 
Both expectations turned out to be correct. While the mission’s design was adapted to meet 
the anticipated objections, this could not prevent the rise of heated debates on whether the 
Dutch operation was actually a ‘combat mission intentionally disguised as reconstruction 
mission’, which lasted throughout the deployment (Dimitriu and Graaf 2016, p. 14). At the 
same time, news of Dutch engagement in combat bolstered the reputation of Dutch troops 
as a military that was willing to fight (see e.g. Klep 2011).
The Battle of Chora, which involved intense fighting in and around the town of Chora, 
points to the ways in which military actions affected public debates. The battle was preceded 
by an insurgent’s suicide attack on 15 June 2007, killing a Dutch soldier and at least five 
Afghan children. The next day, hundreds of insurgents attacked the Chora district. Quickly, 
it was decided that the district should not be left in the hands of insurgents, and the intense 
three-day battle followed, fought with heavy weaponry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, 
Olsthoorn and Verweij 2012, pp. 82–3). Eventually, they regained control of the district. A 
Dutch captain involved in the battle, who had also been deployed to the enclave of Srebrenica 
in Dutchbat III, urged his soldiers on with the slogan ‘rave the enclave’. Both he and media 
commentators would later recall that in contrast with Srebrenica, the Dutch had now been 
able to effectively defend the area they were supposed to defend (Algemeen Dagblad 2007a, 
Boom 2007, Eijsvoogel 2007). ‘My men were extremely motivated’, the Dutch captain told a 
journalist shortly after the battle. ‘This time we did have the resources to fight back hard and 
sweep away these guys. I was surprised that they kept coming. But we stood our ground’ 
(quoted in Boom 2007, translation TM). Indeed, the Dutch troops had robust Rules of 
Engagement, sufficient troops and heavy weaponry, including F-16s and Apaches, enabling 
air support (Algemeen Dagblad 2007a, Olsthoorn and Verweij 2012). That said, they had far 
too few soldiers and military resources to maintain control over the district of Chora, and 
by the end of 2007 it was in the hands of the opponents again (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2010).3 
The battle had caused the death of one American soldier, one Dutch soldier, sixteen Afghan 
soldiers and dozens, perhaps hundreds of insurgents. Moreover, dozens of Afghan civilians 
had also been killed, most of whom, it seemed, by the Dutch bombardments (Boom 2007, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, Olsthoorn and Verweij 2012, p. 83).
The Battle of Chora soon became the subject of extensive media reporting (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2007, Olsthoorn and Verweij 2012). This bolstered the image of the Dutch 
troops in the Netherlands (see e.g. Klep 2011) but the many casualties it had caused also gave 
3 It never was the objective to occupy the district of Chora. Since it was clear from the start that there were far too few troops 
to achieve this, the goal was limited to ‘frustrating’ the Taliban (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2010).
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rise to criticism. Shortly after the battle, the Dutch troops were confronted by the fact that 
the Dutch parliament demanded an investigation into the battle (Eijsvoogel 2007). Besides 
the Dutch armed forces, the UN, the ISAF commander and an Afghan commission for human 
rights also launched their own investigations (Olsthoorn and Verweij 2012).4 Although the 
resulting reports did not lead to in trials, they received substantial attention in the Dutch 
newspapers and television programs. Particular attention was directed to the allegation 
that the Dutch troops had acted unnecessarily heavy-handedly, and journalists accused the 
Ministry of Defense of having concealed the many civilian casualties in the battle (see e.g. 
Marlet 2007, Trouw 2007).
Parliamentarians critical of the Afghanistan mission took the Battle of Chora as an 
opportunity to debate its continuation, arguing again that it had become too much of 
a ‘combat mission’ (Algemeen Dagblad 2007b, Trouw 2007). The government, however, 
responded by emphasizing that especially now, stabilization and reconstruction would be 
feasible. The Dutch could not just abandon their NATO allies (Van der Meulen and Grandia 
2012, p. 27). Initially, this response helped defend the continuation of the mission (Van der 
Meulen and Grandia 2012, p. 27). However, over time, the gap between domestic perceptions 
and the reality on the ground became progressively clear, and parliamentary and public 
opposition mounted. As noted before, this opposition may have had to do more with the 
initial framing of the mission (which many perceived as deceptive) than with unconditional 
public opposition to the use of force (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001). Whatever the reasons, 
the public expected the TFU mission to be a ‘reconstruction mission’, and the more it became 
clear that it was a ‘combat mission’, too, the more public support dwindled (ibid). In 2010, the 
Dutch mission in Uruzgan was terminated. 
 
TFU, ISAF: Veterans’ Experiences
Frustration and Anger
‘Nothing happens here, it’s totally safe here, only very friendly people!’, Dutch soldier filmed 
in Afghanistan said this sarcastically, expressing his annoyance about the Dutch public’s 
wariness of the use of force in Afghanistan (Franke 2006). This soldier’s sarcasm resonates 
with the accounts of many of the interviewed TFU veterans. Though most agreed with the 
prevailing criticism in the Netherlands of the US troops (who they accused of behaving like 
‘cowboys’), they believed the Dutch public were both naïve and arrogant in how they saw 
the situation in Afghanistan. The following sections discuss how TFU veterans perceived the 
Dutch perceptions of their mission and how it affected them, beginning with the frustration 
and anger that many expressed.
4 The reports concluded that the methods were heavy-handed but accorded with the Rules of Engagement. Only the ISAF 
commander’s report found the use of armored howitzers without directly identifying military targets against the Law 
of	Armed	Conflict.	However,	the	Secretary	General	and	Supreme Allied Commander Europe	of	NATO	disagreed	with	this	
conclusion	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	2007,	Olsthoorn	and	Verweij	2012).
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Former private Boris, for instance, told me the following.
Going forward strewing teddy bears, long live the rainbow, the bees, the butterflies, you 
know… That’s how people here would like to see it. But that’s not how it is. [I ask him, 
‘Would you like the government to say: but they are fighting’?] Well, ha-ha, politicians 
don’t even dare say the word ‘fighting’. I don’t think the Dutch would ever see it like this.
Many veterans were particularly frustrated by how often people ‘just had their opinion ready’. 
They all shared anecdotes of occasions when people, after learning they were in the armed 
forces, quickly steered the conversation into ‘a speech on everything that’s wrong with the 
Afghanistan mission’. It was not the criticism that bothered them – they too were critical of 
their mission – but the fact that someone was explaining their own field of expertise back 
to them in an accusatory manner, like ‘Aunty Trudy who’d read about it once, sitting on the 
couch’.
Several veterans remembered often being asked how they dealt with ‘having murdered 
[sic] people’. Some also admitted they had gotten furious in response. Former private 
Servie, for instance, (quoted in Chapter 7 on failing to stop a young boy’s abuse and suicide) 
recounted the following.
Not long after [I came back from Afghanistan] I went out with my girlfriend, for a drink. 
I was talking to someone, don’t remember what about exactly, probably about my 
deployment. What I do know is that he called me a filthy murderer, and... [chokes up] 
then I got my first black out. I did things I don’t remember anymore. I know from what I 
was told that I … er… hit women. And I gave four men a broken nose.
Looking back, he realized that he had ‘gone completely crazy’.
So, the Afghanistan mission engendered not only criticism but also admiration. However, 
many veterans felt that even expressions of interest and appreciation were often clouded by 
people’s attitudes, as if the critics were ‘watching monkeys in the zoo’. To repeat an earlier 
quote, when people heard that an interviewee was in the military, they typically asked, ‘Have 
you ever been deployed?’, ‘Have you ever killed anyone?’ And, ‘Do you have any problems 
now?’ The veterans found these questions sensationalist and inconsiderate.
The account of Jan, a NCO in Afghanistan, offers an example of how distressed veterans 
experienced questions like these. During his deployment, Jan witnessed a lot of blood 
and suffering. While gory things never troubled him, he did struggle profoundly with the 
death of a colleague, killed by a suicide bomber, for which he still feels responsible. A few 
weeks before this happened, Jan and his colleagues had been surprised by a man wearing 
an explosive belt, who changed his mind at the last moment and fled before they could do 
something. Ever since Jan has been troubled by the question, ‘was the suicide bomber who 
killed [my colleague] later’. While successfully keeping his inner struggles a secret from his 
environment, he has not always been able to hide the frustration triggered when thoughtless 
people ask about his deployment. For instance, once a close relative tried to convince him 
to share his deployment story, exclaiming, ‘You never talk about Afghanistan’. Initially, 
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nothing happened. Jan insisted that he did not like to talk about Afghanistan, which reason 
she eventually accepted. But that evening, when they were surfing TV channels and a horror 
movie came up, she turned away and said she could not watch such movies, which triggered 
him. At once he responded, ‘And you ask me what I experienced in Afghanistan? You want me 
to tell you about pink dust clouds, about losing buddies, but you can’t even watch this?’ Jan 
told me about this incident with a mix of frustration and embarrassment. He clarified that 
he did not mean that people should be capable of watching scary movies on TV before they 
can ask him about his deployment experience, but that many people beg for shocking stories 
while not actually wanting to hear them.
Silence
Besides frustration and anger, silence emerged as an important theme in the accounts 
I heard. After recounting experiences of combat, civilian casualties, fear and joy, many 
veterans remarked that they usually did not share this much with others out of a fear of being 
misunderstood. One veteran put it as follows. ‘I’m careful about telling things to people 
who can’t imagine it, who’d think, “This guy is not right in the head”’. Veterans who did not 
report deployment-related mental health problems usually told me about their reticence with 
nonchalance. They would, for instance, tell me about the running gag among Dutch soldiers 
of responding to questions of what they do for a living by saying they are a dolphin trainer, 
a student of necrophilia or something equally silly. Distressed veterans, however, generally 
spoke about the communication difficulties they experienced as something that hurt and 
isolated them.
Sjaak’s account provides an insightful illustration of this. Speaking of his combat 
encounters, the then private explained that the Taliban often fired from qalas [units of 
houses] and corn fields – ‘you don’t see a thing’ – and admitted that he might have hit a 
civilian instead of an insurgent. Also, he commented that at the time, especially after he 
had lost a close colleague, he ‘really wished’ he had been able to see up close the guys he 
had possibly ‘wacked’. Further, he told me how not long after his buddy was killed, his unit 
caught an alleged Taliban fighter, whom he had to guard. He strongly felt the urge to hit the 
man, which he did not do, ‘because you just don’t do that’, but he fully understood when a 
colleague from another unit had not been able to resist the urge in a similar situation and 
had hit a Taliban fighter. Like many other veterans, Sjaak found direct questions about his 
combat experiences rude. When I asked why, he explained that of all the people who had ever 
started a conversation by asking him about this topic, no one had been genuinely interested. 
He sketched the following scenario.
Okay, so imagine, I don’t know this guy and suddenly I say, ‘did you ever kill someone?’ 
And he says ‘yes’, without blinking. Later, I go to a mate of mine. ‘Listen to this’, I say. 
‘There’s a guy and he says without blinking that he’s killed someone. He’s fucking sick 
in the head, man’. It’s just a nice story, so people have something to tell each other, they 
don’t really care about it in any way other than that.
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Negative experiences like these led Sjaak and many other veterans to stop telling people they 
were in the military.
Disorientation and Alienation
A military psychiatrist once warned me that from the perspective of the armed forces, the 
term ‘moral injury’ could be interpreted negatively as signifying that soldiers are more 
likely than others to commit immoral acts. Yet, when I reiterated this possible connotation 
to veterans, they always laughed and responded along the lines of ‘but of course we are, 
we get sent to war!’. Some exclaimed that they could not understand how people can deny 
that war encourages people to do things they might not otherwise do. They called this a 
prime example of keeping up appearances. As discussed above, confrontations with societal 
perceptions not only elicited cynical laughter, but silence, too. Moreover, it made many 
veterans feel a stranger to society.
Like many veterans, Björn believed that people who admired the Dutch troops’ conduct 
in Afghanistan would be shocked when they heard actual stories of combat. According to 
this former NCO, ‘People here have no idea what all those people have experienced, what 
they did’. He found it understandable because ‘people only know war from video games, 
bam-bam-bam, and when you’re killed, you press the X button and start again’. But this was 
why, he said, it was difficult to share his experiences with people who had not been there. 
‘I can show video clips that we made over there, but I see that people often watch like it’s a 
movie’.
Many veterans tied people’s perceptions of military practice to societal double standards 
regarding the military. Former platoon commander Henk had opposed the political motives 
for sending troops to Afghanistan, yet had been for the mission. But in the Netherlands, he 
said, ‘You have to come up with an excuse for why you are in the military’. According to Henk, 
many Dutch civilians like to see violence ‘as something sad and horrible’ because it is ‘nice 
and easy’, while also enjoying the privilege of having armed forces. He elaborated on this 
point as follows.
 
We don’t want to know about the price we pay for it. It‘s like, we want to eat meat, but 
we don’t want to know how these cows were butchered. (…) We only want to eat meat 
butchered without violence, but that’s of course impossible, to get meat without violence. 
Note that he said ‘we’ rather than ‘they don’t want to know’. When I mentioned this to Henk, 
he replied it was not a mistake, and that ‘I also know that, if we’d really follow our moral 
compass, we’d be in Africa or somewhere right now, where the really serious conflicts 
and genocides are, but that’s not where our interests lie’. Many veterans, while lamenting 
civilians’ lack of understanding, also admitted having mixed feelings about their profession.
Some veterans reported feeling confused as to which world they belonged, the civilian or 
the military world. Former NCO Bas, for example, wrote the following on his Facebook page 
(quoted with permission).
I can’t find the ‘civilian switch’ anymore. I don’t think I have it. I don’t understand 
lunchboxes. I don’t understand that people happily join traffic jams every day, on their 
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way to fancy office buildings where they walk out at 17:02 to repeat the traffic jam ritual. 
If I had an opinion of a colleague’s behavior I’d still want to say how I feel. I could still do 
that but probably I’d be called into the boss’ office five minutes later, to explain why my 
colleague is crying and hugging the radiator. (…) I left service out of anger, sadness, and 
frustration. I left because I thought I’d become unfit. Unfit for another deployment. I was 
empty. I didn’t want to become a soldier who tried to avoid deployment. (…) I know so 
well that things will never be the same. And yet, if it were possible… I miss it.
Like Bas, many veterans no longer understood the worlds that used to be their own. Some 
felt alienated from both the civilian universe and the military world. As one veteran put it, 
they were ‘stuck between two worlds’, finding it hard to ‘even understand myself’.
 
 
Not/Wanting to Hear About Violence
The previous sections discussed how the TFU mission elicited both criticism and admiration 
from the Dutch public and showed that the interviewed veterans often perceived both 
responses as misunderstandings. They felt both distorted their mission and this not only 
angered them but rendered them silent, made them feel alienated from society and caused 
them to feel disoriented about who they were and where they belonged. As I did in the 
Dutchbat case, now I will reflect in some more analytical depth on why TFU veterans felt 
misunderstood by the Dutch public and why Dutch public perceptions took shape the way 
they did.
Various surveys indicate that although a large portion of the Dutch public disapproved of 
the mission in Afghanistan, an even larger part perceived the veterans as courageous, or at 
least victims of war (e.g. Netherlands Veterans Institute 2014a, 2014b, TOS 2015). At the same 
time, however, only a minority of Dutch veterans seems to have felt societal appreciation. In 
line with my research findings, the majority of surveyed veterans answered the statement ‘as 
a veteran I feel appreciated by society’ with ‘neutral’ (53%) or ‘disagree’ (26%) (Netherlands 
Veterans Institute 2014c). Several factors can account for this ostensible discrepancy. First, 
veterans may notice negative responses more than positive reactions. Second, veterans may 
experience criticism of their mission as personal criticism (Algra et al. 2007). A third, related 
reason may lie in some veterans’ inclination to readily reject non-military perceptions as 
erroneous (Harari 2008, Sørensen 2015).
However, besides military distrust and cynicism, and in relation to it, it seems that the 
specific narratives that are formed in public debates should also be taken into account. 
Consider the following result of another survey. Consider the result of another survey, which 
asked Dutch veterans to answer several hypothetical descriptions of veterans. The majority 
said that they found ‘hero’, ‘courageous’ and ‘brave’ ‘unsuitable’ (Blauw Research 2013). This 
indicates that the lack of appreciation many veterans reported might not just be a matter 
of miscommunication. Instead, it suggests that admiration in the form of romantic images 
have an important element in common with condemnation: both may be experienced as 
oversimplified caricatures.
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In the experience of many veterans, most people simultaneously do and do not want to 
hear about their deployment experiences. They want to hear about the killing, what it feels 
like, and whether it is hard. Yet, veterans noticed, people often seem to expect a particular 
response: they expect to hear that the veteran is still burdened by the fact that he killed, or 
they simply want to hear a sensational story about the thrilling madness of war. Instead, 
veterans’ stories are often about the moral complexity of violence and the utter illusion of 
Rambo-like imaginings. They are, for instance, about the normalcy of cheering and laughing 
when seeing a blast of fire, the piercing cries of soldiers at the loss of a buddy, the black 
humor used to cope with this loss, the easy acceptance of ‘collateral damage’ resulting from 
combat, and, at the same time, about profound feelings of guilt at being unable to save a 
child from abuse. Or, they are about killing in fear and revenge, feelings of brotherhood, 
aggression against strangers on returning home, fundraising for aid organizations in 
Afghanistan, suicide attempts as a spouse and parent, and simultaneous feelings of hate 
and ‘homesickness’ for war. Such stories are destabilizing; they mess up the notions of 
perpetrator and victim, normal and abnormal, and good and evil.
Indeed, violence in general causes discomfort in society and provokes efforts to expel 
this discomfort (Tal 1996, Griffin 2010). War stories are attractive, but only as long as they 
allow us ‘both to feel a sense of our own mortality and to hold that sense at bay’ (Brothers 
1997 cited in Griffin 2010, p. 8). In this sense, violence is tantamount to sex: although most 
of us do not find it wrong by default, it may cause discomfort, and while we are fascinated 
by it, especially by its excesses, we are also repelled by it; in particular, we are repulsed by 
the idea of doing it for a living. As this analogy further suggests, the discomfort invoked by 
violence lies not simply in the fact that it means a physical threat, but also in that it is taboo, 
like in sex, a symbolic threat. Throughout history, many societies have increasingly regarded 
violence as deviant and uncivilized, and since military violence is employed in the name of 
society, its moral status has become highly contentious (Christensen 2008, Griffin 2010, De 
Swaan 2015). As a result, the military operates in the margins of society, where violence is 
to take place, while at the same time it is closely and suspiciously monitored (cf. Bredow 
2006, De Swaan 2015). At the level of representation, the gore of military violence is carefully 
kept out of frame (cf. Griffin 2010, De Swaan 2015), and what is in the frame is ‘cleansed’ 
by romantic justifications (‘hero’) combined with euphemisms (‘use of force’, ‘collateral 
damage’, ‘casualties’) (cf. Christensen 2008).
So to expel the discomfort of violence, it must either be condemned as immoral, or, in 
order to accept it back into the realm of the normal and justifiable, it must be ‘sanitized’. 
This can be done by representing military actions as humanitarian efforts, or conversely, as 
action movie scenes, and the most unnerving actions may be attributed to ‘a few bad apples’. 
Consequently, military conduct can be justified and perhaps even glorified, while at the same 
time, the soldier and his violence are kept at a distance. Again, Shay’s cloak of safety (1994, 
p. 37) forms a helpful metaphor. A cloak of safety allows people to keep right and wrong 
separate from one another and to keep wearing this cloak, people cannot allow unsettling 
complexities to penetrate it.
As argued, morally distressed veterans are no different in this respect. Like any other 
person, it seems, they try to hold onto their cloak of safety. Yet, in many cases it seems as if 
their cloak has been irreparably ruptured by irresolvable moral disorientation. Consequently, 
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they may feel alienated from the prevailing societal perceptions of military practice. In fact, 
they may start telling themselves that civilians are all ‘naïve’, ‘spoiled’ people, who ‘don’t 
understand shit about it anyway’. In this case, they start doing the very thing for which they 
charge public opinion: creating one-dimensional caricatures.
Parallels between Dutchbat and TFU: Societal Misrecognition and (Self-)
Estrangement
As was the case Chapter 7, comparing the stories of the veterans interviewed revealed not only 
differences but also, and above all, striking similarities. To start with the differences, mostly 
the veterans who had experienced distressing situations on deployment related that a sense 
of being misunderstood by the Dutch public had hurt them. The themes of anger, silence, 
moral disorientation, and estrangement from both society and the self emerged mostly in 
their stories. That said, though the veterans without deployment-related distress did not say 
that public misunderstanding had caused them pain, many did express a similar sense of 
being misunderstood by the Dutch public. In line with this, their stories similarly conveyed, 
although to a lesser degree, the themes of anger, silence, disorientation and estrangement.
Comparing Dutchbat and TFU, it became clear that the Dutchbat veterans generally 
reported a stronger sense of frustration and anger in relation to Dutch public perceptions than 
the TFU veterans did. This difference can be related to the fact that overall TFU troops faced less 
harsh criticism than the soldiers of Dutchbat, and TFU troops were also admired. However, the 
same themes of anger, silence, disorientation and estrangement emerged in the stories of both 
groups. In fact, veterans spoke of misunderstanding not only in relation to public criticism, but 
also in response to heroic and other too-positive images. As with public criticism, they regarded 
such images as overly simplistic caricatures. Thus, most veterans interviewed – whether or 
not they had experienced distressing deployment events; whether they were Dutchbat or TFU 
veterans – expressed remarkably similar feelings regarding public perceptions, though it was 
only the veterans with deployment-related distress who spoke about this with pain.
Considering these similarities between veterans despite the different public perceptions, 
one might want to conclude that public factors actually play little or no role in moral distress. 
However, my findings indicate that the issue is more complex. On the one hand, it is possible 
that upon their return home from deployment, veterans will in any case experience a degree 
of anger, silence, disorientation and estrangement vis-à-vis society, regardless of the specific 
public perceptions surrounding their mission. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, studies have shown that a profoundly shocking experience may in itself lead to 
problems in linguistic expression (Scarry 1985, Hull 2002), avoidance behavior (Herman 1967, 
2011) and fears of misunderstanding (Tedeschi and Calhoun 1993), while ‘flesh-witnessing’ 
war may lead to a sense of estrangement from the home society among veterans in general 
(Harari 2008, Sørensen 2015). That being said, the similarities between the experiences 
of Dutchbat and TFU veterans also seem to lie in the fact that the public perceptions of 
their mission shared an essential feature. In both cases, public debates revealed a certain 
discomfort about military practice and therefore created relatively one-dimensional images 
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of the Dutchbat and TFU veterans, thus denying the moral complexity of these veterans’ 
actions and experiences. Below, I reflect on these parallels and their implications for the 
understanding of moral distress.
Both Dutchbat and TFU veterans generally felt understood by their fellow veterans, 
because soldiers ‘speak the same language’ or because ‘words are not even necessary’. Yet, 
communicating and sharing their pain with non-veterans, including family and friends, 
could be extremely difficult. For such interactions, no words were readily at hand, and 
the words that were used did not necessarily mean the same to all interlocutors. To recall 
veterans’ accounts of cheering when seeing a fire blast, using black humor about death, 
suicide attempts, missing war, and so on; what such accounts meant to the veteran in 
question often signified something else to the other person. Consequently, many veterans 
developed both anger and disorientating self-doubt, and became silent and estranged from 
both society and themselves.
In my analysis of how these different experiences and responses related to one another 
and to moral distress, misrecognition emerged as the overarching theme, a term that many 
veterans themselves used also in relation to public perceptions. This misrecognition did not 
mean a lack of admiration – most veterans turned out to find admiration just as problematic 
as criticism – but a kind of misunderstanding. Turning back to existing theory, my analysis led 
me to philosopher Honneth’s conceptualization of misrecognition (see e.g. Honneth 1997, 
2005). As Honneth writes, the significance of recognition lies in the fact that it is about a moral 
relation with others, which may be respected or violated. Misrecognition, then, is a violation 
of one’s moral relation with others. Strikingly, although Honneth is in no way concerned with 
the notion of ‘moral injury’ as developed in the context of deployment-related suffering, 
he uses this exact term several times to describe the result of misrecognition. According 
to him, it is the experience of ‘not being recognized in one’s own self-understanding that 
constitutes the condition for moral injury’, which he described as the awareness of a ‘moral 
injustice’ (Honneth 2005, p. 47). One could say that misrecognition does injustice to a 
person’s experience and thus do moral damage.
As Das argues, to utter ‘I am in pain’ is to make a claim asking for recognition (Das 1996, 
p. 70). However, such a claim is not easily made. Besides the risk of being denied, another 
obstacle is that it can only be made with difficulty outside the prevailing narratives and 
frames of reference of a particular community, which can make it very hard to even articulate 
such a claim (cf. Das 1996). No one is completely free in his choice of words and, particularly, 
in the meaning of those words, because the social environment shapes and limits the 
words and meanings available for one’s experiences. The words may be there, but their 
appropriateness and significance is not up to the individual. The individual has to deal with 
others’ perceptions of what his experiences signify and what kind of person he is, and when 
he feels that these perceptions are distortions, the ‘recognizability’ of his pain and thus its 
‘speakability’ are already problematic beforehand.5
5	 It	seems	worthwhile	to	mention	the	work	of	Butler	(2009)	on	‘recognizability’.	Butler	theorizes	that	people	who	do	not	
conform to particular norms are quickly excluded from the schemes that determine who is regarded a subject worthy of 
grief,	for	instance	in	the	case	of	non-Western	victims	of	US	state	violence.	
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Fussell explains the unspeakability of war experiences as follows. ‘Logically, there is no 
reason why (…) language could not perfectly well render the actuality of (…) warfare: it is rich 
in terms like blood, terror, agony, madness, shit, cruelty, murder, sell-out and hoax, as well as phrases like 
legs blown off, intestines gushing out over his hands, screaming all night, bleeding to death from the rectum, 
and the like’ (1975, pp. 169–170 italics in original). Yet, while we have ‘made unspeakable 
mean indescribable’, it ‘really means nasty’ (1975, p. 170 italics in original). Along the lines 
of Fussell’s argument, my findings indicate that the problem of ‘unspeakability’ is not only 
that words are unavailable but also that words (e.g. ‘I feel guilty’ and ‘I miss war’) are given or 
refused particular meanings. When veterans feel their words are distorted in public debates, 
they may choose to remain silent. As a result, their deployment memories become what Das 
would call ‘poisonous knowledge’ (Das 1996, pp. 84–5): swallowed as poison and hidden in 
the own body, painful and incapable of being shared with society but as such also protected 
from distortion.
Yet, as this metaphor indicates, even if veterans choose to remain silent, misrecognition 
may damage not only their moral relation with others but also how they relate to themselves 
(see also Honneth 1997). In other words, when public perceptions are at odds with veterans’ 
personal experience, this may cause not only a sense of social estrangement, but also 
a disturbed self-understanding. Notably, this does not necessarily mean that veterans 
will completely internalize public perceptions: all the veterans I spoke to felt to a greater 
or lesser extent that prevailing narratives ‘did not match’. Yet, this mismatch can hinder 
veterans in making sense of their experiences, as that would have to happen outside existent 
representations. This, in turn, may amplify or possibly even cause feelings of self-doubt and 
moral disorientation. Accordingly, veterans’ sense of social estrangement, which can be 
defined as feeling cut off from society and lacking a sense of belonging, may also contribute 
to a sense of self-estrangement, that is, to a feeling of being removed from oneself. Indeed, 
the self is always embedded in society. Society offers its members a moral framework of 
values and norms, and thus, when one becomes a stranger to society, one may also become 
a stranger to oneself.
Conclusion
This chapter showed that not only veterans may struggle with the moral significance of 
military intervention, but society as well. It seems that the more society experiences a violent 
event as unsettling, the more it feels compelled to lock up the event in neatly closed ‘wrong’ 
and ‘right’ boxes. In this process, categories such as hero, victim and perpetrator may emerge. 
A hero has only used force against evil enemies and in defense of the innocent. A victim is a 
survivor whose potential self-blame is noble but inappropriate, and a perpetrator is simply 
a criminal and a sinner, who, depending on one’s ideological perspective, is a bad apple 
unrepresentative of the military or a typical soldier. Although creating such categories may 
resolve societal discomfort with military intervention, it does so by denying the existence of 
human fragility, complexity and conflict.
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Interestingly, the concept of moral injury itself seems to have become something 
unsettling, as indicated for instance in the concern raised by a Dutch military psychiatrist 
regarding the concept’s potential connotations of immorality. In the US, similar concerns 
can be heard. At an annual conference on combat stress in the United States, a Marine 
commander said he was ‘insulted’ by the term ‘moral injury’, because it would imply that 
soldiers’ problems are a result of unethical conduct (McCloskey 2011). In fact, to avoid this 
connotation, the US Marines Corps now employ the euphemistic term ‘inner conflict’ instead 
(Nash and Litz 2013, p. 368). Responses like these underscore that the concept of moral injury 
has the potential to reveal moral complexities that would otherwise remain unseen, and 
that such moral complexities arouse discomfort.
 As I have made clear, societal discomfort with military intervention may have important 
implications for veterans’ moral relation to both society and themselves. As is the case for 
all human beings, veterans depend on the shared narratives of society for the development 
of their life stories and ‘the moral’ of these stories. Therefore, when they feel that public 
narratives misrecognize their experience, this process may be distorted. Even when veterans 
reject rather than internalize these narratives, misrecognition is not without personal 
consequences. For one, public narratives may still influence the ways in which soldiers 
are sent on a mission and perceived afterwards. What is more, even without leading to 
internalization, public narratives may still hamper veterans’ self-understanding. As Chapter 
6 showed, it is difficult in itself to make sense of experiences for which there are no words, 
such as feeling guilt and non-guilt at the same time, and problematic public narratives will 
only add to this difficulty. Ultimately, problematic public narratives can contribute to a sense 
that the veteran has, quite literally, lost himself to his deployment.
Part Three  
Conclusions
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Part III. Conclusions: Theoretical and Practical Implications
 
In the final two chapters of this dissertation, I discuss the implications of my findings. In 
Chapter 9, I answer the research questions posed in the Introduction, summarizing the major 
findings and turning these into a refined conceptualization of moral injury. Also, I reflect 
on the broader theoretical contributions of this study and propose possible directions for 
future research. In Chapter 10, I discuss, in depth, this study’s implications for the individual, 
military, political and societal level.
9
Chapter 9. Conclusions: Theoretical Implications
The aim of this study was to advance the empirical and theoretical understanding of moral, 
political and societal dimensions of deployment-related moral distress, and thus contribute 
to the concept of moral injury and practical interventions to address and prevent moral 
distress. I achieved this by examining moral dimensions of experiences of distress, and the 
role of political practices and public perceptions in experiences of moral distress in Dutchbat 
and TFU veterans. In this chapter, I take stock of my findings, and discuss their implications 
for the concept of moral injury.
 
Main Research Findings
 
In order to be able to contribute to moral injury theory, I took a critical stance to the current 
concept of moral injury and any conceptualization of deployment-related suffering. To begin 
with, I explicitly distinguished between the concept and phenomena of moral injury (calling 
the first ‘moral injury’ and the second ‘moral distress’), thus refraining from reifying ‘moral 
injury’ as an objective thing. I found that although the concept of moral injury is explicitly 
intended to address moral aspects that the concept of PTSD fails to grasp, it focuses mainly 
on the ‘injury’ while attending too little to the ‘moral’. Also, as with the PTSD concept, it 
overlooks the wider context of deployment-related suffering. As my research focus, therefore, 
I chose the to-date insufficiently addressed moral and sociopolitical dimensions of moral 
distress, to advance the concept of moral injury.
In terms of research strategy, I adopted a qualitative, grounded theory approach, 
enabling me to inductively study phenomena about which existing theory is limited. My 
case studies focused not just on combat – the current focus of moral injury research – 
but also on peacekeeping. Specifically, I analyzed the Dutchbat and TFU missions, a ‘blue 
helmet’ UN peacekeeping mission met with harsh public criticism and a ‘green helmet’ 
NATO counterinsurgency mission that encountered mixed public response. I did not select 
a sample of veterans who matched the symptoms defined in the current concept of moral 
injury, but went for a more open, unspecified selection of veterans, including veterans with 
minor or no psychological problems at all. Finally, in analyzing the case studies, I went 
beyond the predominantly psychological perspective of the current concept of moral injury, 
and adopted a combination of psychological, philosophical, anthropological and political 
scientific perspectives. Together, this allowed me to examine experiences that overspill the 
boundaries of the current concept of moral injury and explore other than psychological 
interpretations for the experiences.
Taking the stories of 40 Dutchbat and 40 TFU veterans as starting points, I examined 
moral dimensions of experiences of distress, and the role of political practices and public 
perceptions in experiences of moral distress, during and after deployment. The veterans’ 
related their reasons for joining the military, their expectations of deployment, the reality of 
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deployment, their experience of returning home, the distress that some developed, and how 
they responded to this distress. It became clear that when veterans struggled, their struggles 
were never confined to deployment, but also lay in the problems of resuming civilian life. 
Specifically, many veterans related a post-deployment spiral of guilt and anger, leading to 
destructive and neglecting behavior toward themselves and their loved ones, increasing 
their guilt and anger, and so on. While each of the stories I heard proved to be unique, 
together they revealed insights into more than just the variety of veterans’ experiences. 
They also showed patterns. These patterns included many parallels between the stories of 
Dutchbat and TFU veterans as well as between the stories of distressed and non-distressed 
veterans, while the differences between these groups turned out to be largely gradual, 
not fundamental. I analyzed the patterns and differences I found with the help of existing 
theory on trauma, morality and sociopolitical aspects of mental suffering, and information 
about the sociopolitical characteristics of the Dutchbat and TFU mission, which generated 
insights into how veterans’ stories related to their wider context. Chapters 5 to 8 presented 
my findings.
In Chapter 5, I focused on the stories of veterans who reported no or hardly any 
deployment-related distress, as well as on the ‘pre-distress’ memories of veterans who did 
eventually develop distress (both of which turned out to be very similar). Analyzing the 
stories, I tried to understand how soldiers perceive their profession in the first place and 
what cognitive strategies they tend to use to cope with moral challenges during and after 
deployment. This, in order to better understand why and when moral distress does arise. 
The interviewed veterans’ accounts indicated that moral challenges often emerge in both 
‘blue’ and ‘green’ operations. Also, their accounts showed that while the specific content 
of the cognitive strategies that soldiers use for moral challenges may vary, in essence they 
are remarkably similar. When experiencing moral tension, soldiers seem inclined, at least 
initially, to employ justifying simplifications to resolve the tension, relying on the belief 
that all situations are ultimately uncomplicated and soluble. For instance, faced with moral 
challenges on deployment, they may tell themselves that ‘some things just happen in war’, or 
they may employ formulas such as ‘I just have to follow orders’, ‘it was him or me’ or ‘I treat 
them as they treat me’. Also, to resolve possible tensions arising from being both a soldier 
and a civilian, they may compartmentalize their military and civilian selves, prioritizing 
the former in military contexts and allowing the latter to supersede in others. The veterans’ 
stories showed that soldiers may interpret the compartmentalization they employ, of which 
they are often aware, as the necessary burden required by their profession, which allowed 
them to interpret soldiering as morally right not in spite of the fact that they are civilians too, 
but because of it. 
Simplification and compartmentalization appeared in virtually all veterans’ stories, 
distressed or not. Yet, the stories showed that these strategies can fail. In Chapter 6, I 
examined the specific moral dimension of moral distress, honing in on the stories of 
veterans who reported moral distress. In examining this dimension, it became evident 
that the moral complexity of particular quandaries cannot always be simplified and that 
particular actions cannot always be unequivocally justified or excused. These actions were 
condemned. Yet, just as veterans were unable to unequivocally justify or excuse these actions, 
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they usually could not unequivocally condemn them. When the interviewed veterans related 
morally distressing experiences, their stories spoke of value conflicts in which adhering 
to one value inevitably means violating another, of moral detachment resulting from the 
overwhelming significance of a situation, and of senselessness. These situations did not 
involve straightforward moral transgressions (the focus of current studies on ‘moral injury’), 
and thus do not allow clear-cut interpretations (which soldiers tend to employ). While many 
veterans blamed themselves or others for these situations, they often felt uncertainty 
and conflict with respect to judgments. That is, besides guilt, shame and anger, morally 
distressing events often engendered a profound sense of moral disorientation. Many veterans 
lost their trust not only in the goodness of both themselves and the world, but also in the 
very notion of good and bad. This painful loss forced them to engage in an ethical struggle 
against previous moral expectations and beliefs, in the attempt to resolve the arising moral 
questions and find moral re-orientation again.
Besides moral distress at the individual level, I examined the role of political practices 
in moral distress in Chapter 7. Specifically, I examined whether and how political decision-
making and framing surrounding military missions contributes to the emergence of 
particular morally distressing experiences for soldiers ‘on the ground’, both during and after 
deployment. While virtually all the interviewed veterans spoke about how political practices 
had adversely affected their deployment, it was the veterans who related facing disturbing 
situations due to political practices who spoke about how political failures had wrapped 
their mission in pain. Remarkably, although the Dutchbat mission was a peace mission 
while TFU’s mission was a counterinsurgency mission involving combat, comparing their 
stories revealed striking similarities. Both groups related similar themes of powerlessness, 
senselessness and abandonment both during and after their mission. Further analysis showed 
that these similarities were related to the fact that on the political level, too, the missions 
had far more in common than expected. To be sure, compared to the Dutchbat mission, the 
TFU mission had a clearer mandate, more resources available and an improved mental health 
care system. However, at a more fundamental level, the two missions were characterized by 
similar unresolved conflicts, including discrepancies in the why (overarching purpose), what 
(objectives) and how (resources and possibilities) of the mission, ambiguity regarding the 
why, what and how of the mission, discrepancies between soldiers’ operational experience 
and political narratives, and lack of political acknowledgment of such issues and thus 
of the role of political practices in distressing experiences. As became evident, political 
compromises do not always mean that problems are solved. On the contrary, rather than 
achieving true reconciliation of conflicting views and interests, compromises may mean that 
conflicts are left to lower levels to deal with. As a result, veterans’ stories showed, soldiers 
may develop profound feelings of political betrayal and, in turn, seek symbolic and material 
reparations from the political leadership, for instance by filing a lawsuit against the state to 
enforce apologies and compensation.
Finally, in Chapter 8, I examined the role of public perceptions of military missions 
and the military in general in experiences of moral distress. Dutchbat veterans faced harsh 
criticism, while the TFU mission evoked both negative and positive reactions. Despite the 
different public responses, the two groups had striking parallels, as was the case with respect 
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to political practices. While the Dutchbat veterans interviewed generally reported a stronger 
sense of frustration about Dutch public perceptions than the TFU veterans did, both groups 
spoke of anger, silence, disorientation and estrangement in relation to the Dutch public. My 
findings showed that veterans perceived both public criticism and admiration as simplistic 
distortions that did injustice to their deployment experience. The greater the distress with 
which veterans struggled due to their deployment experiences, the more they were usually 
affected by public perceptions. While their experience may in part be explained in terms of 
misguided fears and judgments on their part, it also turned out that in both missions public 
narratives did indeed convey rather one-dimensional images of perpetrator and victim, 
normal and abnormal, and good and evil, which stood in stark contrast to veterans’ personal 
experience. Many veterans experienced this one-dimensionality as societal misrecognition 
of their deployment experiences, which particularly affected the veterans struggling with 
their experiences, leading to a sense of estrangement among them. In fact, this experience 
of societal misrecognition often engendered not only a sense of estrangement from society, 
but also from themselves.
Refining the Concept of Moral Injury
Drawing my research findings together and juxtaposing them with the current concept of 
moral injury, the following conclusions emerge (see Table 4). In line with the current concept 
(Litz et al. 2009, 2015, Nash and Litz 2013), my findings indicate that the feelings of guilt, shame 
and anger with which veterans may struggle require an approach that takes these feelings 
seriously. Veterans’ moral emotions and judgments cannot simply be lumped together under 
the umbrella of subjective experience, if only because they may need different responses. The 
veteran who blames himself for having survived an attack while his colleague died might be 
helped most by having his thoughts challenged and his feelings of guilt alleviated, whereas 
the veteran who feels guilt for having actively hurt other people may instead find meaning 
most in having his sense of accountability confirmed and self-forgiveness. In other words, 
veterans’ moral distress should not be readily explained away as misguided, but requires 
considering their moral judgments and emotions as possibly appropriate. This is in line with 
the current moral injury concept.
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Table 4: The Current and a Refined Conceptualization of ‘Moral Injury’ 
Current
concept Refined Concept
Individual 
level
Individual
level
  Political
  context
    Societal 
    Context
Moral 
beliefs
Coherent 
system
Complex constellation with potentially competing beliefs
Morally 
injurious 
event(s)
Moral 
transgression
and/or
Perceived moral 
failure
Perceived political violations of trust 
and dependency
Perceived
societal 
misrecognition
Moral injury Blame of self 
and/or	others
                                and/or
                            ° Tragic remorse
                            ° Moral disorientation
                            ° Sense of betrayal
                            ° Estrangement of self and others
Responses
Self-
handicapping 
behaviors, 
self-injury
and/or
Ethical
struggle
Seeking political
reparation
 Seeking societal
 recognition
Factors
° The event
° Belief in the 
self and world 
as good and 
meaningful
and /or
°  Belief in the self and 
world as logical, 
coherent and fair
°		More	specific	beliefs,	
e.g. ‘can-do’
°  Discrepancies between the why, 
what	and/or	how	of	the	mission
°  Ambiguity regarding the why, what 
and/or	how	of	the	mission
°  Discrepancies between political 
narratives and operational reality
°  Lack of political acknowledgment 
of aforementioned issues 
°  Black-and-
white narratives 
(perpetrator;	
hero;	victim)
Yet, my study also yielded insights different than found in other research on moral injury. 
Confirming existent philosophical and social scientific theory on morality, it showed that a 
person’s moral beliefs are not a coherent system, as the current concept of moral injury implies, 
but a complex constellation. Soldiers are both instrument and agent, civilian and soldier, 
and their multiple roles come with potentially competing moral requirements. My research 
showed that while soldiers are generally able to resolve minor conflicts between competing 
moral requirements by means of strategies of simplification and compartmentalization, 
these strategies may fail in the case of more severe conflicts, with particular implications. 
My findings demonstrated that ‘morally injurious’ situations may involve more ambiguous 
and ambivalent experiences than unequivocal transgression, which, moreover, may have 
important sociopolitical aspects. I often found that veterans paradoxically feel both guilty 
and non-guilty, both responsible for their own acts and betrayed by the political leadership, 
both misrecognized by societal simplifications and rightly judged by society for their 
actions. Fundamentally, they may feel they failed morally but at the same time develop the 
sense that their moral beliefs and expectations failed them. As is the case for unequivocal 
emotions and judgments, paradoxical feelings cannot be readily interpreted as misguided. 
Rather, they should be understood as the result of the moral complexity of the situations 
veterans encountered.
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In line with this moral complexity, my findings showed that moral distress may involve more 
than the guilt, shame and anger emphasized in the current concept of moral injury. Veterans 
may also experience the complex emotion of tragic-remorse, which is remorse about the fact 
that the morally best option in this situation was merely the lesser evil, and they may feel moral 
disorientation, which is the loss of previous certainties about wrong and right, thus a loss of 
the moral frame of reference and perhaps also of the moral self-perception. In addition, when 
veterans perceive distressing experiences as partially caused by the wrongdoing of others, they 
may develop a sense of betrayal, including violated trust and dependency. Perceived societal 
misrecognition of the experiences with which they struggle, moreover, may engender anger 
while at the same time amplifying or even causing self-doubt. In turn, veterans may develop a 
sense of estrangement from both society and themselves, involving both the feeling of being 
cut off from society and the sense of being removed from oneself. 
Such experiences may provoke a variety of behavioral responses. As indicated in 
existing research on moral injury, this includes self-handicapping and self-injury behavior 
(Frankfurt and Frazier 2016). Additionally, my research showed that veterans may engage in 
an ethical struggle with previous moral expectations and beliefs. And they may seek political 
reparation, demanding political amends and financial or symbolic compensation. Further, 
they may seek societal recognition, specifically societal justice for their experiences.
Regarding types of potentially morally distressing events, the current concept of moral 
injury acknowledges that not just acts of commission (e.g. killing) but acts of omission 
(failing to prevent human suffering) may also engender moral distress. Nevertheless, the 
literature on moral injury focuses almost exclusively on conventional war and combat 
situations, particularly the impact of killing (see e.g. Bica 1999, Litz et al. 2009, Drescher et 
al. 2011, Brock and Lettini 2012). In the two missions I examined, however, by far the most 
reported distressing experience was not active infliction of harm, but inability to act in the 
face of human suffering. The potential of non-action being morally distressing, thus, should 
also be taken into account.
With respect to factors other than the event, the current concept of moral injury points 
to the basic human assumption that the self and the world are good and meaningful (Litz et 
al. 2009, Nash and Litz 2013). My findings indicated that beliefs about the self and the world 
as logical, coherent and fair may also play an important role in moral distress, potentially 
engendering profound moral disorientation when veterans are confronted by events that 
testify that the self and the world are utterly illogical, incoherent and unfair. The same goes 
for other beliefs, such as the military ‘can-do’ attitude which considers doubts, conflict and 
uncertainty bad things.
Besides personal beliefs, my research indicated, contextual factors such as political 
practices and public perceptions often play an important role in moral distress. While 
I described veterans’ experience in terms of perceived political betrayal and societal 
misrecognition, I also maintain that these themes are more than a matter of subjective 
experience. This is in line with epistemological foundations of this study, which involve an 
approach to human experience in terms of meaning-making processes while appreciating 
that people’s experiences are not just intra-psychic processes but also informed by contextual 
factors. Building on these crucial insights, I analyzed veterans’ stories in relation to existing 
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literature on the Dutchbat and TFU missions, and this led me to argue that just as veterans’ 
own agency in their suffering should be considered, the role of sociopolitical factors should 
be taken seriously.
Regarding political factors, it became clear that as political decisions and narratives move 
down the chain of command, they affect soldiers at the micro-level. While conventional ‘green 
helmet’ war operations increase the risk of soldiers developing moral distress because of their 
active use of violence, ‘blue helmet’ peace operations increase the risk of moral distress related 
to failure to act. Most importantly, perhaps, is the extent to which a mission’s character matches 
or conflicts with operational reality. The Dutchbat mission, for instance, was a peacekeeping 
operation to a war area where there was little peace to keep, and consequently created morally 
critical situations for Dutchbat soldiers on a daily basis. In relation to this, the specific ways 
in which competing political and public perspectives and interests surrounding a mission are 
dealt with are relevant. For instance, if restrictions are imposed on a ‘green helmet’ mission 
in response to political and public objections, as was the case in the TFU mission, soldiers can 
feel helpless in the same way that ‘blue helmet’ peacekeepers can feel. The other way around, if 
soldiers are asked to use robust force in a mission that is supposed to center on humanitarian 
acts, they may come to regret their actions in retrospect. Generally, discrepancies and 
ambiguities in the why, what and how of a mission, and lack of political acknowledgment of 
such discrepancies and ambiguities seem to increase the risk of soldiers developing feelings of 
guilt, shame, moral disorientation and betrayal. Today’s military interventions often involve 
many parties besides the national government, including international actors, parliament 
and the public, resulting in conflicts and compromises. Consequently, my findings suggest, 
many present-day missions are likely to have moral distress-inducing problems of discrepancy, 
ambiguity and lack of political acknowledgment.
In addition to political practices, societal perceptions may play a role in moral distress. 
While it may come as no surprise that public criticism can adversely affect veterans, my 
findings showed that overly sympathetic representations, too, can contribute to the 
emergence or persistence of moral distress, because they turn veterans into a caricature. 
Images of hero, perpetrator and victim all deny agency and responsibility on the side of either 
the veteran or others, and in doing so more generally misrecognize the moral complexity 
of what veterans did and failed to during their deployment. As such, these images imply a 
certain misrecognition that does injustice to veterans’ experience and hinders their making 
sense of their experiences. In many present-day societies, public discomfort with military 
intervention and related orderly images of hero, perpetrator and victim can be signaled. In 
some societies, images of perpetrator and victim might be most prevalent, while in others 
the image of hero is dominant, but their shared one-dimensional character will in all cases 
contribute to experiences of misrecognition among veterans.
As a final remark, it is worth explicating that morally distressed veterans are not just passive 
recipients of sociopolitical forces, but also active agents demanding political reparations and 
searching for societal recognition. In fact, it seems that the individual, political and societal 
levels continuously exert reciprocal influences on one another. Therefore, although Table 4 
shows these levels in distinct columns for reasons of legibility, they might also be imagined 
as different angles of one triangle.
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Moral Injury as a Manifestation of Latent Tensions
 
Although this study focused on personal suffering, it is also insightful in a more general 
sense. As a study of mental ‘breakdowns’, it not only shed light on the breakdowns 
themselves, but also made manifest underlying structural tensions and vulnerabilities that 
normally remain hidden. To draw on Freud’s crystal metaphor, ‘[i]f a crystal is thrown to the 
ground, it will break into pieces, not in a random way, but according to specific fault-lines 
which, although they are invisible, have been predetermined by the structure of the crystal’ 
(Freud cited in Corveleyn 2009, p. 87). By investigating the crystal pieces of moral distress, 
this study offered insight into both sociopolitical fault-lines of military practice and fault-
lines of the human psyche. That is, it made manifest moral tensions that military practice 
and its sociopolitical aspects poses to all soldiers, whether or not they develop distress as a 
result of these tensions, and offered insight into basic vulnerabilities to moral distress that 
most people seem to have in common, whether or not they are soldiers.
Specifically, this study indicated that military practice almost inevitably comes with 
tensions between being both a human agent and a political instrument, and both a civilian and 
a soldier. Also, it showed that specific political practices and public perceptions may aggravate 
these tensions. Conflicting political interests may result in compromises that pass the conflicts 
to the ground level, and public sensitivities may engender distorting simplifications of soldiers’ 
conduct in a mission. Such simplifications, in turn, may encourage the creation of problematic 
political compromises, and vice versa. At the same time, these processes tend to conceal 
themselves. Political compromises pass conflicts to lower levels in a way that simultaneously 
obscures this fact, and societal simplifications at once distort soldiers’ own stories and 
render them unrecognizable. Consequently, the role of political compromises and societal 
simplifications in soldiers’ well-being tends to stay out of the picture. At least in part, this 
problem is just as inevitable as the issue of soldiers having to incorporate the multiple roles of 
instrument/agent and civilian/soldiers. Political leaders will always have to negotiate between 
what is best for their troops and other important interests, while it is usually impossible to 
determine in advance the specificities of a mission. Military missions will therefore always be 
characterized by conflict and a degree of unclarity and ambiguity. Also, it seems, the public will 
always try to keep the specter of war at bay. Like soldiers, the political leadership and society at 
large will always have to deal with moral challenges related to military intervention.
This brings me to the point that people generally seem vulnerable to moral distress. As 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, most people hold the unarticulated belief that the world makes 
sense and has a certain order and fairness to it, even when they simultaneously know on 
another level that this is not always the case (see also Ewing 1990, Janoff-Bulman 1992, Cohen 
2001). Although this belief seems particularly strong among soldiers, whom the military 
has taught to rely on a ‘can-do’ attitude, it is something that most people have in common, 
soldiers and civilians alike. In most people’s lives, this belief will be violated many times. It 
seems safe to assume, then, that some degree of moral disorientation and moral distress, 
rather than a condition that befalls only an unfortunate few soldiers is something that many 
people will experience in their lives. Indeed, as suggested before, moral distress is most 
accurately represented not as a yes/no dichotomy but as a continuum ranging from relatively 
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mild, temporary feelings of guilt and anger to a profoundly destructive spiral of negative moral 
emotions. That said, moral distress also clearly has a fundamental aspect. In the case of everyday 
moral conflict, people will often successfully use simplifications and justifications without 
even being aware of it. But major moral conflicts, instead, may reveal the utter illusion of such 
coping strategies and give rise to moral distress. In other words, it makes a huge difference 
whether the aforementioned crystal is scratched but in one piece, or fractured beyond repair.
 
Moral Injury and PTSD
How do the findings of this study relate to PTSD theory? In the course of my research, many 
people asked me this question. Specifically, I have often been asked precisely how moral 
injury overlaps with and differs from PTSD, and whether particular cases are PTSD or moral 
injury. Yet, questions like these are not as simple as they seem. As made clear throughout 
this study, ‘PTSD’ and ‘moral injury’ are not distinct entities to be unraveled by science, 
but abstract creations of science. As conceptual lenses, they focus on particular elements 
of mental suffering while analyzing them from particular perspectives, with particular 
implications, which may change over time. Hence, this study cannot provide a single ‘right’ 
answer to questions such as those mentioned above. In fact, it showed that such questions 
are not always the most useful, as they tend to reify the concepts of moral injury and PTSD.
However, what this study does offer is several considerations for how to understand and 
approach deployment-related suffering. First, it showed that the non-moral medical approach 
of the current concept of PTSD is flawed. Specifically, it confirmed existing research on ‘moral 
injury’ arguing that deployment-related suffering may not always be characterized by events 
of life-threat and fear-related symptoms (focus of much current PTSD research), but also by 
moral conflict and moral conflict-related emotions, which should not readily be labeled the 
result of ‘distorted cognitions’ (as in the current DSM classification of PTSD), but considered as 
possibly appropriate. Moreover, this study showed that deployment-related suffering should be 
understood not only in terms of mental illness, but also as an ethical struggle, and not only as a 
disorder in the mind of the veteran, but also as a manifestation of political and societal disorder. 
Together, these insights indicate that while concepts such as ‘PTSD’ are helpful for the 
understanding of deployment-related suffering, veterans’ distress should not be encapsulated 
in a strictly psychiatric lexicon, if only because its salience exceeds the scope of what has 
been called mental disorder. This is not just a theoretical issue but also has very practical 
implications. On the one hand, this study showed, the medicalization of deployment-related 
suffering into a mental health issue enables veterans to receive judicial, political and societal 
recognition for their distress. On the other hand, if ‘moral injury’ is medicalized in this way, 
it will be disconnected from its political and societal context in other ways, as political and 
societal problems will be redefined as individual mental health problems. Considering that 
research on ‘PTSD’ originally contained political critique but soon became dominated by a 
non-moral, non-political medical discourse (Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2013), such a future 
for ‘moral injury’ is particularly conceivable.
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The Study in a Wider Context
This study may also have some insights to contribute to other lines of research. First, it may 
be relevant to research on moral responsibility and blame. Recent philosophical works on 
these issues emphasize that responsibility and blame are to be understood by reference 
to the moral emotions that people’s actions provoke in themselves and others (Eshleman 
2016). At the same time, it is debated whether there can be responsibility without blame 
(Pickard 2017, Brandenburg 2018). This study offers insight into the emotional dimension 
of this question. As shown, people may feel they are guilty and non-guilty at the same time 
for their actions, and accordingly may perceive neither straightforward condemnation nor 
exemption as appropriate responses, but rather interpretations in terms of ‘non-culpable 
guilt’ or ‘non-blameworthy responsibility’. Paradoxical utterances like these may make 
sense given the moral complexity of a situation, and in such situations should be understood 
as genuine rather than that only one of two conflicting statements is acknowledged as 
truly expressive of a person’s experience. On the emotional level, it thus seems, there can 
certainly be responsibility without blame. Yet, as this study also showed, people tend to find 
(ostensible) paradoxes illogical and discomforting. Researchers are people, too. Therefore, 
researchers should be particularly aware of potential tendencies in themselves to readily 
approach contradictions in research data as ‘kinks’ that need to be ironed out. When taking 
contradictions and other inconsistencies in people’s stories seriously, it becomes possible to 
illuminate aspects of people’s experience that might otherwise be set aside.
Second, to move the sociopolitical level, this study may be relevant to conflict studies. 
In recent decades, research on military and humanitarian intervention has directed 
increasing attention to post-conflict measures, particularly to reconciliation by material 
compensation and apologies, for instance (Kriesberg 2016). Also, research on non-violent 
social conflict has focused on the calls for recognition and reparations heard from a variety 
of emancipatory social movements today (O’Neill and Smith 2012). This study sheds light 
on the impact of experiences of injustice and the resulting need for acknowledgment and 
correction, and supports the idea that recognition and reparations are important to help 
people who feel wronged move forward. In line with this, it supports the contention that 
interventions focusing on recognition and reparations may foster reconciliation and 
conflict transformation. At the same time, this study perhaps also offers a warning against 
implementing interventions as mere means to the end of stability and peace. For apologies 
and compensation to be effective – that is, to promote reconciliation rather than reinforce a 
relation of enmity – it seems that their recipients need to experience them as genuine.
Finally, on a fundamental epistemological level, this study offers both researchers and 
mental health professionals relevant considerations concerning the approach to people’s 
personal realities. While it is important to critically examine and challenge the ways people 
construe and give meaning to the world, it is equally important not to reduce their realities 
to ‘merely a matter of interpretation’. To be able to make a distinction between, for instance, 
survivor guilt and feeling guilty over having actively hurt others, one cannot indiscriminately 
approach all realities as mere variations of subjectivity. This is not to deny that people’s 
realities are always shaped by individual and collective beliefs and assumptions, as for 
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instance cognitive psychology and social constructionism correctly emphasize, but to assert 
that one cannot stop there. As crucial as it is to unpack people’s realities as cognitive models 
or social constructions, it is also important to critically consider the relative appropriateness 
of these models and constructions in relation to intersubjective realities.
Limitations and Future Directions
In the following, final chapter of this study, I discuss and consider in detail the practical 
implications of my findings. Before doing so, here I discuss my study’s main limitations 
and propose several directions for further research. In particular, the scope of this study 
is relatively limited. I focused on Dutch veterans of only two missions, and the striking 
similarities between the two led me to focus on the features they had in common rather 
than their differences. Furthermore, I focused only on the role of sociopolitical factors in 
moral distress and not, for instance, on organizational factors or personal characteristics. 
Although my aim was to take a descriptive, not normative approach, this focus inevitably 
had normative implications. While I tried to approach sociopolitical factors as ‘simply’ a 
context that shapes soldiers’ and veterans’ experiences and as such may play a role in the 
development of moral distress, doing so meant that I drew all attention to these factors 
while keeping the focus away from the role of other factors in moral distress. Finally, also 
with respect to sociopolitical factors this study has been incomplete, as I did not disentangle 
different levels and types of political practices and public perceptions.
Consequently, there are several relevant issues that I have not been able to address in 
this study. In addition, questions have emerged as a result of this study. In what follows, let 
me discuss these issues and questions as directions for future research. A first suggestion is 
to conduct further research on moral, political and societal dimensions of moral distress, 
including statistical and longitudinal research to zoom in on factors and relations discussed 
in this study. Also, it would be valuable to conduct further case study research comparing 
several types of conflict, interventions, national militaries, and populations in terms of 
religion, ethnicity and gender. As stated before, current research on ‘moral injury’ focuses 
mainly on clinical questions of diagnostics and treatment and leave contextual factors 
largely unaddressed. Consequently, the concept risks turning into a purely psychiatric 
category strictly focused on the individual. This particularly warrants further research on 
moral, political and societal aspects.
Second, it is worthwhile to examine the role of factors other than sociopolitical ones 
in moral injury such as personal characteristics and military organizational factors. Since 
personal characteristics are already examined in clinical studies (Frankfurt and Frazier 
2016, Jinkerson 2017), let me briefly explain the relevance of focusing on the military. On 
the one hand, the military’s intensive rites of passage and family-like structures make it a 
loyal ‘brotherhood’, while on the other, it is a biopolitical institution that has to maintain 
soldiers’ health only to put them in health-threatening situations. These complex, partially 
paradoxical dynamics warrant investigation into the specific military context of moral 
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distress, at the level of both military units and the military institution at large. It would be 
interesting to consider not only how dominant structures shape and constrain soldiers’ 
agency, but also how soldiers respond to them.
Third, research on appropriate interventions for moral distress will be valuable. Since 
the factors shaping moral distress lie at different levels, solutions should also be sought at 
different levels. At the same time, ill-considered interventions may be counterproductive. 
As argued in the previous chapter, for instance, interventions that attempt to impose a 
justifying sense of purpose on soldiers do not so much prevent moral distress as increase the 
chance that soldiers do things that they will later come to regret and retrospectively develop 
‘puppet show’ experiences. Therefore, careful research into the question of interventions for 
moral distress seems needed.
Fourth, it would be insightful to examine the issue of moral distress among non-military 
populations. Two examples are police officers and hospital personnel. Like soldiers, these 
professionals are likely to face life-and-death situations in which their actions have major 
consequences, while at the same time, they depend heavily on decisions made at higher 
levels and are relatively often the topic of public debate. Besides certain professions, it would 
be interesting to focus on communities such as churches and sport clubs, both to examine 
feelings of guilt and shame and experiences of betrayal by the community.
Fifth, I encourage research on moral distress in the context of conflict resolution and 
transformation. I have mentioned that genuineness seems crucial for effective intervention 
in recognition and reparations. At the same time, my research also showed that morally 
distressed individuals may get stuck in feelings of victimhood and anger, especially 
when victimhood has come to define their identity. With this in mind, I hypothesize that 
initiatives in recognition and reparations may in some circumstances reproduce dynamics 
of conflict rather than stimulate resolution and reconciliation. Questions like these seem 
worth examining.Finally, and in relation to the previous suggestions, further critical research into the 
concept of moral injury is warranted. Specifically, it would be interesting to critically examine the causes and implications of the concept’s current popularity. Besides positive implications, such as the potential to address moral issues and contextual factors, the concept undoubtedly will have undesirable consequences, especially when it gains the appearance of something that can only be cheered for. As mentioned, for instance, ill-considered interventions to combat moral distress may turn out to be counterproductive. Potential consequences like these demand continuous critical examination of the concept of moral injury. 
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Chapter 10. Practical Implications
 
What do the findings of this study imply for practice? Given the nature of the research 
topic – moral distress – I found this question particularly important, deserving thorough 
deliberation. This involved identifying the main implications for the individual, military, 
political and societal levels, followed by a new search for relevant literature, in line with 
the grounded theory approach of this study. Eventually, a variety of considerations and 
suggestions emerged. This chapter is devoted to discussing these, moving from the individual 
level to the military, political and societal levels
 
The Individual and Interpersonal Level
Beginning at the individual and interpersonal level, the following implications pertain to 
morally distressed veterans, therapists, religious/spiritual counselors, colleagues, family 
members, friends and other individuals. The considerations and suggestions concern the 
value of focusing on guilt and blame, addressing shattered assumptions, developing a more 
elaborate moral vocabulary, and encouraging both introspection and ‘extrospection’.
Guilt and Blame
One of the key insights resulting from this study’s findings is that moral distress is inherently 
tied to moral questions of guilt, shame and blame, questions that need to be taken seriously. 
Litz and his colleagues have also made this point, but given that therapists are ‘often too 
eager to relieve guilt, and, thereby, undermine the patient’s need to feel remorseful’ (2009, 
p. 703), it seems an important one to underscore. As Litz and colleagues argue, morally 
distressed veterans should be able to speak about the event without it being excused and 
thus without it being invalidated. In relation to this, self-forgiveness can be an important 
step toward healing from moral distress (Litz et al. 2009, Nash and Litz 2013). My research 
suggests, moreover, that such space for moral judgments and forgiveness is also valuable in 
cases of perceived betrayal and anger, when blame is directed toward others. For instance, 
my research points to veterans’ felt need for genuine remorse and genuine efforts of 
reparation on the part of the political leadership, in order to restore a violated moral relation 
of dependency and trust.
At the same time, my findings indicate that when veterans keep feeling that they or 
others fail in correcting the injustice done, they remain unable to grant themselves or 
others forgiveness. This brings me to Lifton’s work on military trauma (1973), in which he 
distinguishes between ‘static guilt’ and ‘animating guilt’. Static guilt, Lifton claims, is an 
unproductive kind of guilt, often felt at only the unconscious level. It brings the veteran no 
further, leaving him stuck in a spiral of guilt, shame and anger, and in feeling unworthy 
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of good things to happen. Static guilt means that the veteran keeps focusing on perceived 
guilt and cannot envision himself beyond that guilt. Animating guilt, in contrast, involves 
an ‘active imagery of possibility beyond the guilt itself’ and ‘bringing oneself to life around 
one’s guilt’ (Lifton 1973, p. 127). It entails an interaction between blaming oneself and having 
a vision of a future where this may no longer be necessary. For this reason, Lifton argues, 
animating guilt is the kind that can foster healing. Following Lifton, a similar distinction 
might be made between static blame and animating blame. In the case of static blame, the 
veteran remains stuck in anger against those who hurt him and perhaps also in ever-failing 
attempts to make the wrong-doers correct their wrongs. Animating blame, in contrast, 
involves anger about the injustice done by others in combination with an imagery of a life 
beyond a preoccupation with anger, even if this injustice will never be corrected. To be sure, 
transforming static guilt and blame to animating guilt and blame is easier said than done, 
but it seems that an awareness of such a distinction might be an important starting point for 
veterans stuck in moral distress.
Some might be inclined to say that, at least in clinical practice, a focus on forgiveness 
of self and others is inappropriate, as this would force the therapist to judge the accuracy of 
a patient’s feelings while the therapist’s moral judgment should be irrelevant. However, it 
should be noted, efforts to alleviate guilt are just as much based on a moral judgment as a 
focus on forgiveness is. Making a moral judgment is inevitable and always bears relevance. 
For one, it influences the course taken in therapy sessions, as the therapist has to decide 
whether or not to try to challenge the patient’s feelings of guilt and anger or treat them 
as appropriate emotions. Furthermore, just as ill-considered condemnation of a patient’s 
actions might harm the patient, the opposite might also be harmful. When a veteran’s 
expressions of guilt are met with efforts of deresponsibilization, he may perceive this as yet 
another moral betrayal and feel further alienated from others (see also Lifton 1973, Bica 1999, 
Boudreau 2011). As stated, judging one’s own actions as wrong and ‘owning up’ to them may 
be imperative to make sense of them. 
 
Addressing Ethical Struggles
A second consideration for the individual level concerns the value of going beyond the 
specific morally distressing event. My research showed that veterans may struggle not only 
with feelings of guilt and anger about a particular event, but also with a more general sense 
of moral disorientation and resultant ethical questions. Though Litz and his colleagues 
likewise acknowledge that a ‘morally injurious event’ violates ‘beliefs about right and wrong 
and personal goodness’ (2009, p. 698), their treatment model is confined to beliefs about the 
event and does not address wider beliefs. To reiterate a metaphor used earlier, their model 
addresses the injury, but not the changed moral ‘body’.
Reviewing the literature on treatments that might help fill this gap brought me to the 
Shattered Assumptions Theory (Janoff-Bulman 1992), which does attend to a person’s wider 
beliefs, claiming that an event is traumatic because it shatters core assumptions about 
the self and the world. According to this theory, all people initially hold the unconscious 
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assumption that the world is benevolent (that people essentially are genuine), that the world 
is meaningful (that things in life generally make sense, that life is fair and that people get 
what they deserve), and that the self is worthy (that they themselves ultimately are good 
persons worthy of good things). Exposure to utterly cruel or meaningless events violates 
these assumptions. Proper treatment, therefore, has to address not only the traumatic event 
but also the assumptions it has shattered, namely by promoting a more flexible self- and 
world-view that can be reconciled with the trauma. This more flexible view would hold that 
‘[t]he world is benevolent, but not absolutely; events that happen make sense, but not always; 
the self can be counted on to be decent and competent, but helplessness is at times a reality’ 
(Janoff-Bulman 1992, p. 174).
The Shattered Assumptions Theory approach makes it possible to address the potential 
damage done to a veteran’s fundamental moral beliefs. Yet, two things might be added to 
this approach. First, besides the beliefs and expectations that most people arguably hold (the 
world as benevolent, and so on), beliefs and expectation that are more particular to certain 
groups or individuals may also be worth addressing. In the case of a morally distressed 
soldier, one could think of typical military values such as comradeship and courage. Also, 
one could consider the soldier’s military role. A commander will feel particularly responsible 
for his unit’s safety, whereas a military nurse will feel particularly committed to helping 
others without exception. Explicating the role of such more specific beliefs and expectations 
may help veterans to make sense of their moral distress. 
Second, it may be necessary to address ethical questions before being able to work on a 
more flexible self- and world-view. As argued, a veteran’s experience may have shattered not 
only his trust in people’s ability to do right, but also his trust in the very notion of ‘doing right’. 
It may have damaged the very moral frame of reference which he used to make judgments 
of right and wrong. It seems that in cases of what I call moral disorientation, something 
else has to happen before a veteran can come to believe that ‘the world is benevolent, but 
not absolutely’. In such cases, the veteran struggles not only with moral questions of ‘am 
I/are others good or bad?’, but also with ethical questions of ‘what is good and bad in the 
first place?’. These ethical questions, then, should also be addressed. This could mean, for 
instance, that the veteran obtains a better understanding of morality in general and the 
moral complexity of war and military action in particular, to be better able to make sense 
of the disorientation he feels, and thus to find re -orientation.1 The more elaborate moral 
vocabulary argued for in the previous section could provide helpful words in this process.
 
The Value of a Moral Vocabulary
A third consideration resulting from this study concerns the value of an elaborate vocabulary 
to deal with moral distress. My findings indicate that both veterans and their environment 
1	 Similarly,	Vietnam	veteran/philosopher	Bica	(1999,	p.	82)	argues	for	the	value	of	enabling	a	‘morally	injured’	veteran	‘to	
understand	the	theoretical	nature	of	war	–	 its	moral,	social,	and	political	underpinnings	–	the	profound	 indoctrination	
process he has endured, the nature of moral values, and the existential reality of war’. However, as his use of ‘indoctrination’ 
indicates, Bica bends toward an anti-war approach that frames military ideals and self-perceptions as deceptive myths, 
which may not be helpful to veterans who do not agree with this stance.
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currently lack the language to address the potential moral ambivalence of veterans’ 
experiences. They lack, for instance, a proper word for feeling guilty and not guilty at the 
same time and generally lack available ‘stories’ with which to grasp and explain experiences 
of moral distress. This absence is not just an issue of representation and communication. As 
shown, language and stories are of paramount importance for making sense and coming to 
terms with one’s experiences.
Several other scholars have also noted that present-day societies lack adequate language 
for the moral complexities of military practice. Verkamp (1993), for instance, contends that 
soldiers’ feelings of guilt are often reduced to an issue that needs psychological treatment, 
while Kinghorn (2012) argues that the moral aspects of war acts tend to be judged in legal 
terms only, namely by the standards of the Geneva Conventions and military Rules of 
Engagement. Verkamp (1993) and Tick (2005) point out that societies used to have spiritual 
and symbolic practices to guide warriors through warfare, but these no longer exist.
These developments are problematic for the same reason: veterans are left without 
constructive narratives to deal with the moral impact of having gone to war. No matter 
how legally justified the actions of a soldier are, these actions may still have wounded him. 
Similarly, no matter how dysfunctional guilt feelings may be in psychological terms, these 
feelings may also be considered appropriate. It should be added, however, that no matter how 
‘inhumane’ and ‘monstrous’ an individual’s actions may be according to societal standards, 
the tragedy of violence is that it is very human.
Addressing the moral impact of military practice, then, seems to require a more 
complex moral vocabulary than one limited to binary categories such as ‘guilty–innocent’, 
‘responsible–not responsible’, ‘perpetrator–victim’, ‘inhumane–humane’ and ‘functional–
dysfunctional guilt’. It seems to require a better understanding of such terms as ‘values’, 
‘norms’ and ‘dilemmas’. As Dutch soldiers have reported (Baarle et al. 2017), understanding 
ethical terms helped them to recognize, understand and communicate about moral 
dilemmas on deployment, which indicates that having a more elaborate moral vocabulary 
may also work preventively.
Of course, in addition to separate words, narratives play an important role in meaning-
making, and besides language, the role of practices should not be forgotten. These issues are 
addressed in the section on the societal level (see below), which will discuss ancient and new 
‘purification’ rituals and the narratives they convey about war.
 
Encouraging both Introspection and ‘Extrospection’
A final important suggestion for the individual level concerns the value of going beyond 
introspection. As this study showed, moral emotions are not only about one’s relation to 
oneself but also about one’s relation to others. Anger is usually directed at another person, 
and feelings of guilt and shame have to do with how one perceives oneself as seen through 
the eyes of others. Accordingly, moral distress may provoke certain behavior to others, for 
instance, a preoccupation with injustice expressed in volunteer work and/or in aggressive 
responses to daily injustices.
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Because moral distress has such a strong social dimension, a veteran should be enabled 
to look not only inward but outward as well. Lifton (1973) and Bica (1999), who share this 
contention, point out the importance of enabling a veteran to understand his experience 
in the context of the images and rhetoric prevailing in society about war, the armed forces 
and military action. Regarding active forms of ‘extrospection’, Litz et al. (2009) emphasize 
the healing power of ‘making amends’, while Shay (1994) argues for being able to share 
one’s experiences with the wide community without condemnation. Shatan (1973) says that 
collective self-help efforts may be instrumental in healing. In short, looking outward and 
going outside the self, both figuratively and literally, may help morally distressed veterans 
re-engage with the world in which they live.
The Level of the Military Organization 
Just as it may be valuable for veterans to look outward, it is important that efforts to address 
moral distress go beyond the level of the individual veteran. Before considering this study’s 
implications for the political and societal level, it is worth looking at a level that has received 
no explicit attention so far, namely the level of the military organization.
When researchers and policy makers discuss how the military can help prevent mental 
health problems, the answer is usually: good training, ethical leadership and unit support (see 
e.g. Cossar 2008, Jones et al. 2012, Vermetten et al. 2014). This is also the case in discussions on 
‘moral injury’ (Kilner 2002, Shay 2002, Frankfurt and Frazier 2016). A currently popular answer 
is resilience, which refers to the ability to ‘bounce back’ after stressful events. Resilience-
promoting training and leadership, it is believed, would substantially decrease the risk of PTSD 
and other disorders and possibly even foster ‘post-traumatic growth’ (Tedeschi and Calhoun 
1993, APA 2011, Eidelson et al. 2011, Lester et al. 2011, Boermans v. 2012, Mulligan et al. 2012). But 
what do ‘good training’, ‘ethical leadership’, ‘unit support’ and ‘resilience’ entail exactly? The 
interpretations given are diverse, if formulated at all, and often without critical consideration 
(see e.g. Eidelson et al. 2011, MacLeish 2012 for critical evaluations). 
Below, I consider two prevalent, generally unquestioned interpretations: encouraging 
a sense of purpose and promoting a can-do mindset. This will show that what may seem 
good, ethical, and so on, may have considerable downsides. After discussing these two 
interpretations, which serve as a warning against the perils of imposing a sense of purpose 
and a one-dimensional can-do mindset, I will discuss several alternatives.
Encourage a Justifying Sense of Purpose?
Given that feelings of guilt and senselessness contribute to moral distress, it may seem 
helpful to convince soldiers that their actions were actually justified and meaningful. Indeed, 
such efforts have been signaled, in the US armed forces at least. US military chaplains and 
psychologists have reported trying to help soldiers struggling with guilt by justifying their 
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actions (Lifton 1973, Kilner 2010). Currently the largest resilience training program in the US 
military encourages a sense of meaning and purpose in personnel in order to prevent mental 
health problems (Hammer et al. 2013, Matthews 2013). According to US Lieutenant-colonel 
Kilner (2002, 2010), military leaders have ‘the obligation to justify killing’ so that soldiers 
will not suffer guilt.
While explicit justification may apply to some armed forces more than others, many 
militaries depict military practice as virtuous and meaningful, for instance in their 
recruitment campaigns (see e.g. Woodward 2000, Dutch Ministry of Defense 2013, 2017, 
Hein 2014). However, my findings showed that some situations do not allow soldiers to see 
their job as such. They suggest that veterans may see more value in condemning their own 
or others’ actions and in denouncing their mission as meaningless, whereas the imposition 
of a justifying sense of purpose may instead create a ‘puppet show’ experience of fakeness 
and betrayal. This is in line with literature showing that both confidence and doubt can 
offer guidance, and that not only pride but also guilt, blame and regret can give meaning 
to one’s life (Lifton 1973, Held 2004, Litz et al. 2009, Rietveld 2009), and with the fact that 
military practice is inevitably morally complex. Imposing a justifying sense of purpose, thus, 
may actually have iatrogenic consequences. It may not only give rise to a sense of betrayal 
after soldiers return from deployment, but also increase the risk that they will do things on 
deployment they will later come to regret.
Overly laudatory portrayals of mental health interventions, it is worth noting, carry similar 
dangers. Current studies on resilience emphasize that deployment is an opportunity for 
personal growth and speak ambitiously about the potential of resilience training to prevent 
mental health problems (Eidelson et al. 2011, MacLeish 2012). These studies hypothesize, for 
instance, that resilience skills enhance the ‘ability to handle adversity, prevent depression 
and anxiety, prevent PTSD, and enhance overall well-being and performance’ (Reivich et al. 
2011: 26). Similarly, as critical scholars have pointed out, evaluations of the currently largest 
resilience training program have been ‘overly enthusiastic’, continuing a ‘history of hyping 
that began with the program’s initial development roll-out’ (Eidelson and Soldz 2012, p. 
1). Rather than promote positive thinking in soldiers, such keen hype may adversely affect 
them. To be sure, emphasizing resilience over a focus on mental disorder has its benefits. 
But, again, incorrect claims that good training will protect soldiers from mental health 
problems may both encourage them to do regrettable things and, afterwards, engender a 
sense of betrayal.
Promote a Can-Do Mindset?
While training instructors and commanders may stress that military practice is just and 
purposeful, at the same time, a ‘can-do’ mindset is often encouraged in the military, 
especially in informal talk. A can-do attitude entails the belief that all situations are 
ultimately solvable and all tasks ultimately doable, and extensive deliberation on larger 
questions is unhelpful (Soeters et al. 2006, Arundell 2009). Differently put, it entails a no-
nonsense solution-directed pragmatism, which readily sees worries about the meaning 
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and purpose of one’s work as obstacles to problem-solving. Indeed, as this study discusses 
throughout, Dutch soldiers tend to discard the belief that their job serves a higher purpose 
even before their deployment, and focus on doing their job as best they can instead. A study 
of US soldiers likewise found that ‘[q]uestions as to the purpose of their deployment would 
typically be answered with an “it’s my job” reply, leaving the issue of purpose to politicians’ 
(De Rond and Lok 2016, p. 1982).
On the one hand, a focus on ‘can-do’ may help soldiers protect themselves from worrying 
about the ‘why’ of their actions. However, on the other hand, avoidance tends to leave 
them unprepared in case ’why’ questions do come to occupy their minds. If soldiers are 
confronted with situations that seem truly senseless, they may find themselves looking for 
an overarching purpose, and, consequently, the ‘why’ may turn out to be personally relevant 
after all. When this is the case, a can-do attitude, the coping strategy on which they have 
come to rely, cannot help them.
Another problem is that the can-do attitude carries problems of rigidity. While it is the 
opposite of dogmatism in the conventional sense, it is similarly rigid in that irresolvable 
situations are considered out of the question. Again, such rigidity may help soldiers protect 
themselves against confusion and conflict. Yet it leaves them without adequate coping 
mechanisms for situations that simply resist resolution because in all the openness that can-
do encourages, uncertainty and conflict are considered bad things. So, just as dogmatism 
causes dissonance when it becomes impossible to hold onto one’s principles, the ostensibly 
flexible military can-do attitude is counterproductive when moral quandaries turn out to be 
irresolvable. Neither attitude allows soldiers room for accepting uncertainty and conflict.
 
 
Acknowledge Moral Complexity and Paradoxes
Although both an unquestioned belief in the justness of military action and a ‘can-do’ 
mindset may be useful in many respects, they may not be adequate and perhaps even 
counterproductive when it comes to moral distress. Meanwhile, many militaries have 
implemented a range of specific interventions that convey promising alternatives, or at least 
constitute fruitful grounds for a more adequate approach.
Two interventions are mental health training and ethics education. The first usually 
comprises a combination of field exercises and classroom psycho-educational sessions. In 
the field exercises, soldiers are trained in stress-response regulation (cf. Britt et al. 2006, 
Robson and Manacapilli 2014), while in the classroom, they are equipped with information 
about types of stressors, effects of stress, and types of support available in the military (cf. 
WRAIR Land Combat Study Team 2006, Sharpley et al. 2008, Vermetten et al. 2014). Ethics 
education focuses on issues of morality, and usually consists of classroom sessions on how 
to recognize moral aspects of deployment situations, make morally responsible decisions 
and take responsibility for decisions made (see Baarda and Verweij 2006, Robinson et al. 
2008). Each intervention in its own way creates space for an appreciation of the potential 
impact of military practice on soldiers.
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Still, it seems that some modification would be useful. First, as others have also noted, 
‘despite growing evidence that demonstrates a bidirectional link between stress and ethical 
behaviors, it continues to be the case that mental health training (…) and ethics training are 
developed and delivered completely independent of each other’ (Thompson and Jetly 2014, 
p. 3). Mental health training tends to focus on stress and PTSD, whereas ethics education is 
mostly concerned with moral decision-making (ibid). The link between the two thus needs 
to become an explicit point of attention.2 Moreover, it should be given proper attention. For 
instance, it has been reported that some versions of ethics education focus on ‘the creation 
of morally upright persons through the instillation of certain key qualities or dispositions of 
character’ (Robinson et al. 2008, p. 1). While this may protect soldiers from doing things they 
will later regret, once again, it may also engender a ‘puppet show’ experience. To overcome 
this problem, ethics education should always include attention for the constraints imposed 
on soldiers and the limits of adhering to one’s values in the face of value conflicts. Both 
ethics and psycho-education would benefit from realistic teaching methods. As mentioned, 
both interventions are generally confined to classroom sessions, sometimes in the form 
of PowerPoint presentations (see Warner et al. 2011, Vermetten et al. 2014), with the risk that 
moral dilemmas are treated as ‘brainteasers’. Conversely, in the course of my research I have 
noted a tendency in some basic training instructors to use education tools for ethics training 
as ‘instruction cards’ for real-life dilemmas, thus turning dilemmas into ‘can-do’ challenges 
that can be solved with a checklist. Integrating ethics education in field exercises, it seems, 
would allow realistic, experience-oriented training, thus credibly showing how stress plays 
a major role in moral decision-making, and vice versa (see also Warner et al. 2011, Thompson 
and Jetly 2014).
A third intervention worth mentioning is the work of military chaplains – called ‘mental 
caregivers’ (geestelijk verzorgers) in the Dutch military – who help soldiers deal with questions 
of conviction, values and meaning, either in religious or non-religious terms. Their job 
might be understood as a kind of moral counseling.3 Their jobs usually include individual 
counseling, educational sessions and sessions of (spiritual) reflection (cf. Hetebrij 2007, 
Besterman-Dahan et al. 2013). A large part of their work involves simply ‘being there’ in the 
workplace, including during exercises and deployment, so that they are easily accessible 
in both a physical and mental sense (cf. Hetebrij 2007, Besterman-Dahan et al. 2013). 
Because of this, the work of military chaplains seems particularly suitable and valuable for 
soldiers struggling with moral distress. Yet, as stated before, this is only the case as long 
as quick justifications and rationalizations are avoided and, instead, moral complexity is 
acknowledged. 
Two words of caution are in order regarding the limits of interventions such as mental 
health training, ethics education and moral counseling by chaplains. First, the ease with 
which isolated interventions may change military norms such as ‘can-do’ should not be 
overestimated. Even if soldiers accepted, for instance, that it is crucial to acknowledge the 
2 To	be	sure,	forcing	soldiers	to	reflect	on	the	moral	dimensions	of	their	job	may	increase	the	chance	that	they	experience	
moral	tension.	However,	besides	other	objections	to	deploying	morally	unreflective	soldiers,	the	partial	 inevitability	of	
moral distress suggests a preference for ethics training over no such preparation.
3 In the Dutch armed forces, chaplains come from several religious backgrounds (Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, Islam 
or Hinduism) as well as from a humanist background. 
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complexity of military practice, they remain part of a cultural system which encourages a 
no-nonsense can-do attitude, and flexibly switching between the two attitudes is only easy 
in theory. Second, cultural change may be partially undesirable. As anthropologists have 
often pointed out, approaching cultural beliefs and practices as merely ‘barriers to progress’ 
is to fail to appreciate that cultures are never free-floating but always embedded in particular 
logics and concerns (see e.g. Nichter and Lock 2002).4 The can-do attitude, for instance, is 
functional with respect to the short-term demands of military deployment as it lets soldiers 
make quick decisions in critical situations and handle acute stress (Weiss 1995, Molendijk et 
al. 2016). So, the very notions that deny soldiers appropriate coping mechanisms for moral 
distress may be crucial for functioning in the short run, a paradox that seems inherent to 
military practice. In fact, paradoxes like these are part of the moral complexity I have been 
emphasizing. Rather than trying to solve such paradoxes, or worse, denying them, it seems 
best to explicitly acknowledge and discuss them throughout various interventions. 
 
 
The Level of Political Practice
 
Though soldiers may initially believe that their job has nothing to do with politics, this study 
showed that their dependency on the state becomes irrefutably manifest when this relation 
is violated. Indeed, just as soldiers are not entirely autonomous but part of the military 
organization, the military is embedded in the political domain. In this section, I reflect on 
what can be done at the political level to address moral distress, proceeding from abstract 
considerations to more practical suggestions.
 
The Ethics of Responsibility and the Ethics of Conviction
This study showed that political malpractice or error may contribute to the onset of moral 
distress in soldiers. Turning this finding around, it seems that morally responsible political 
practice may work protectively. At the very least, it seems that the absence of political 
malpractice or error would decrease the risk of moral distress in soldiers. However, it is not 
automatically evident what this would entail. The intervention in Srebrenica, for instance, 
did not lack good intentions. But the felt moral obligation to intervene gained the upper hand 
over concerns about adverse consequences, leading to a highly problematic mission in which 
soldiers felt utterly powerless (Honig and Both 1996, NIOD 2002, pp. 867–8). Clearly, good 
intentions are not enough.
Yet, it would be equally simplistic to dismiss actions based on felt moral obligation 
as naïve, futile idealism. To move beyond this, an understanding in terms of Weber’s 
4 This point is particularly warranted given the ever-growing body of studies on what has been dubbed ‘barriers to mental 
health care’ in the military (e.g. Hoge et al. 2004, Pietrzak et al.	2009,	Gould	et	al.	2010,	Kim	et al. 2010, Iversen et al. 2011, Vogt 
2011, Garcia et al. 2014).
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(1946) distinction between the ethics of conviction and responsibility seems useful.5 The 
deontological ethics of conviction is based on principles (‘we have the obligation to help 
people in need’); the utilitarian ethics of responsibility is focused on consequences (‘we 
have to assure that our actions do more good than harm’). Weber acknowledges that the two 
kinds of ethics are ultimately irreconcilable, as adhering to principles may have undesired 
consequences, while achieving objectives may require violating principles. However, he 
maintains that one can never simply set aside one or the other because that would imply 
either disregard to foreseeable bad consequences or indifference to the means by which the 
end in view is attained. According to Weber, one should always remain concerned about both 
fundamental moral principles and the outcomes of one’s actions. This tension, he argues, is 
what constitutes the challenge of acting morally responsibly: trying to force the two ethics 
together and accepting the associated paradoxes (Weber 1946).
In the context of military intervention, the notion of ‘virtue by proxy’ is relevant. 
Ignatieff (1996, 2004) coined the notion to describe a policy of calling for action while getting 
others to engage in this action for them. He uses it in the context of the war in the former 
Yugoslavia to describe how several countries voiced the need for intervention only to leave 
actual intervention to others (Ignatieff 1996, 2004). Following Ignatieff, one could say that 
military intervention, by definition, is an act of ‘virtue by proxy’, executed by military troops 
on behalf of the political leadership that decided it (see also NIOD 2002, p. 869).
It seems that in making a decision of moral action ‘by proxy’, one should seek a balance 
between the principles-based ethics of conviction and the consequences-based ethics of 
responsibility. Yet, again, this is not all. The Dutch mission in Uruzgan demonstrates that 
further specification is warranted. As discussed, the Dutch government imposed several 
restrictions on this mission. While as such parliamentary and public objections were taken 
seriously, it was less clear to what extent it served the interests of the Dutch troops and the 
Afghan population, as some restrictions actually hindered the troops in creating safety and 
stability in Uruzgan. When discussing the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, 
then, a crucial question to ask is: vis-à-vis whom? For whom are perceived moral obligations 
fulfilled, and for whom are the consequences of decisions taken into account? So, when 
political decision-makers balance moral obligations and potential consequences, the interests 
of both the local population and the own troops should be included in the decision-making 
process. Put differently, to reduce the risk of moral distress, political leaders should try to 
bring together an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility with regard to all parties 
involved, not only before embarking on a military mission, but also after its termination.
 
‘Just War’ Criteria as a Guiding Framework
To achieve a balanced combination of conviction and responsibility in political decision-
making, more specific guidance would be useful. Such guidance is offered by the framework 
5	 NIOD’s	extensive	report	on	Srebrenica	uses	Weber’s	ethics	of	conviction	and	ethics	of	responsibility	(NIOD	2002,	p.	124),	
arguing that in deciding to send troops to Srebrenica, the Dutch government let the ethics of conviction prevail over the 
ethics of responsibility, while the opposite was the case in many other countries.
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provided by ‘Just War’, a tradition of centuries-long deliberation on the ethics of military 
intervention, including contributions from Plato, Cicero, Augustine, Grotius and Walzer (see 
e.g. Walzer 1977, Evans 2005, Baarda and Verweij 2009, Orend 2013). Over the centuries, these 
and many other thinkers have formulated a range of moral criteria for military intervention. 
Although Just War thinkers were originally concerned only with classic warfare, increasingly 
they have expanded their scope to other types of military intervention, noting that at least 
in part, Just War criteria can also apply to peacekeeping operations (Pfaff 2001, Brough et al. 
2007). Together, the criteria can be understood as a framework that combines the ethics of 
conviction and the ethics of responsibility.
Admittedly, the Just War Tradition is certainly not without problems, as I discuss in the 
next section. Nevertheless, it seems it can give political leaders helpful guidance, not only 
because it combines the ethics of conviction and responsibility, but also because it covers 
all phases of military intervention, namely before, during and after. As my research findings 
indicate, it is not just post-mission mental health care but political practices in all three 
phases that are relevant to veteran well-being. For classical Just War thinkers, this would be 
self-evident, as they understood the three phases of military intervention as inextricably 
connected with one another (Verweij 2015). However, many contemporary Just War theorists 
insist that pre-, peri- and post-intervention criteria are separate, arguing for instance, that 
an intervention can be started for just reasons but carried out unjustly (Orend 2013, p. 33). 
Whether or not one agrees with this contention, my study showed that the three categories 
are clearly interrelated in the issue of moral distress. If political leaders decide on an 
intervention supposedly to establish peace but in reality for diplomatic interests, soldiers 
run an increased risk of retrospectively regretting what they did during that intervention. In 
turn, in the soldier’s experience an unjustly terminated mission renders the actions taken 
during the mission more easily unjust, as it leaves fewer gains to compensate for the damage 
done and lives lost. In short, the grounds on which political leaders resort to decide on 
military intervention inevitably affect soldiers’ conduct during the intervention and their 
retrospective appraisal of their own conduct, such that political practices influence soldiers’ 
vulnerability to developing moral distress even before the mission begins.
To turn to the specific criteria of the Just War tradition, the first set involves conditions for 
embarking on a military intervention. For this phase, the following interrelated conventions 
have been established. The military intervention should have a just cause (e.g. end the 
violation of human rights); it should be conducted with the right intention (e.g. it cannot 
be for material gain); it should be declared by a legitimate political authority (e.g. the UN); it 
should be a last resort, only selected when other means do not work; the anticipated benefits 
should be proportionate to the anticipated harm, and, finally, the intervention should have 
a reasonable probability of success. Note that the first three criteria mostly express the ethics 
of conviction, while the last three can be linked to the ethics of responsibility.
Three moral criteria are included for conduct in conflict situations (see e.g. Walzer 1977, 
Evans 2005, Baarda and Verweij 2009, Orend 2013). Non-combatants can never be intentionally 
involved in the conflict, the use of force and other actions should be in proportion (because 
an act should seek to minimize overall suffering), and the good effects of an act should 
193
Chapter 10  Practical Im
plications
Part  3   Conclusions: Theoretical and Practical Im
plications
outweigh the bad. Here, the first criterion is exemplary of the ethics of conviction while the 
last two express the ethics of responsibility.
The moral criteria for ending interventions are recent additions to the tradition, in line 
with general trends in approaches to violent conflict, which attribute increasing importance 
to post-conflict intervention (Kriesberg 2016). The criteria of this third category deal with 
the mission-termination phase and the morality of post-intervention settlement and 
reconstruction. Of the various conditions proposed (see e.g. Orend 2002), those proposed by 
Evans (2005) are particularly relevant to this study. He outlines three criteria: terms should 
be co-established to make peace just and stable and address the injustice that prompted the 
intervention; full responsibility should be taken for one’s share of the material burdens of 
the aftermath; and full, proactive participation should be undertaken in forgiveness and 
reconciliation processes. Each of these three criteria can be seen as a combination of the 
ethics of conviction and responsibility.
All the criteria listed above, it seems, are valuable for reducing the risk of moral distress. 
Or, to turn it around, it seems that the risk of moral distress increases when any of these 
criteria are violated. Therefore, they all are relevant to veteran well-being, yet only as long as 
they are approached as inextricably interrelated rather than checklist bullet points.
Beyond a Checklist Application of Existing Criteria
The warning against approaching Just War criteria as bullet points brings me to the question: 
how to integrate the criteria of the Just War Tradition in political practice? To an important 
extent, this has already been done. At least in a formal sense, the tradition has found a firm 
place in politics. At the international level, its core criteria have been incorporated in the 
formal frameworks of the UN (Falk 2004, Baarda and Verweij 2009, Dorn 2011). Chapters VI 
and VII of the UN Charter impose a general prohibition on the use of force, and the exceptions 
they stipulate include individual or collective self-defense, last resort and proportionality. In 
addition, the recently introduced principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, endorsed in 2005 
by all UN members states, affirms that they may take coercive action against another state if 
the latter fails to protect its citizens from avoidable catastrophe (Iancu 2014). International 
Humanitarian Law also lays down criteria for conduct during a mission, including special 
protective status for non-combatants and that the principles of necessity and proportionality 
must dictate the use of force (Falk 2004, Baarda and Verweij 2009, Dorn 2011).
 At the Dutch national level, Just War criteria are included in the Assessment Framework 
(‘Toetsingskader’), which the government introduced in 1995 just before the fall of 
Srebrenica, and expanded in 2000 partially as a result of the Srebrenican tragedy (TK 2014). 
This framework includes the requirements that a military mission serves the interests of the 
Netherlands, including protecting international peace and security, and that it is effected 
conform international law and on the basis of a clear mandate. It also stipulates clear 
international agreements, a concrete military assignment, attainable political and military 
goals, a clear command structure, feasible military tasks and a good exit strategy. In 2014, 
protection of the civilian population and aftercare for deployed soldiers were added as focal 
points (TK 2014). The same year, the Veterans Decree (‘Veteranenbesluit’) came into force, which 
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set detailed rules for the government’s special duty of care to veterans as laid down in the 
Veterans Act (‘Veteranenwet’) of 2012.
So, practical moral criteria for military intervention in line with what I suggested above 
already exist. However, this does not mean that they always work as intended. In the context 
of moral distress, I identified at least three important preconditions that should be met 
before the criteria will actually work. A first, understandable imperative is that the political 
leadership should go beyond paying mere lip service to the criteria. This is not as easy as it 
may sound. Consider for instance cases in which the main reason for intervention is in the 
interest of securing inter-state relations or economic motives. For obvious reasons, one will 
hardly ever hear political leaders admit this; instead, they will put forward such concerns as 
self-defense and humanitarian obligations (cf. Berkowitz 2013, Dimitriu and Graaf 2014). In 
these cases, Just War criteria do not guide political decision-making so much, or not at all, but 
rather become window-dressing tools. As such, the criteria may work counterproductively.
A second precondition is to consider criteria in relation to one another and not misapply 
them as a mere checklist (Crawford 2003, Walzer 2006, Megoran 2008, Dorn 2011, Verweij 2015). 
For the TFU mission in Uruzgan, the Dutch Assessment Framework was used as a checklist 
(Klep 2011, Grandia 2015). In 2011, the then prime minister even spoke of ‘ticking boxes’ when 
discussing a planned police training mission in another region of Afghanistan (Klep 2011, 
p. 228 translation TM). The problem with using checklists is that it can too easily justify an 
intervention: if each criterion is satisfied somewhat, the political leadership might declare the 
intervention ‘just’ (Dorn 2011). The fundamental issue underlying this problem is that Just War 
criteria are considered in isolation while, as argued, they are inextricably connected (Verweij 
2015). Checklist boxes such as ‘proportionality’ are actually rendered meaningless when the box 
for ‘intentions’ reads ‘dubious’, or when ‘objectives’ are ‘unclear’, because questions considering 
the proportionality of violence cannot be sensibly answered when the purpose of this violence 
is questionable. Yet, the checklist approach can still tick off the criteria of proportionally.
Third, the use of criteria cannot avoid excluding relevant actors in the decision-making 
process. Consider the fact that civilian protection and veteran aftercare have recently been 
added as explicit focal points in the Dutch Assessment Framework. If these issues had always 
been treated seriously, it seems, this addition would have been unnecessary. As argued, when 
insufficient attention is given to if and how a mission may actually benefit or disadvantage the 
local population and deployed soldiers, it may lead to feelings of senselessness and betrayal 
in soldiers. So, when assessing a proposed mission, it is important to take into account its 
effects on all parties that, willingly or not, are involved in the mission (see also Myers 1996).
Ultimately, the three points above all seem to boil down to the problem of Just War 
frameworks being cut loose from their context. When this occurs, important moral questions 
become mere judicial issues, and useful guides for reflection become ends in themselves. 
And for all the justificatory work that the Just War criteria may do, they never simply make an 
intervention just and thus never simply prevent moral distress. In fact, veterans’ experiences 
of fakeness and betrayal indicate that Just War rhetoric may even be a source of moral distress. 
This is a crucial argument in Meagher’s highly critical work on the Just War Tradition (2014). 
According to Meagher’s pacifism-inclined reasoning, the Just War Tradition is the root cause 
of moral distress as it deceives soldiers into an inherently immoral project. I do not entirely 
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agree. That is, my findings do confirm that the Just War Tradition can and is abused as a cover 
up for material self-interest, and that justifying rhetoric may contribute to moral distress 
when soldiers come to experience their mission as unjust. However, my findings contradict 
Meagher’s contention that by default Just War criteria form the cause of moral distress rather 
than are a partial solution to it. Many interviewed veterans developed moral distress, not 
because they had used force, but because they had not. More generally, most veterans did 
not oppose to military intervention as such, but to the specific ways in which their mission 
had taken shape. These veterans would have been helped neither by being allowed to act 
without moral restrictions, nor by being completely prohibited to act, but rather, by gaining 
conditional authorization to intervene in accordance with Just War criteria.
To be clear, my contention is not meant to be an all-encompassing, normative argument 
for military intervention as such, but is confined to the question of how political practices 
can protect soldiers from developing moral distress. When reflecting on this question, I 
come to the conclusion that the moral difficulties of military intervention can never be truly 
overcome, and that an approach should be adopted that acknowledges this. So, whereas 
Meagher argues that the phenomenon of ‘moral injury’ testifies to the inherent unjustness 
of war and that we must therefore reject the Just War Tradition, my findings lead me to claim 
that it testifies to the moral complexity of military intervention and therefore black-and-
white solutions should be refused. I postulate that a sincere, careful consideration of the 
admittedly limited, subjective and perhaps even paradoxical notion of ‘just war’ is preferable 
over rejecting the notion because it is limited, subjective and perhaps paradoxical. The 
same holds for combining the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, which 
ultimately exist in irresolvable tension with one another. I contend that a sincere attempt to 
balance the two kinds of ethics is preferable above rejecting one of the two because of this 
tension. Using flawed moral criteria for military intervention as guidance, while recognizing 
that military intervention will always remain morally problematic, may be as close as one 
can get at the political level to reduce the risk of moral distress.
The Societal Level
In this section, I turn to the level of society at large. First, I discuss an issue that recurred 
throughout this study: the problem of ostensibly supportive images of hero and victim. 
Subsequently, I discuss several ancient and present-day rituals as examples of imageries that 
may resonate better with veterans and may be more helpful to address moral distress.
Supporting Veterans as Heroes and Victims?
Unsurprisingly, while veterans find accusations painful and isolating, this study showed 
that images of veterans as heroes or victims may also not be experienced as supportive. 
Why is this? Let me start with the image of hero. To call veterans heroes is to admire them 
for their courage and strength while acknowledging that they have faced hardships. Hence, 
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heroization may seem the ultimate form of recognition. However, as discussed, most 
interviewed veterans did not see much value in being applauded as heroes. Many called it 
complete nonsense. Those reporting feeling guilt objected the most to being called a hero, 
explaining that it made them feel extremely uncomfortable and aggravated their guilt.
Two related problems with heroization can explain veterans’ resistance. First, heroization 
means that the ugly side of working in war zones is ‘sanitized’. Veterans may have gotten their 
hands dirty and feel unable to wash them clean, but as heroes they are transformed into noble 
supermen, while questionable conduct is attributed to so-called bad apples. Second, heroization 
means deresponsibilization. To idolize veterans is to deny that they could make mistakes and to 
withhold the possibility of remorse. Heroization, in short, does no justice to their experience 
and in fact denies their humanity (see also Lifton 1973, Morris 2013, Farnsworth 2014).
If heroization fails to recognize the moral impact of military action on soldiers, what 
about the focus on PTSD? After all, this concept is the result of a search for exactly such 
recognition (Young 1997, Fassin and Rechtman 2009, Withuis and Mooij 2010). At first glance, 
a PTSD frame does seem helpful as it serves the interests of both veterans and society. It 
offers society an answer to the question of how can veterans live with having fought and 
killed (‘they can’t just live with it’), and as such, it opens up a way for civilians to identify and 
sympathize with them. Moreover, it does so without forcing civilians to choose a political 
side. Though the birth of the PTSD concept went hand in hand with critique of the Vietnam 
war (e.g. Lifton 2005), its present-day use offers society a way to acknowledge the suffering 
of veterans without having to pass either positive or negative judgment on the mission in 
which they served. 
However, the benefits also have their downsides. While a PTSD frame acknowledges 
deployment-related problems, it portrays veterans as victims of war, and as with heroization, 
victimization leaves veterans no space to feel remorse. What is more, a PTSD frame tends to 
reduce suffering to an internally contained mental disorder and readily denies responsibility 
for all actors involved. By medicalizing veterans’ suffering as a disease caused by the stressors of 
war, it disregards not only the veterans’ own agency, but the potential role of society and politics 
in their suffering. Like heroization, one-sided representations of veterans as victims of PTSD 
allows sympathy but at the price of overly simplifying and perhaps glorifying their suffering.
 
 
Purification and Reintegration Rituals
What follows from the above considerations is that to address moral distress at the level of 
society, its representations need to make sense to veterans. In the beginning of this chapter, 
I discussed the value of a more elaborate vocabulary for moral phenomena. Yet, appropriate 
narratives and practices are important as well. Interestingly, there are many insightful examples 
of what adequate societal narratives and practices could look like. Many societies used to have 
rituals for returning soldiers which acknowledged the moral complexity of military intervention 
and involved both the returned soldier and society (cf. Verkamp 1993, O’Donnell 2015). These 
rituals might serve as indicative examples of how societal narratives and practices may not only 
estrange veterans but also foster moral re-orientation and societal reintegration.
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One well-documented example concerns Christian ritual practice in early medieval times. 
As documented by Verkamp, the ‘Christian community of the first millennium generally 
assumed that warriors returning from battle would or should feel guilty and ashamed for all 
the wartime killing they had done’ (Verkamp 1993, p. 11). It was believed that although the 
evil in which warriors had participated might have been necessary, it was still evil. And so, 
rather than dismissing guilt and shame ‘as insignificant or irrelevant’, returning warriors 
were encouraged to seek resolution (…) through rituals of purification, expiation, and 
reconciliation’ (Verkamp 1993, p. 11). Elsewhere there were comparable rituals for warriors, 
including several Native American nations who cleansed warriors of their ‘inner pollution’ 
with sweat lodge rituals and by sharing war stories (O’Donnell 2015).
Purification rituals still exist today. They have been documented in the context of the 
Mozambican Civil War, which ended in 1992 (Honwana 1999, Granjo and Nicolini 2006). 
Here, these rituals served to cleanse returned (child) soldiers from the spirits of people 
they or others had killed, as well as the spirits of people whose death had been caused by 
war in other ways. It was thought that these spirits could create problems and disrupt life 
in the families and villages of the soldiers. Besides the soldiers themselves, their family 
and ancestral spirits were required to be present at these rituals, which would take several 
days, and included soldiers re-enacting war moves with a pestle pole, which, notably, did 
not signify a weapon but the family and the house. This re-enactment served as a form of 
catharsis. The soldiers would have to take herbal remedies to cleanse their bodies internally, 
through inhaling and drinking, and externally through bathing and massage. Besides re-
establishing spiritual balance, the rituals served to restore the social balance disrupted by 
war. Precisely, spiritual and social (im)balance were seen as inextricably connected. This is 
why the final rituals, centered on the soldiers’ homecoming, always entailed the villagers’ 
acceptance of the soldiers’ regret and welcoming them back in a festive manner (Honwana 
1999, Granjo and Nicolini 2006).
It is worth noting that while the ancient Christian rituals centered on guilt and penance, 
the Mozambique rituals focus on moral imbalance and restoring harmony (cf. Granjo and 
Nicolini 2006). That said, Christian, Native American and Mozambican rituals also have 
important characteristics in common. To list some key characteristics, they all:
• involve an understanding of military action as something that may be morally 
‘polluting’
• involve an approach to moral pollution as something more complicated than the 
effect of unequivocal wrongdoing, without releasing veterans from responsibility 
for their acts
• combine physical, psychological and social elements in dealing with the impact of 
deployment
• are not just for the veteran but demand active engagement by the wider community
• are simultaneously purification and reintegration rituals
• and aim to guide homecoming soldiers find a new inner and social balance.
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To be clear, despite what the notion of ‘purification’ suggests, no ritual entailed an 
expectation of complete individual cleansing and social restoration. The rituals were rites 
of passage,6 meaning that returned soldiers did not re-assume their pre-deployment status 
but took the new status of veteran in the community. In line with this, the aim was to re-
establish a certain spiritual and social balance, not make things exactly as they were before.
Today’s Dutch society has no institutional practices with these characteristics, and 
it seems safe to assume that this is the case in many other societies. There are speeches, 
medals and an annual Veterans Day, but these rituals are isolated celebrations of veterans’ 
supposedly exceptional status. They address the moral significance of military intervention 
only superficially, leaving deeper discussion to the private rooms of therapists. As such, 
moreover, they may even deepen the distance between veterans and society.
How to address this problem? In any case, not by simply copying and implementing one 
of the above rituals, it seems. A ritual derives its meaning from its relation to larger material 
and ideational frameworks (see e.g. Van Gennep 1909, Turner 1969, Geertz 1973), and when 
an existing ritual is mimicked in an entirely different context, its meaning inevitably changes 
(Johnson 1995, Aldred 2000). Hence, it can happen that a ritual signifying moral complexity 
and purification in Mozambique becomes an alienating charade if implemented in the 
Netherlands.
Interestingly, however, the stories of the interviewed veterans indicate that in the absence 
of existing meaningful rituals, they invented their own symbolic acts. Many Dutchbat 
veterans, for instance, have returned to Srebrenica to walk the locally organized annual 
March of Peace (Marš Mira). This march follows, in the opposite direction, the route taken 
by thousands of Muslim refugees after the fall of Srebrenica. Some veterans still go there 
every few years, by themselves or with their family and colleagues. Of the veterans speaking 
about this, some said they did the march to get a better picture of what they had experienced; 
others said they did it to ‘re-do’ their tour but with a better ending this time; some said it was 
a kind of apology, a way to show accountability and remorse; others maintained it was to 
show solidarity to local survivors of the tragedy, to whom they felt connected. Many veterans 
mentioned several of these reasons. 
A second activity many of the interviewed veterans recounted was sharing their 
experiences. Some veterans wrote down their experiences, either in a diary or blog solely 
meant for friends and family, or in a book to be read by Dutch society at large. Others have 
given guest lectures on their deployment in Dutch schools as part of an initiative organized 
by the Netherlands Veterans Institute. Yet others shared their story with journalists or 
researchers – me, for instance. Again, the reasons given for doing this were versatile, and 
again, many gave several reasons. They began talking about their experience to gain a 
better picture of it; to ’confess’ the mistakes they had made; to help others (family, friends, 
colleagues, society in general) understand what it was like; to obtain recognition both for 
themselves and fellow sufferers, and/or to warn politicians about the consequences of their 
decisions.
6	 ‘Rites	 of	 passage’,	 coined	 by	 anthropologist	 Van	 Gennep	 (1909)	 and	 expanded	 by	 anthropologist	 Turner	 (1969)	 refer	
to	 three	phases:	 separation	 (of	 the	old	status/world),	 liminality	 (transition	between	 the	 two	statuses	and	worlds),	and	
reincorporation	(into	the	new	status	and	new	world	(Van	Gennep	1909,	Turner	1969).
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Similar to communal rituals mentioned above, these newly created ‘rituals’ allowed 
veterans to deal with their moral distress in ways that acknowledged moral complexity and 
opened up space to re-connect with others. Also, the rituals did not entail an illusionary 
promise of returning to a previous innocence, but offered a step toward a new way of 
engaging with the self and the world. In many ways, then, these new rituals answer the 
question of how to address moral distress in present-day societies. However, in one essential 
respect the new rituals still lack what their predecessors did have: involvement on the part of 
society. This is unfortunate in many ways because besides being vital in themselves, societal 
recognition and engagement seem to be significant motivators for change at all discussed – 
individual, military and political – levels.
 
 
Conclusion
It could be said that problems of black-and-white approaches constituted the common 
thread running through not only this final chapter, but through this entire study. As became 
clear, to find words for disorientating experiences and connect to people without similar 
experiences is often difficult in itself. If society then seems to offer only black-and-white 
narratives of heroes, victims and perpetrators, this exacerbates this difficulty. Conversely, 
so long as veterans disengage from society, they perpetuate these narratives, making the 
problem of estrangement a two-way street. With respect to political practices, black-and-
white narratives also thwart a nuanced approach to the moral dimensions of military 
practice. They cause the notion of Just War to either be misapplied as a simple affirmation of 
the righteousness of warfare, or to be rejected as an impossible paradox. When misapplied as 
simple justification, soldiers are deployed with dangerous illusions. When rejected because 
it is paradoxical, all that is left is either a radical interpretation of military intervention as 
always evil and nothing but evil, which in its simplicity is just as unhelpful as unequivocal 
justification, or an interpretation of military intervention as something for which normative 
judgments are inappropriate, which leaves no space for moral questions at all. In discourse 
dominated by black-and-white narratives, recognizing complicated moral understandings is 
already a problem beforehand, and when this is the case, such understandings may not even 
be able to enter the discourse.
Reflecting on the practical implications of this study, I considered several alternatives 
to black-and-white approaches. I discussed, inter alia, the value of a more elaborate moral 
vocabulary, the decision-making framework of the Just War Tradition, and purification 
and reintegration practices. These approaches share several crucial characteristics: they 
recognize the existence of moral distress, they do it justice by considering guilt and anger 
as possibly appropriate feelings, they offer a language and practice for moral complexity, 
they stress both individual responsibility and contextual factors, and they acknowledge the 
inevitability and at times insolvability of moral conflict.
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Appendix A. Interview Topic List
[While I always carried a copy of the topic list with me, I usually did not have to look at it.]
Pre-interview 
Repeat information mentioned in email
• This interview is for a scientific research that focuses on how soldiers and veterans deal 
with challenges during deployment and after homecoming. The research also focuses 
on the role of political decision-making and public opinion in soldiers’ and veterans’ 
deployment and homecoming experiences. One of the goals of the research is to better 
understand deployment-related stress and mental health problems.
• The research is a scientific study, and I’m a researcher in what is called the social sciences. 
I’m thus not a therapist but a scientist. I’m not trained to give any information or advice 
regarding psychological problems or other deployment-related problems.
• There is a central office for advice or help. It’s called the Veteranenloket, website 
Veteranenloket.nl. I also wrote the address in my email to you.
• A bit about me: I have been doing research on military topics for several years now. I 
became interested in this topic as a result of friendships with soldiers.
• This interview will be completely anonymous. In my publications/talks/all my contacts 
with other people, I will never use your real name, always a pseudonym. If necessary I’ll 
also leave out details such as specific dates and locations.
New information
• This interview won’t be an interview in a very formal format with a list of questions to 
tick off, but more like a normal conversation. So you’re also free to deviate from my 
questions and whatever else you’d do in normal conversations.
• The topics I want to discuss are your reasons for joining the military, your military 
education, your deployment experiences and your homecoming experiences, and all 
other experiences that may have something to do with this.
• I would like to record the interview so that I don’t have to write during the interview. 
Nobody except me will have access to the recordings. Is that okay?
• You do not have to answer any question if you don’t want to.
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Topic list
[Most interviews lasted between three and five hours. I probed deeper into answers when 
the interviewee discussed impactful experiences, topics related to morality (injustice, guilt, 
shame, etc.), the mission’s political and/or societal dimensions or other relevant topics]
Motivations for joining the military/the mission
• When did you join the military? Why?
• What trade and weapon did you choose, why?
• Can you tell me about your training and education?
• Was it what you expected of it? Why (not)?
• What was easy? What was difficult?
• Did you feel it changed you?
• Did you feel being a soldier is very different from a civilian job? (Is a soldier 24/7 a soldier? 
How does that work?)
• Does your work has to be useful in your eyes? Why (not?) What does being useful mean 
to you?
Deployment expectations and experiences
• How many times have you been deployed? When and where?
• How was the first time?
• What did your friend and family think of it?
• In what function were you deployed to Srebrenica/Uruzgan?
• Can you remember what you expected of that mission?
• What did you hope the mission would be like?
• How was the first week of the mission?
• Can you tell me about the rest of the mission?
• Was it what you expected of it? Why (not)?
• What was easy? What was difficult?
• Did you personally stand behind the mission?
• Did it matter whether or not the mission had some kind of point? Why (not)? What did 
matter to you?
Impressive or difficult experiences during deployment
• Are there moments or events that you would call impressive, in a good or negative way?
• Can you tell me about these moments/events? (Ask about them in detail)
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[Whenever appropriate:]
• Why, exactly, did this moment/event impact you?
• Had you ever expected you could experience something like this? Why (not)?
• Were you prepared for something like this? Why (not)?
• Can you remember how you felt about it back then? How do you feel about it now?
 
Homecoming
• How were the last weeks of your mission?
• Before returning home you went to Zagreb/Crete. Can you tell me a little about that?
• How were the first days and weeks of being back in the Netherlands? How did you 
experience it? What did you do?
• How was it to see friends and family again?
• Was it what you expected of coming home? Why (not)?
• What was easy? What was difficult?
• After those first weeks, how was it?
Possible impact and help seeking
• What, would you say, does your time in the military mean to you and your life?
• What about your deployment more specifically?
• How did it influence you?
• Do you feel it changed the way you look at things or deal with things? Why (not)? Positive/
negative?
• What things are you proud of? What things aren’t you proud of?
• What things helped you deal with difficult experiences?
• Are there things that made your problems worse?
[If not addressed yet:]
• Did you go to a counselor/chaplain?
• To someone else?
• Did you go in therapy?
• [If so:] What made you go? How did you experience it? [If not:] Would you ever consider it?
• Do you have a diagnosis? [If so:] How was it to receive this diagnosis? [If not:] What do 
you think of when you think of PTSD?
• Did therapy help you?
• Did you seek help in other ways?
In research circles, there’s a relatively new concept: ‘moral injury’. Do you know it? [Explain 
concept.] What do you think about the term moral injury?
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Closing questions
• What did you think of this interview/conversation?
• Any questions you found strange?
• Are there things I didn’t ask about? [take time]
Post-interview
Explain: I can always be reached via email for questions about the research, or if you think of 
anything you haven’t told me yet and which might be interesting for the research.
Repeat info about being a scientific researcher instead of therapist, and the Veteranenloket as 
the central office for questions or help regarding personal situations.
Ask: do you have a colleague or acquaintance who might also be interested in an interview? 
Explain: preferably not a close friend, because I want to reach a range of soldiers/veterans as 
wide as possible.
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Appendix B. Data Coding Results
 
The individual level
How did Dutchbat and TFU (ex-)soldiers in general make sense of and cope with (potential) 
moral challenges related to their profession?
Initial codes Focused codes Core categories
No	justification	needed No	justification	needed
Making soldiering less 
complex
Contrasting	with	murderers/
mercenaries/	robots
Justifications	and	
rationalizations Inconsistency in 
interpretations
Doing good things
Rules & instruction
Reciprocity
Distancing & numbing
Switching	civilian/military	
mindsets
Compartmentalization
 
Did Dutchbat and TFU (ex-)soldiers report distress related to moral challenges, and if so, 
what did these challenges and experiences of distress entail?
Initial codes Focused codes Core categories
Unequivocal	transgression Unequivocal	transgression Unequivocal	transgression
Value	conflict
Equivocal experiences Moral failureOverwhelmed/detached
Senselessness
Initial codes Focused codes Core categories
Self-blame
Unequivocal	
(self-)blame
Equivocal 
(self-)blame
Moral disorientation
Ethical struggle
Blame of others
Questions/uncertainty	
regarding responsibility 
and blame
Questions/uncertainty
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Moral distress in relation to factors at the political level
Did political practices surrounding the Dutchbat and TFU missions, including decision-
making practices related to the mission design, its framing and practices in the mission’s 
aftermath, play a role in experiences of moral distress among deployed (ex-)soldiers, and if 
so, how?
UNPROFOR
Initial codes Focused codes Core categories
Powerlessness and senselessness
Experiencing political 
displacement of 
problems
Experiencing political 
silence
Experience of institutional 
betrayal
Abandoning and being 
abandoned during deployment
Feeling suckered and let down in 
the	mission’s	aftermath
Demanding truth and 
compensation
Demanding truth and compensation Seeking reparations
ISAF
Initial codes Focused codes Core categories
Powerlessness and senselessness
Experiencing political 
displacement of problems
Experiencing political 
silence
Experience of institutional 
betrayal
Abandoning and being 
abandoned during deployment
Denial of one’s experience in the 
mission’s	aftermath
Desire to be taken seriously Desire to be taken seriously Seeking reparations
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Moral distress in relation to factors at the societal level
Did public perceptions of the Dutchbat and TFU missions and of the military in general, as 
expressed in for instance public debates, play a role in experiences of moral distress among 
(ex-)soldiers deployed on these missions, and if so, how?
UNPROFOR
Initial codes Focused codes Core categories
Public accusations
Feeling misunderstood
Experience of misrecognition
Frustration and anger
Silence
Societal estrangement Self-estrangement
Disorientation and Alienation
ISAF
Initial codes Focused codes Core categories
Criticism and admiration
Feeling misunderstood
Experience of misrecognition
Frustration and anger
Silence
Societal estrangement Self-estrangement
Disorientation and Alienation
Summary
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Summary
Military intervention is a collective enterprise which may have great moral impact on 
soldiers. Although this has since long been known, most current conceptualizations of 
military distress pay marginal attention to its moral and sociopolitical-political aspects. 
Current concepts such as ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ tend to focus on fear-related 
pathology rather than moral conflict, and on the psyche of the soldier rather than of the 
people who send soldiers on a missions and welcome them back. To address these gaps, the 
present study examined potential moral dimensions of deployment-related distress and the 
role of political and societal factors in this.
The focus is on the relatively new concept of ‘moral injury’, which refers to the suffering 
that may arise when a person’s expectations and beliefs about right and wrong and personal 
goodness are violated, either by him- or herself or by others. Both academic and public 
discourses have quickly embraced the concept, but it is still in development. Though 
explicitly intended to address the moral aspects that dominant trauma models fail to grasp, 
it focuses mainly on the ‘injury’ while attending too little to the ‘moral’. Also, as in current 
trauma models, it overlooks the wider context of deployment-related suffering.
These shortcomings are translated in the following research objective: to advance the 
empirical and theoretical understanding of moral, political and societal dimensions of 
deployment-related moral distress, and in doing so, contribute to the concept of ‘moral injury’ 
and to practical interventions to address and prevent moral distress. (To avoid confusion and 
explicitly refrain from the reification that often plagues research on psychological concepts, 
a distinction is made between the particular concept of ‘moral injury’ and the label ‘moral 
distress’, created to refer to phenomenon that this concept aims to account for.)
An interdisciplinary theoretical framework was developed to achieve the research objective, 
integrating perspectives from the fields of psychology, philosophy, anthropology and political 
sciences. This made it possible to move from the predominantly psychological perspective that 
the current concept of moral injury employs to gain a more comprehensive understanding. To 
gain thorough insight into potential moral and sociopolitical dimensions of moral distress, 
two qualitative case studies were conducted among (1) Dutchbat veterans been deployed to 
Srebrenica, the former Yugoslavia, and (2) TFU veterans deployed to Uruzgan, Afghanistan. 
Drawing on 80 in-depth interviews (40 per case), this study examined moral dimensions of 
experiences of distress, and the role of political practices and public perceptions in experiences 
of moral distress, during and after deployment. Although the initial plan was to compare the 
Dutchbat mission, as a ‘blue helmet’ peace mission, with the TFU mission, as a ‘green helmet’ 
counterinsurgency mission involving combat, the two cases turned out to be remarkably 
similar with respect to moral, political and societal dimensions of moral distress. 
Before focusing on stories of moral distress, in order to better understand why and when 
moral distress arises, this research explored how soldiers perceive their profession in the 
first place and what cognitive strategies they tend to use to cope with moral challenges 
during and after deployment. The research findings showed that soldiers generally do not 
experience as much moral tension as one might expect considering their circumstances. Yet, 
as the findings also showed, this does not mean that they never experience tension, and 
when they do, they tend to employ justifying simplifications to resolve tension, relying on the 
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belief that all situations are ultimately uncomplicated and soluble. Moral challenges seem to 
arise relatively often in both peace missions and combat operations, and while the specific 
content of the justifying simplifications that soldiers use in peace missions and combat 
operations may vary, in essence they are remarkably similar. In the face of moral challenges 
during deployment, soldiers tell themselves that ‘some things just happen in war’, or they 
may employ formulas such as ‘I just have to follow orders’, ‘it was him or me’ or ‘I treat them 
like they treat me’. To resolve possible tensions arising from being both a soldier and civilian, 
they tend to compartmentalize their military and civilian selves, prioritizing the former in 
military contexts while allowing the latter to supersede in others. Many tend to interpret the 
compartmentalization they employ, of which they are often aware, as the necessary burden 
required by their profession. Consequently, it is not in spite of but because of the fact that they 
are also civilians that they are able to interpret soldiering as morally right.
Second, this research zoomed in on the stories of veterans who reported distress related 
to moral challenges, to examine what the moral challenges and experiences of distress 
of morally distressed veterans entail. This investigation showed that the aforementioned 
cognitive strategies can fail: the moral complexity of situations cannot always be simplified 
and these situations cannot always be unequivocally justified or excused. At the same time, 
it turned out, this complexity often also made it impossible to unequivocally condemn 
these situations. The morally distressing experiences of which veterans spoke were often 
situations of value conflict, moral detachment and feelings of senselessness. These situations 
did not involve clear-cut experiences of wrongdoing (the focus of current studies on ‘moral 
injury’), and accordingly did not allow straightforward interpretations (which soldiers tend 
to employ). While veterans often blamed themselves or others, they usually also experienced 
uncertainty and conflict with respect to these judgments. That is, besides feelings of guilt, 
shame and anger, morally distressing events often engendered a profound sense of moral 
disorientation. Many veterans lost their trust not only in the goodness of both themselves 
and the world, but in the very notions of good and bad. This painful loss forced them to 
engage in an ethical struggle with previous moral expectations and beliefs, in an attempt to 
resolve the moral questions that had arisen and find moral re-orientation again.
Third, this research examined the role of political practices in experiences of moral 
distress. Specifically, it examined whether and how political decision-making and framing 
surrounding military missions may contribute to the emergence of particular morally 
distressing experiences for soldiers ‘on the ground’, both during and after deployment. 
The stories of Dutchbat and TFU veterans turned out to be remarkably similar with respect 
to political factors, and further analysis showed that these similarities were related to 
the fact that at the political level as well, the Dutchbat and TFU missions had far more in 
common than not. To be sure, compared to the Dutchbat mission, the TFU mission had a 
clearer mandate, more means and possibilities and an improved mental health care system. 
However, at a more fundamental level the two missions turned out to be characterized 
by similar unresolved conflicts, including (1) discrepancies between the why (overarching 
purpose), what (objectives) and how (means and possibilities) of the mission, (2) ambiguity 
regarding the why, what and how of the mission, (3) discrepancies between soldiers’ 
operational experience and political narratives, before, during and after the mission, and 
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(4) lack of political acknowledgment of such issues and thus of the role of political practices 
in distressing experiences. As became evident, when problems on the political level 
remain unresolved, they will likely affect soldiers on the micro-level. Moreover, political 
compromises do not always mean that problems are solved. On the contrary, rather than 
achieving true reconciliation of conflicting views and interests, compromises may mean 
that conflicts are left to the lower levels to deal with. As a result, veterans’ stories showed, 
soldiers may develop profound feelings of political betrayal and, in turn, seek reparations 
from the political leadership.
Fourth, this research gained insight into the role of public perceptions of military 
missions and the military in general in experiences of moral distress. Specifically, this 
part of the study focused on the public criticism that Dutchbat veterans faced and the mixed 
reactions that the TFU mission evoked. Despite the differences in public response, the two 
groups revealed many striking parallels. The research findings showed that not only public 
criticism but also admiration may be experienced as misrecognition, and that perceived 
societal misrecognition may directly and indirectly contribute to moral distress. At the same 
time, it became clear that it is not just soldiers and veterans who may struggle with the moral 
significance of military intervention, but society as well. Yet, in the two examined missions 
this led to the opposite of mutual rapprochement between veterans and society. Public 
debates seem to resolve potential discomfort through orderly narratives of perpetrator 
and victim, normal and abnormal, and good and evil, which many veterans experienced 
as societal misrecognition and accordingly led to a sense of estrangement. In fact, this 
experience of societal misrecognition often engendered not only a sense of estrangement 
from society, but also from themselves.
Fifth, this research compared and integrated the abovementioned insights with the 
current concept of moral injury, in order to refine the concept. In the current concept, a 
person’s moral beliefs are implicitly understood as a coherent system, a potentially morally 
injurious experience is defined as an individually perpetrated moral transgression, and moral 
injury is conceptualized as blame of self and/or others. In the refined concept developed in 
this research, moral beliefs are understood as a complex, ‘messy’ constellation. As potentially 
morally injurious experiences, experiences of moral failure, political violations of trust and 
dependency and societal misrecognition were added to the concept. The possible responses 
included experiences of moral disorientation, political betrayal and estrangement from 
oneself and society as well as ethical struggle, a search for political reparations and a desire 
for societal recognition.
Finally, this study reflected on practical implications of these theoretical insights 
for the individual/interpersonal, military, political and societal level. In doing so, 
several valuable approaches to military practice and deployment-related suffering emerged, 
including a more elaborate moral vocabulary, the decision-making framework of the Just 
War Tradition, and purification and reintegration practices. These approaches share several 
crucial characteristics: they recognize the existence of moral distress, they do it justice 
by considering guilt and anger as possibly appropriate feelings, they offer a language and 
practice for moral complexity, they stress both individual responsibility and contextual 
factors, and they acknowledge the inevitability and at times insolvability of moral conflict. 
Samenvatting
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Militaire interventie is een collectieve onderneming die een grote morele impact kan hebben 
op militairen. Hoewel dit al lang bekend is, besteden de meeste huidige conceptualiseringen 
van militair lijden nauwelijks aandacht aan morele en sociaal-politieke aspecten. Huidige 
begrippen zoals ‘posttraumatische stressstoornis’ richten zich op angstgerelateerde 
pathologie in plaats van op morele conflicten, en meer op de psyche van de militair dan op 
de mensen die militairen op een missie sturen en ze weer terug ontvangen. Om deze lacunes 
te vullen onderzocht deze studie potentiële morele dimensies van uitzendgerelateerde 
problematiek en de rol van politieke en maatschappelijke factoren hierin. De focus van dit onderzoek ligt op het relatief nieuwe begrip ‘morele verwonding’, dat verwijst naar het lijden dat kan ontstaan  wanneer iemands verwachtingen en overtuigingen over goed en kwaad en persoonlijke goedheid geweld aan worden gedaan, door zichzelf of door anderen. Het begrip is al snel omarmd in zowel het academische als maatschappelijke discours, maar bevindt zich nog in de ontwikkelingsfase. Hoewel het begrip expliciet bedoeld is om de morele aspecten te vatten die huidige traumamodellen niet meenemen, concentreert het zich voornamelijk op de ‘verwonding’ en maar weinig op het ‘morele’. Net als huidige traumamodellen laat het bovendien de bredere context van uitzendgerelateerd lijden buiten beschouwing. 
Deze tekortkomingen zijn vertaald in de volgende onderzoeksdoelstelling: bij te dragen 
aan het empirische en theoretische begrip van morele, politieke en maatschappelijke 
dimensies van uitzendgerelateerd moreel lijden, en daarmee bij te dragen aan het concept 
‘morele verwonding’ en aan praktische interventies om moreel lijden aan te pakken en 
te voorkomen. (Om verwarring te voorkomen en om expliciet de reïficatie te vermijden die 
onderzoek naar psychologische concepten vaak plaagt, is een onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
‘morele verwonding’, dat een specifiek concept is, en ‘moreel lijden’, een label dat is gecreëerd 
om te verwijzen naar het verschijnsel dat dit specifieke concept tracht te vangen.)
Om de onderzoeksdoelstelling te bereiken is allereerst een interdisciplinair theoretisch 
raamwerk ontwikkeld dat verschillende perspectieven op het gebied van psychologie, 
filosofie, antropologie en politieke wetenschappen integreert. Dit maakte het mogelijk 
om de overwegend psychologische benadering die het huidige concept hanteert uit te 
breiden naar een meer omvattend perspectief. Om diepgaand inzicht te krijgen in potentiële 
morele en sociaal-politieke dimensies van moreel lijden zijn twee kwalitatieve casestudy’s 
uitgevoerd onder (1) Dutchbat-veteranen, die uitgezonden zijn geweest naar Srebrenica, 
voormalig Joegoslavië, en (2) TFU-veteranen, die uitgezonden zijn geweest naar Uruzgan, 
Afghanistan. Aan de hand van in totaal 80 diepte-interviews (40 per casus) onderzocht dit 
onderzoek morele dimensies van ervaringen van moreel lijden onder deze veteranen, tijdens 
en na uitzending, en de rol van politieke praktijken en publieke percepties in ervaringen van 
moreel lijden. Hoewel aanvankelijk het plan was om de Dutchbat-missie, als een ‘blauwhelm’-
vredesmissie, te vergelijken met de TFU-missie, als een counterinsurgency-missie inclusief 
vechten, bleken de twee casussen opvallend vergelijkbaar wat betreft morele, politieke en 
maatschappelijke dimensies van moreel lijden.
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Als eerst, en voordat het onderzoek zich toespitste op verhalen van moreel lijden, werd 
onderzocht hoe militairen hun beroep in de eerste plaats zien en welke cognitieve 
strategieën zij gebruiken om te copen met morele uitdagingen tijdens en na de 
uitzending. Dit, om beter te begrijpen waarom en wanneer moreel lijden ontstaat. Uit de 
onderzoeksresultaten bleek dat militairen over het algemeen niet zoveel morele spanningen 
ervaren als men zou kunnen verwachten gezien hun omstandigheden. Tegelijkertijd 
lieten de bevindingen ook zien dat dit niet betekent dat ze nooit spanning ervaren, en 
wanneer ze dat wel doen hebben ze de neiging om rechtvaardigende simplificeringen 
te gebruiken om zo deze spanning op te lossen, bouwend op de overtuiging dat alle 
situaties uiteindelijk ongecompliceerd en oplosbaar zijn. Morele uitdagingen lijken 
relatief vaak voor te komen tijdens zowel vredesmissies als gevechtsoperaties, en hoewel 
de specifieke inhoud van de rechtvaardigende simplificeringen die militairen gebruiken in 
vredesmissies en gevechtsoperaties kan variëren, zijn ze in essentie opmerkelijk gelijk aan 
elkaar. Geconfronteerd met morele uitdagingen tijdens uitzending vertellen militairen 
zichzelf bijvoorbeeld dat ‘sommige dingen gewoon gebeuren in oorlog’, of hanteren ze 
formules zoals ‘ik moet gewoon instructies opvolgen’, ‘het was hij of ik’ of ‘ik behandel 
hen zoals ze mij behandelen’. Om potentiële spanningen op te lossen tussen het zijn van 
zowel militair als burger blijken militairen geneigd tot het compartimentaliseren van hun 
militaire en civiele zelf, waarbij ze in militaire contexten prioriteit geven aan de eerste 
terwijl ze de laatste in andere contexten laten prevaleren. Bovendien beschouwen velen deze 
compartimentalisering, waarvan zij zich vaak bewust blijken, als de noodzakelijke last die 
hun beroep vereist. Hierdoor is het niet ondanks maar dankzij het feit dat zij ook burgers zijn 
dat zij het militaire beroep als moreel juist kunnen zien.
Ten tweede zoomde dit onderzoek in op de verhalen van veteranen die psychische 
problematiek rapporteerden, om te onderzoeken wat de morele uitdagingen en ervaringen 
van lijden van moreel ‘verwonde’ veteranen inhouden. Hieruit bleek dat bovengenoemde 
cognitieve strategieën kunnen falen: de morele complexiteit van bepaalde situaties kan niet 
altijd worden vereenvoudigd en deze situaties kunnen niet altijd ondubbelzinnig worden 
gerechtvaardigd of verontschuldigd. Tegelijkertijd bleek dat, vanwege deze complexiteit, 
veteranen vaak ook niet in staat waren om deze situaties ondubbelzinnig te veroordelen. 
De ervaringen waarover veteranen spraken waren vaak situaties van waardeconflict, morele 
loskoppeling en gevoelens van zinloosheid. Deze situaties betroffen geen ondubbelzinnige 
ervaringen van morele schendingen (die wel de focus zijn van huidig onderzoek naar ‘morele 
verwonding’) en stonden daarom geen eenduidige interpretaties toe (die militairen normaal 
gesproken geneigd zijn te hanteren). Hoewel veteranen zichzelf en/of anderen deze situaties 
vaak kwalijk namen, ervoeren ze vaak ook onzekerheid en conflicten met betrekking tot 
deze oordelen. Dat wil zeggen, naast schuldgevoelens, schaamte en boosheid ervoeren zij 
vaak ook een sterk gevoel van morele desoriëntatie. Zij verloren niet alleen hun vertrouwen 
in de goedheid van zowel zichzelf als de wereld om heen, maar ook in de noties van goed 
en slecht als zodanig. Dit pijnlijke verlies dwong hen ertoe een ethische strijd aan te gaan, 
een worsteling met vroegere morele verwachtingen en overtuigingen, als een poging om de 
morele vragen die waren ontstaan op te lossen, zoekend naar morele heroriëntatie.
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Ten derde onderzocht dit onderzoek de rol van politieke praktijken in ervaringen 
van moreel lijden. Meer specifiek werd onderzocht of en hoe politieke besluitvorming en 
‘framing’ rondom militaire missies bijdroegen aan het ontstaan van moreel verwondende 
ervaringen voor militairen ‘on the ground’, zowel tijdens als na hun uitzending. De verhalen 
van Dutchbat- en TFU-veteranen bleken opvallend gelijk aan elkaar wat betreft politieke 
factoren, en verdere analyse liet zien dat deze gelijkenissen gerelateerd waren aan het feit dat 
de Dutchbat- en TFU-missies ook op politiek niveau veel meer met elkaar gemeen hadden dan 
niet. In vergelijking met de Dutchbat-missie had de TFU-missie zonder meer een duidelijker 
mandaat, meer middelen en mogelijkheden en een verbeterde geestelijke gezondheidszorg. 
Maar op meer fundamenteel niveau bleken de twee missies gekenmerkt door vergelijkbare 
onopgeloste conflicten, waaronder (1) discrepanties tussen het waarom (overkoepelend 
doel), wat (doelstellingen) en hoe (middelen en mogelijkheden) van de missie, (2) ambiguïteit 
met betrekking tot het waarom, wat en hoe van de missie, (3) discrepanties tussen de 
operationele ervaring van militairen en politieke narratieven, voor, tijdens en na de missie, 
en (4) gebrek aan politieke erkenning van dergelijke kwesties en dus van de rol van politieke 
praktijken in psychische problematiek onder militairen. De onderzoeksbevindingen lieten 
zien dat wanneer problemen op politiek niveau onopgelost blijven, ze waarschijnlijk 
hun doorwerking zullen hebben op militairen op het microniveau. Bovendien bleek dat 
politieke compromissen niet altijd betekenen dat problemen worden opgelost. Integendeel, 
compromissen kunnen betekenen dat conflicten aan de lagere niveaus worden overgelaten 
in plaats van dat daadwerkelijke synthese van tegengestelde opvattingen en belangen wordt 
bereikt. Als gevolg hiervan kunnen militairen diepgaande gevoelens van politiek verraad 
ontwikkelen en op hun beurt reparaties van het politieke domein gaan zoeken.
Ten vierde heeft dit onderzoek inzicht verkregen in de rol van publieke percepties van 
militaire missies en de krijgsmacht in ervaringen van moreel lijden. Meer specifiek 
richtte dit onderzoeksdeel zich op de publieke kritiek waarmee Dutchbat-veteranen werden 
geconfronteerd en de gemengde reacties die de TFU-missie opriep. Ondanks deze verschillen 
in publieke respons lieten de twee groepen opnieuw veel opvallende overeenkomsten zien. 
Zo werd duidelijk dat niet alleen maatschappelijke kritiek maar ook bewondering kan 
worden ervaren als miskenning, en dat maatschappelijke miskenning direct en indirect kan 
bijdragen aan moreel lijden. Tegelijkertijd bleek dat het niet alleen militairen en veteranen 
zijn die kunnen worstelen met de morele betekenis van militaire interventie, maar dat dit 
ook geldt voor de samenleving als geheel. Echter, in de twee onderzochte missies leidde dit 
tot het tegenovergestelde van onderlinge toenadering tussen veteranen en samenleving. In 
publieke debatten leek eventueel ongemak te worden opgelost door middel van ordelijke 
verhalen van dader en slachtoffer, normaal en abnormaal, en goed en kwaad, wat veel 
veteranen ervoeren als maatschappelijke miskenning en wat daardoor leidde tot een gevoel 
van vervreemding. Bovendien leidde deze ervaring van maatschappelijke miskenning vaak 
niet alleen tot vervreemding van de samenleving, maar ook van henzelf.
Ten vijfde werden de bovengenoemde inzichten vergeleken en geïntegreerd met het 
huidige begrip van morele verwonding, om zo tot een meer verfijnd concept te komen. 
In het huidige begrip worden de morele overtuigingen van een persoon impliciet begrepen 
als een samenhangend systeem, een potentieel moreel verwondende ervaring wordt 
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gedefinieerd als een individueel begane morele overtreding, en morele verwonding wordt 
geconceptualiseerd als veroordeling van het ‘zelf’ of anderen. In het verfijnde concept dat 
is ontwikkeld in dit onderzoek, worden morele overtuigingen begrepen als een complexe, 
‘rommelige’ constellatie. Als potentieel moreel schadelijke ervaringen zijn ervaringen van 
moreel falen, politieke schending van vertrouwen en afhankelijkheid, en maatschappelijke 
miskenning toegevoegd aan het concept. Als mogelijke reacties op dergelijke ervaringen 
zijn ervaringen van morele desoriëntatie, politiek verraad en vervreemding van zichzelf 
en de samenleving toegevoegd, evenals ethische worsteling, een zoektocht naar politieke 
reparaties en een verlangen naar maatschappelijke erkenning.
Ten slotte werd gereflecteerd op praktische implicaties van deze theoretische inzichten 
voor het individuele/interpersoonlijke, militaire, politieke en maatschappelijke 
niveau. Hieruit kwamen verschillende waardevolle benaderingen van de militaire praktijk 
en uitzendgerelateerd lijden voort, waaronder een meer uitgebreide morele vocabulaire, 
het besluitvormingskader van de Traditie van de Rechtvaardige Oorlog, en praktijken van 
purificatie en re-integratie. Deze benaderingen hebben enkele cruciale kenmerken met 
elkaar gemeen: ze erkennen het bestaan van moreel lijden en doen hier recht aan door 
morele oordelen te overwegen als mogelijk gepast; ze bieden adequate taal en praktijken 
voor morele complexiteit; ze benadrukken zowel individuele verantwoordelijkheid als 
contextuele factoren, en ze erkennen de onvermijdelijkheid en soms onoplosbaarheid van 
morele conflicten.
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